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*THE LITERATURE OF ISRAEL.**

THE reader of the Old Testament who consults the traditional beliefs as to the date and authorship of the several books, is asked to believe that the Pentateuch, or Law, was written by Moses, some thirteen or fifteen centuries before the birth of Jesus.

After this he is (or ought to be) perplexed to find a period of about five centuries of comparative barbarism, during which a highly organised nation has fallen into a loose federation of clans, an elaborate ritual with a jealously exclusive official clergy has been superseded by a crude and uncouth cultus presided over by an irregular and personal priesthood, and the trained strength of a disciplined army coextensive with a victorious nation has disappeared, leaving the oppressed Israelites dependent upon flashes of individual and undisciplined valour for even temporary relief from their sufferings.

Almost without warning the docile reader is now hurried from the wild and barbaric virtues and vices of the period of the judges into the marvellous spiritual depth and maturity of the Psalms, and is asked to believe that the hero who stood with one foot in the period of Gideon and

* *Die Geschichte der Heiligen Schriften Alten Testaments.* Entworfen von EDUARD REUSS. Braunschweig. 1882.

Jephthah (to say nothing as yet of his own doings and beliefs) composed those portions of the Old Testament which stand nearer than any others to the feelings and aspirations of Christianity.

Again we leap over two or three centuries, during which not even the faintest after-vibrations of David's harp are to be heard, and we are then startled by the apparition of the prophets—true sons of the earth, in the freshness and verve of their appeal, speaking like men whom a sudden sense of what should be has startled and horrified by its contrast with what is, and who turn in all the passion of new-born conviction to force the truth upon a heedless or astonished world.

A few centuries more, and all is plunged into sudden darkness. For five hundred years before the birth of Christ, Israel, to the ordinary reader of the Bible, is without a religious history.

Ecclesiastical tradition has had its own way of evolving order out of the chaos. The whole of the Old Testament has been strung upon the golden thread of prophecy concerning the Christ. Darkly shadowed forth by type and symbol in the Mosaic dispensation, foreseen and sung by the Royal Psalmist, the Christ appears in the very details of his divine function, and the manifold splendour of his sacred titles, in the revelations of the prophets. And thus the succession Law, Psalms, Prophets, is not only that of the traditional chronology, but appears fairly to conform to the only line of internal development which the traditional view recognises.*

It is not so easy to explain why the free school of historical criticism which unhesitatingly rejected what we may call the Messianic Synthesis of Hebrew literature long remained attached to a great, if not the greater, part of the old conception of the relative chronology of the Old Testament books. From the position to which modern researches have at last led us, it is difficult to understand

* Cf. Kuenen, *The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel*. Pp. 2—4.

how some of the old ideas could resist so much as the first touch of a critical method of inquiry, or an attempt to discover the lines of a really historical development; for the truths which were only reached by a series of laborious and acute investigations extending over many decades, now strike us as almost self-evident.

To the venerable scholar, whose latest work is cited at the head of this article, belongs the credit of having instinctively grasped the chief results of the newest school of criticism—so far as they affect the main lines of literary chronology—very nearly fifty years ago; and he has the singular satisfaction of expanding in his old age, as a recognised leader of the dominant school, those very theses which he hardly ventured to throw out in their audacious novelty, when he first appeared, as a young and almost unknown scholar, above the theological horizon.

It is, indeed, strange to think how recently critical authority has fallen into line with common sense, and has presented us with a view of the literature of Israel capable of appealing successfully to the feelings and impressions which every intelligent reader of the Bible, learned or unlearned, must have experienced in attempting to conceive of the Old Testament as a chapter of human history; but we may now boldly assert (and may congratulate Professor Reuss as we do so) that modern criticism has arrived at conclusions attached with equal firmness at the one end to exhaustive technical investigations, and at the other to clear and coherent historical results—results which can hardly fail to secure the assent of the thoughtful public when once they are clearly grasped.

It will be the purpose of a series of articles, by various hands, to lay before the readers of the *Modern Review* some of these results, freed from scholastic technicalities, and exhibited in their vital connection with the growth and development of Israel's religion.

In the following pages, which are intended as an introduction to the series, I shall confine myself to a rough attempt to explain the grounds on which Professor Reuss and others substitute the series Prophets, Law, Psalms, for

the series Law, Psalms, Prophets, and to indicate, in the merest outline, the bearings of this substitution upon the treatment of Israel's religious history. If I can succeed in thus rendering the general framework distinct and comprehensible to the reader's mind, he will, I hope, go on to the study of special portions of the subject with some clue to their wider significance, and be able to appreciate the relative importance of the various questions discussed.

To begin, then, with the Law. If we look through the "Five Books of Moses" we can hardly repress our amazement that in their present form they could ever have been supposed to stand at the opening of Israelitish history—so obviously have they a long Israelitish history *behind* them. It would be as easy to persuade a geologist that a sandstone or even a conglomerate dated (as Miss Bremer puts it) from "the first creative day," as to persuade a critic, or any intelligent reader in whom the critical faculties have been roused, that the Pentateuch is without a long history of growth and consolidation. In a word, the "Law" reveals itself, even to the casual and superficial reader, as a literary "deposit-rock." Embedded in its very centre appear again and again fragments that tell us they were wrenched from some distant cliff of civilisation or barbarism wholly different in character from those that have contributed the surrounding matter; fossils of belief or custom lie preserved in the successive layers to tell how widely human life and thought differed at the several epochs in which the strata were deposited; and (to drop the metaphor) side by side in motley contrast and variety lie the maturest and the crudest products of the religious imagination.

In the very first pages of our Bible the contrast forces itself upon us. What is there in common between the majestic Elohim (God) of the first creation story, evolving from chaos by his creative word the orderly successions of nature, and the half-human Yahveh (the LORD, or Jehovah) fashioning the moistened earth into a man, blowing the life-breath into his nostrils, and taking a rib out of his side as he

sleeps, closing the flesh over its vacant place, and "building" a woman out of it? *

Or, again, what is there in common between the Yahveh of Genesis, who fears the rivalry of man, should the fruit of the tree of life be added to that of the tree of knowledge, or should the success of the tower of Babel provoke bolder attempts, or who sits and eats with Abraham and rebukes Sarah for laughing at his words behind his back, and the Yahveh of Deuteronomy, the lord of nations, the divine object of Israel's gratitude and devotion?

Or, to take another class of phenomena, what contrast could be sharper than that between the express statement on the one hand, "In all places where thou shalt celebrate my name I will come unto thee, and I will bless thee" (Ex. xx. 24, according to the original reading), and the anxious limitation of worship to a single altar, which runs through the whole body of the legislation, on the other hand? Or what more striking instance is there of an incongruous and, as it stands, incomprehensible survival embedded in a system to which it is wholly foreign than is supplied by the ceremonies of the great day of atonement and the part that the demon Azazel plays in them? (Lev. xvi., where we should read "Azazel" instead of "the scapegoat"). And how is the attentive reader startled when he finds towards the end of the concluding chapter of Leviticus the tranquil remark that if a human being has been "devoted" or vowed to Yahveh, he must, under no circumstances, be "redeemed," but must "surely be put to death"!

These are but specimens of innumerable phenomena which lead irresistibly to two conclusions: 1st, that there are in the Pentateuch (and book of Joshua) several distinct strata of narrative and legislative matter; 2nd, that each great stratum is itself in larger or smaller degree a "deposit," composed of various and often incongruous elements.

Confining ourselves to the consideration of the great strata, we at once perceive that the Book of Deuteronomy

* The stately language of the Authorised Version partly veils the sharpness of the contrast; but it still remains clear enough even to the English reader.

stands by itself. This is so obvious that it has always been recognised in some fashion, and is expressed in the very name given to the book by the old Greek translators, and thence (through the Vulgate) adopted by ourselves. A little familiarity with the very marked characteristics of tone, style, and language that distinguish this book will soon enable the reader to detect a few scattered passages in Exodus and considerable sections of Joshua as unmistakably belonging to the same "formation," though possibly not from the hand of the same individual author.

When we have cut out the Deuteronomic passages, the remainder falls again into two great divisions. The contrast between the first and second creation stories in Genesis may give us a first clue to their division, and a careful investigation reveals the fact that the former narrative is the beginning of a continuous work which may be traced all through the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua, though the fragments into which it has been split are often separated by intervening masses of other matter. This work has been called "The Book of Origins" or "The Priestly Codex."

After the removal of all this, there still remains a complex mass of narrative (with a comparatively small amount of legislative matter) that is itself anything but uniform. Different designations of the divine being, varying and conflicting accounts of the same thing, and differing expressions and literary artifices indicate once more a twofold origin; but here the results of a literary analysis fail to reveal any noteworthy differences of religious conception or level of general culture between the two documents, though each of them contains traditions adopted from earlier and ruder times. In a word, each is a conglomerate, and each has its own peculiarities of formation; but there is nothing to indicate an important difference either in the dates or the component elements of the two. This composite narrative, which appears at one time to have had an independent existence, is sometimes called the work of the "Prophetic Narrators."

Here, then, we may pause, and may briefly characterise

the three great strata, the existence of which has been pointed out.

To the work of the Prophetic Narrators we owe almost all the graphic and pathetic touches that endear the stories of Genesis to us, together with much that is picturesque in Exodus and Numbers; but, on the other hand, nearly all that shocks our sense of reverence in the representations of the deity, and by far the greater number of those passages which surprise us by their naively primitive morality—or immorality—belong to the same group. The deity of this literature is essentially of the same family as those of the heathen nations. Passionate and capricious, but gracious and generous to his favourites, the Yahveh or Elohim of the Prophetic Narrators is tolerably indifferent to such offences as theft or lying,* but already shows the incipiently ethical character he had assumed in the eyes of his worshippers by the sternness with which he visits the grosser violations of the moral law. Occasionally the touch of a grander conception shows that the writers already stood upon a higher spiritual level than that of the traditional matter they handled, and indicates clearly enough that possibilities of religious development were not wanting in the atmosphere in which they lived.

We are therefore the less surprised to note the strongly ethical character of the legislation which is associated with the work of these narrators. It is found principally in Ex. xxi.—xxiii. 19. This primitive, but just and enlightened code lays far more stress on social and moral than on ceremonial matters. It assumes (as an allied fragment—see Ex. xx. 24—expressly states) that worship might be legitimately conducted at any suitable place. It pre-supposes that every Hebrew lives within easy distance of a sanctuary. It gives not the slightest indication of any exclusive hereditary or official claim to the priesthood, and, indeed, rather implies than states the existence of any priests at all. This code has been called "The Book of the Covenant."

When we turn to Deuteronomy, we find ourselves in a

* This seems to apply with much greater force to the work of one of the Prophetic Narrators than to that of the other.

very different atmosphere; but the work of the Prophetic Narrators is everywhere presupposed. The numerous references to historical and legendary matter which we meet with in the Deuteronomic writings invariably find their explanation in the work of the Prophetic Narrators, while the Deuteronomic legislation constantly builds upon and carries out that of the Book of the Covenant.

From a religious point of view, however, there is a very marked advance. The keynote of the whole book is struck in Deut. vi. 4, 5, "Hear, O Israel: Yahveh our God, Yahveh is One; and thou shalt love Yahveh thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might." The passion of loyalty which breathes through the work makes it one of the most stirring appeals that ever fell from human lips, and even the details of the ceremonial legislation that has now assumed such ample proportions are, on the one hand, interwoven with the precepts of a tender and human morality, and, on the other hand, inspired by an intensity and directness of religious consciousness that raises them out of the region of pure ceremonial. There is, doubtless, much that, as a matter of fact, is almost purely traditional in the observances enjoined by the Deuteronomist, but his living zeal lays hold of everything and transforms all that he approves into an act of direct loyalty and homage to Yahveh, all that he denounces into a more than formal apostasy. The fact is, that in his precepts we feel that a genuinely formative principle is at work, and that religious instinct goes hand in hand with priestly tradition in severing the practices that will bind Yahveh's people more closely to him from those that have the taint of idolatry upon them and will lead the unwary worshipper astray.

To the Deuteronomist there is but one lawful sanctuary—the place where Yahveh has set his name. All sacrifice elsewhere is idolatry. And there is but one tribe—that of Levi—by whom the priesthood can be filled. There is no distinction, however, between the priests and the ordinary Levites. In matters of ritual, then, the Deuteronomist shows

an advance in discipline and organisation upon the Book of the Covenant, but as yet knows nothing of the elaborate system with which the central books of the Pentateuch make us familiar, and which confines the priesthood proper to the family of Aaron, relegating all other Levites to subordinate or even servile offices in connection with the sanctuary.

Lastly comes the Book of Origins, partly narrative, but chiefly legislative. The author of this great work has laid down its main lines with so firm and masterly a hand that although he does not even approach the Prophetic Narrators in graphic power or the Deuteronomist in eloquence and fervour, he has, nevertheless, stamped his chief conceptions indelibly upon the mind of all after generations. His *résumé* of history and his scheme of legislation hold undisputed sway as the received version, and succeed in giving the reader his dominant and abiding impressions. When we speak of "the Law," it is invariably the ideas of this author that are, consciously or unconsciously, in our minds.

The unequalled sublimity of the opening passage of the Book of Origins tells how Elohim (God) created the heavens and the earth, and, at the very beginning of the world's history, instituted the observance of the Sabbath day. Still as Elohim he appeared to Noah after the flood and made a covenant with him, of which the rainbow was the token and by which the greatest of all moral and ceremonial transgressions (murder and the eating of blood) were prohibited. Later on, as El Shaddai (God Almighty), he singled out Abraham and his family for the privilege of a closer union with himself, of which the rite of circumcision became the token; and, finally, as Yahveh, he chose Moses for his prophet and Aaron for his priest, and entered into his eternal covenant with the people of Israel.

In this preliminary historical sketch we already note the two main characteristics of our author—his love of system and his devotion to ceremonial observances. By the successive institutions and precepts gradually revealed we are led up to the great legislative scheme that forms the body of his work; and the orderly evolution and systematic

framework of the patriarchal history finds its counterpart in the elaborate and symmetrical impossibilities of the account of Israel's march through the wilderness and final settlement in Canaan.

It is, as already hinted, in the legislative portions of his work that we find the true purpose of the author of the Book of Origins. All else is introduction or supplement. On comparing his legislation with that of the Deuteronomist we find unmistakable proof of his later date. The simple assignment of the priesthood to the tribe of Levi has grown into a scheme by which the ordinary Levites are degraded to the lower offices, the priesthood is confined to a single family and the highest functions of the priesthood itself to a single individual. Moreover, an anxious scrupulosity and occasionally a certain feebleness have taken the place of the Deuteronomist's inspired zeal. The connection between the ceremonial injunctions and the sanctity they aim at securing has become less vital and immediate, more arbitrary and technical; tradition and system have taken the place of any formative principle. The Law has become an end almost more than a means, a life rather than a manifestation of life. In a word, we find ourselves at last in the atmosphere with which we are rendered familiar by the general impression of Jewish piety left on our minds by reading the Pentateuch—and by studying the New Testament.

The sketch just given brings out with sufficient clearness the internal evidence of the Pentateuch as to the relative antiquity of its several strata. The external evidence is quite as striking and is in entire harmony with it. We know from the twenty-second and twenty-third chapters of the second Book of Kings that in the eighteenth year of King Josiah (say B.C. 621) a book of the Law of Yahveh was "discovered," which the king, deeply moved, proceeded to make the basis of a sweeping reformation. This book (as will be shown in a subsequent article, by another hand) was the substance of Deuteronomy. In perfect agreement with this we find that the literature of the period intervening

between Josiah's reign and the return from the Captivity (*e.g.*, Jeremiah and Kings), shews direct acquaintance with the contents of Deuteronomy, while never presupposing (but implicitly excluding) the existence of the Book of Origins.

On the other hand, when we go back to the prophets of the eighth century B.C. (Amos, Hosea, Micah, Isaiah), who lived before Josiah's reign, we find in their writings not the smallest indication of acquaintance with Deuteronomy, but abundant proof of familiarity with the substance of the stories known to us through the "Prophetic Narrators."

Thus in the eighth century literature we find direct proof of the existence of the earliest stratum of the Pentateuch (Prophetic Narrators), and indirect proof that the other two strata did not exist. At the end of the seventh century we have an account of the discovery and introduction of Deuteronomy. In the sixth century we have direct proof of acquaintance with the Deuteronomic literature, and indirect (but very strong) proof that the Book of Origins did not exist. And finally we read that in the fifth century Ezra came from Babylon to Jerusalem "with the law of his God in his hand"* (B.C. 458), and in conjunction with Nehemiah enforced a code which we recognise as that of the Book of Origins† (B.C. 444). Henceforth the literature (*e.g.* Chronicles) bears unmistakable evidence of acquaintance with the system of the Book of Origins and acceptance of its authority.

If anything were wanting to complete the chain of evidence it would be found in the unquestioned fact that pious Israelites are shown by history not to have conformed to the special precepts even of Deuteronomy in the time of the Judges and early monarchs, while evidence is sought in vain for any kind of observance of the special precepts of the Book of Origins before the time of Ezra.

Our examination has already led us in substance to reverse the traditional succession of "Law and Prophets," in favour of "Prophets and Law," and we have reached the conclusion (which ought not to be a startling one) that

* Ezra vii. 14. † Nehemiah viii.—and Ezra and Nehemiah *passim*.

that portion of the Old Testament which throws most light upon the outward forms and regulations of Jewish piety in the time of Jesus belongs not to the earlier, but relatively to the later formations of Hebrew literature.*

But before we can make any satisfactory use of the knowledge we have gained another great question remains to be settled. What is the relative and approximate date of the bulk of the Psalms?

What most people want in history is not consecutive and coherent ideas, but vivid and fascinating pictures. Such a picture is furnished by the "royal psalmist," the "sweet singer of Israel," the shepherd-boy whose shepherd was the Lord.

It is not easy to dislodge an idea that is rooted in pious associations by appeals to the historical, or even to the moral and religious sense; and although one would think that both the Psalms themselves and the David of history must be the gainers by the severance of the monstrous union that has been established between them,† yet it is probable that few critical opinions are more offensive to the mass of even intelligent readers of the Bible than the conclusion that David did not write a single one of the Psalms.

Did the belief in David as the author of many of our Psalms rest upon any less potent or less unreasonable foundation than that of association, it would hardly survive a moment's reflection or investigation. It is undoubtedly possible that a man may write very beautiful religious poetry, and yet sink to actions of the utmost moral turpitude. Instances of the like are but too easy to find. Still it is stretching possibilities rather far to apply this theory to David as the reputed author of the Psalms. We must recollect that offences which we may well condone in a half-barbarous adventurer and despot such as David (with all the striking and generous traits of his character)

* In a note at the end of this article will be found a concise summary of the results of the literary analysis of the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua.

† Cf. Kuenen in *Modern Review*, October, 1890, pp. 697—702.

appears from history to have been, become unspeakably odious when thought of as committed by a man of refined and cultivated moral sense, quickened by intense religious fervour. But even if such a moral contradiction were possible; even if we were to declare (as seems often to be implicitly maintained), that the existence of such spiritual beauty side by side with such treachery, lust, and cruelty, is consoling and encouraging rather than revolting; it would still remain true that no man can belong to two totally distinct *epochs* of thought and feeling. We cannot conceive of *In Memoriam*, as written by St. Lewis or Alfred the Great. Such a supposition would involve no moral or religious absurdity, but would be a gross violation of psychological chronology. In like manner, even if David had been as saintly as the French or the English King I have named, we should still say, it is impossible that the same man pathetically complained, when exiled from Palestine, that he was "driven out from the land of Yahveh, and bidden to go and serve other gods" (1 Sam. xxvi. 19), and cried to the same Yahveh, "Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?" that he hung the seven sons of Saul to appease the wrath of Yahveh (2 Sam. xxi.), and said, "Thou desirest not sacrifice, else would I give it;" that he wrote the most spiritual religious poetry in the Old Testament, and had an image of a household god (teraphim) close at hand on an emergency (1 Sam. xix. 13). It is not a question of inconsistency of character, but one of widely-severed epochs of religious life and development. Were we not blinded by the tradition, and, therefore, possessed by an idea of David derived from the Psalms themselves, we should see how exquisitely impossible the tradition is.

But we may approach the investigation from another side. As we read the Psalms we can hardly fail to be struck by a few passages that proclaim themselves unmistakably as of high relative antiquity. Like ancient rocks thrust up through later deposits, they remain to tell the tale of earlier ages, lest we should suppose that things had always been as we see them now. Conspicuous amongst these antique

remnants of poetry are Psalm xxix. and the fragment preserved in Psalm xxiv. 7-10. It would, perhaps, be hard to cite a third specimen. Now these very Psalms, so obviously belonging to an earlier system than the rest, offer curious internal evidence as to their date. The former represents Yahveh as sitting in his heavenly palace (v. 9), and the latter obviously celebrates the return of Yahveh (*i.e.*, the ark of the covenant, cf. 1 Sam. iv. 3-9) from war, and his entering the temple doors at Jerusalem. But the temple was not built till the time of Solomon, and previously Yahveh was supposed to "walk in a tent," and not to "dwell in a house" (2 Sam. vii. 6). Hence he could neither be borne in triumph through the "gates" of an earthly temple, nor conceived by analogy as seated in a heavenly palace, until after the time of David. The earliest Psalms, then, are later than the building of Solomon's Temple.

If we now inquire how late we must bring down the composition of more modern Psalms, the answer we get is quite unequivocal. Some of the Psalms were composed as late as in the times of the Maccabees (say 166 B.C.). This can hardly be questioned. The general character of Psalms xliv., lxxiv., lxxix., is such that they cannot with any show of reason be assigned to any other period, and they abound in minute indications which confirm the truth of the conclusions to which a first inspection leads us.

It appears, therefore, that we have strong evidence in support of the statement that the stream of extant Hebrew Hymnology does not begin to flow till considerably later than the time of David, and continues at least till the time of the Maccabees.

Let us now consider the prevalent character of the Psalmic literature, and endeavour to ascertain the relationship in which it stands to the Prophets and the Law, which we may now regard as roughly fixed in their chronological positions.

When we compare the Psalms and the Prophets in their general aspects we can hardly doubt where the priority lies. The Prophets endeavour to *teach* Israel that which the Psalmists sing in the name of Israel. The Psalms, in short,

are the answer which tells—surely after no small interval of time—that the appeal of the Prophets had not been in vain. The prophetic teaching had in long years, nay, in the lapse of perhaps many generations, sunk at last into the hearts of the people, and it rises again, transformed and chastened, in the spontaneous devotion of the Psalms.

When we read the Prophets we are in the presence of great spiritual heroes who knew that they were almost completely alone in the midst of what, judged by their standard, must be pronounced a godless community. In the name of God they plead, they threaten, they entreat, they promise, they rebuke. Themselves, for the most part absolutely unshaken in their faith, with a personal religion of passionate intensity, they speak to men who, hearing, hear not, and in whose hearts even they themselves seem almost to despair of their own words waking an echo. In the Psalms we constantly recognise the utterances of a religious *community*, small indeed, surrounded by oppressors and scoffers, but itself united by a common hope, a common trust, a common love. The Prophets speak in the name of God to his rebellious and sinful people. The Psalmists speak to God in the name of his united worshippers. The fundamental religious conceptions are identical; but the side from which they are approached is completely changed even where the very words are almost identical. “To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? I am full of the burnt-offerings of rams and the fat of fed beasts,” says the Prophet, in the name of God; or “Rend your hearts and not your garments, and turn unto Yahveh your God!” And the Psalmist answers, after many years, in the name of a repentant people, “Thou desirest not sacrifice, else would I give it; thou delightest not in burnt offering. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise.” “Come, now, and let us reason together,” cries the Prophet, in the name of God. “Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red as crimson, they shall be as wool.” And the Psalmist gives back the yearning cry of the conscience

smitten, "Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean; wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow." "Though they dig down into the shadow-land (Sheol), thence shall mine hand take them," cries the Prophet, in the name of God; "though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down." "If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in the shadow-land, behold thou art there!" says the Psalmist. "I was like the husbandman, taking the yoke from the ox's neck and spreading the fodder before it," says the Prophet, in the name of God. "Yahveh is my shepherd, I shall not want," answers the Psalmist, in the name of Israel. "Can a woman forget her sucking child? Yea, she may forget, yet will I not forget you!" cries the Prophet, in the name of God. "When my father and my mother forsake me, then Yahveh takes me up," is the answer of the Psalmist, in the name of Israel.

In a word, the discourses of the Prophets are addressed to a people who have to be brought to a belief in the truths they preach. The Psalms rise from the heart of a people who already hold these truths as their dearest possession. The truths preached by the Prophets to those who, to all appearance, had eyes but saw not, and ears but heard not, were deeply rooted into the hearts of the men by whom and for whom the Psalms were written; and all that, in the old days, came to man in oracles from God by the mouth of his servants the Prophets, now ascended to God in prayer and praise in the music of the Psalmists.

The relation between the Prophets and the Psalms is hardly to be mistaken. If we ask which is the tree and which is the fruit, we cannot long hesitate as to our answer.

No less distinct is the answer we receive to the question, what is the relation of the Book of Psalms, as a whole, to the "Law of Moses," introduced by Ezra and Nehemiah.

To very many of the Psalmists "the Law" was not only well known, but had acquired a position of unquestioned religious supremacy, had become the object of a veneration in and for itself, which seem almost Talmudic in their character. "Blessed is the man," we read, "that

walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor standeth in the way of sinners, nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful. But his delight is in the Law of Yahveh, and in his Law doth he meditate day and night;" or, "While the princes gather together to take counsel against me, I meditate still on God's commandments. His testimonies are my delight, of them take I counsel!" This note recurs again and again in the Psalms. Even songs which had come down from more ancient times, and had nothing whatever in common with this sentiment of admiration for the detailed precepts of the law-givers, must be changed or supplemented to bring them into harmony with it. Devotion to the Law must, indeed, have been long established and deeply rooted before it can have been felt needful to supplement the hymn that opened with the majestic appeal to the testimony of nature,

The heavens declare the glory of God,
And the firmament showeth his handiwork,

with a glowing panegyric on the Mosaic Law with its thousand regulations—finer than gold, sweeter than honey, refreshing the soul, making the simple wise, perfect, joy-bringing, eternal!

And the Temple was the symbol of the Law. Round it and the worship it protected, the fondest hopes and memories of the devout Jew clung. The place it occupied in his religious conceptions in the third century B.C. may be inferred from the Books of Chronicles. And here again we find in the Psalms the reflection of the later phases of Jewish feeling. Not only do they throb with the deepest longing to take part in the temple worship—

A day in thy courts is better than a thousand.
I would rather be a door-keeper in the house of my God
than dwell in the tents of the wicked—

but they ring with the temple-music which the Chronicler takes delight in describing, and in this way, as in so many others, proclaim themselves in no doubtful terms "the hymn-book of the second Temple," though hardly as Prof.

Reuss would have us believe, "the hymn-book of the Synagogue."

Our conclusion, then, is plain enough, and again there is nothing in it that need surprise us. The Psalms, though some of them doubtless go far back into the prophetic and regal ages, belong on the whole to the later centuries of Jewish history, gravitate to the generations that succeeded Ezra, and form the third and last term of the series, Prophets, Law, Psalms. And what is it to assert this, save to assert that that book in which are most clearly reflected the deep and tender piety that alone made the work of Jesus possible, the formalism not only of outward observance, but even of inward feeling that made that work so hard, and the glow of vindictive hatred against the heathen that so constantly threatened to distort it, is not one of the earliest, but one of the latest books of the Bible?

And no sooner have we accepted these conclusions—based upon purely critical considerations, and not dictated by the exigencies of any philosophical scheme of history—than we find that an intelligible account of Israel's development becomes possible. The history that began with the Pentateuch and (after an interval of barbarism) the Psalms, that went on with the Prophets and ended in a silence and stagnation of five centuries was simply unintelligible. The history that begins with the Song of Deborah and the adventures of the strolling Levite (Judges v., xvii., xviii.), that goes on through David, Elijah, Elisha, Jehu, and the Prophetic Narrators, to the era of the great Prophets of the eighth century, Prophets and Lawgivers of the seventh and sixth, Lawgivers and Psalmists of the fifth and following centuries, is eminently intelligible, and moreover leads to the goal we know that it actually reached in the New Testament.

The reconstruction of the history of Israel's religion has, therefore, gone hand in hand with the reconstruction of the literary chronology of the Bible, and the main lines on which it has proceeded seem hardly likely to be reversed.* Ever

* These main lines (affecting the Law, the great Prophets, and the Psalms), which have been traced in the text, are common to Reuss and the school of Kuenen. Reuss, however, is inclined to place the books of Samuel

since Graf (himself a pupil of Reuss's) published his *Historical Books of the Old Testament* (1866), followed at no great interval by Kuenen's *Religion of Israel* (1869-1870), the consensus of unpledged opinion has tended with ever-increasing rapidity and certainty towards the conclusions that may now claim to have won their way to general recognition amongst the critics of Germany, Holland, and England. The unrivalled mastery with which Kuenen (who first perceived the far-reaching significance of the new critical conceptions) handled the subject, together with the uncompromising opposition with which the established critics of Germany at first met the revolution (for it was no less) in their science, fixed the name of "the Dutch school" upon the rising theory of Israelite literature and history; but Germany is now proud to dispute with Holland the priority of discovery, and will join as heartily as any of her sister countries in welcoming the volume—full, like all his works, of wit and wisdom—which the ever-youthful veteran of Strasburg has presented to us as (*absit omen*) his "last work."

Though nominally giving us a history of the sacred writings of the Old Testament, Professor Reuss has in reality presented us with a handbook alike to the history, the antiquities, and the literature of Israel; and it would be hard to find a guide with a brighter eye, a more elastic step, or a more winning smile than his. It is impossible to read the book without feeling as if one knew the author—with his affectionate regard for his colleagues and his pupils, his unconcealed pride in his magnificent library (a suspicion of any defect in which would evidently hurt him more than an attack on his own learning or candour), his constant earnestness, and his scarcely less constant sense of humour.

and Judges earlier than the Dutch scholars do, and, on the other hand, the gravitation of Psalms and Proverbs to a late period is more marked in his system than in theirs. The Books of Ruth and Job (about which last the Dutch critics are not themselves agreed) have no certain points of attachment in Reuss's system. He does not accept Kuenen's hypothesis that Ruth and Jonah emanate from the party that opposed Ezra and Nehemiah, but places the one earlier and the other later than their time. Minor points of difference might be multiplied.

Under such guidance it can hardly be the dry and thankless task it is sometimes supposed to trace the processes and results of modern criticism, and to see how they work into the modern conception of Israel's religious history.

I cannot here attempt, even in hasty outline, to sketch that history itself, as read in the light that now falls upon it; but in conclusion we may dwell for a moment on one of the great lessons it seems to teach—viz., that the end of one spiritual battle is almost necessarily the beginning of another, and the apparent victory of an ideal is seldom purchased save with an accompanying loss.

The prophetic monotheism of the eighth century B.C. is one of the most striking of historical phenomena. It was itself the outcome of a long and painful development, and to it our own religion may be traced distinctly back. No sooner had it become self-conscious than its votaries flung themselves with passionate intensity of conviction and devotion into the task of bringing home its truths to every heart in Israel. By their own preaching, and by the influence they could bring to bear upon some of the kings and nobles, they sought to gain their end. Again and again their attacks were beaten back by the selfishness or the superstition of their countrymen. It seemed as though their standard was too high, their religion too pure, to make way. They failed, generation after generation, but their religion seemed only to grow the purer and deeper. But at last the hour of their triumph came. Their principles were accepted and applied. But in that very application their purity was lost, and their fervour tempered. The mass of half-idolatrous custom and ritual against which the early prophets had inveighed was now consolidated by those who thought themselves (and, indeed, in one sense, were) their sincere disciples, and the victory of Prophetic Yahvism meant the death of prophecy and the deification of the ceremonial laws. Prophecy strove to assimilate the life of the nation. As long as it failed it remained pure. When it began to succeed it began *itself to be assimilated*. Yet the purer religion did not die. It

still lived and grew, though no longer in conscious opposition to a national life that had in outward semblance accepted its consecration. Thus the Psalms, as well as the Law, grew up. For a time the contradiction between a pure spiritual religion and an iron system of external observances was veiled. The protection of the outward shell was felt more than its oppression, and the flowers of the soul were sheltered by it from the storm. But at last it became too clear that true religion was cramped and deformed by what appeared to give it strength; and then all was ripe for the next great religious reform. Again a higher and purer standard was uplifted; again war was declared upon the existing religion of Israel; again there was a struggle that lasted through many generations; again the victory was won, but not without a heavy price, and again the twin birth of spirituality and formalism was seen in the Catholic Church. Christianity had partly assimilated the world, and had been partly assimilated by it; had she failed in the first she would have escaped the last; but, as it was, Augustine's "Confessions" could rise in the bosom of the "Church" and remain unconscious of any want of harmony between their own glowing spirituality and the rigid formalism so fast closing upon them.

It would be easy to carry on the history, and it is superfluous to draw the moral.

PHILIP H. WICKSTEED.

NOTE.

A summary statement of the results of the literary analysis of the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua may be interesting to the reader. The following assignment of passages to the various

documents is (with very trifling modifications) that of Professor J. Estlin Carpenter.

THE BOOK OF ORIGINS OR PRIESTLY CODEX.

GENESIS I. II. 1-4a. V. 1-28; 30-32. VI. 9-22. VII. 6; 7; 8b; 9; 11; 13-16a; 18-23; 23b; 24. VIII. 1; 2a; 3b-5; 13-19. IX. 1-17; 28; 29. X. 1-7; 13-20 in part; 22-32 in part. XI. 10-32. XII. 4b; 5. XIII. 6; 11b; 12. XVI. 1; 3; 15; 16. XVII. except v. 17. XIX. 29. XXI. 2-5. XXII. 20-24. XXIII. 2-20. XXV. 1-20; 26b. XXVI. 34; 35. XXVII. 46. XXVIII. 1-9. XXXI. 18. XXXV. 9-16a; 19; 20; 22b-29. XXXVI. 1-39 in part. XXXVII. 1; 2 in part. XLVI. 6-27. XLVII. 5; 6a; 7-11; 27b; 28a. XLVIII. 2 in part; 3-7. XLIX. 1a; 28b-33. L. 13.

EXODUS I. 1-7; 13; 14. II. 23-25. VI. 2-12; (13-30?). VII. 1-13; 19; 20a; 21b; 22. VIII. 5-7; 15 in part; 16-19. IX. 8-12. XI. 9; 10. XII. 1-20; 28; 40-51. XIII. 1; 2; 20. XIV. 1-4; 8; 9 in part; 15-18 in part; 21 in part; 22; 23; 26; 27 in part; 28a; 29. XV. 27. XVI. XVII. XIX. 1; 2a. XXIV. 16; 17. XXV. 1-XXXI. 17. XXXII. 15a. XXXIV. 29-35. XXXV.-XL.

LEVITICUS.

NUMBERS I. 1-X. 28. XIII. 1-17a; 21; 25; 26 in part; 32 slightly altered. XIV. 1-10; 26-38. XV. XVI. 1a; 2 in part; 3-11; 16-23; 24 in part; 26 in part; 27 in part; 35-50. XVII. XVIII. XIX. XX. 1 in part; 2-13; 22-29. XXI. 4 in part; 10; 11. XXII. 1. XXV. 6-19. XXVI.-XXXI. XXXII. 1-6; 16-33 in part; XXXIII. 1-39; 41-51; 54. XXXIV. XXXV. XXXVI.

DEUTERONOMY XXXII. 48-51; (52?). XXXIV. 1-3; 5-9.

JOSHUA IV. 19. V. 10-12. IX. 15b; 17-21. XIV. 1-5. XV. 1-12; 20-62. XVI. in part. XVII. 1-10. XVIII. 11-28. XIX. 1-48. XX. XXI. 1-42. XXII. 9-32 in part.

DEUTERONOMY AND THE DEUTERONOMIC SCHOOL.

GENESIS XV. XXVI. 2-5.

EXODUS XIII. 3-16. XV. 26. XIX. 3b-6. XX. 2-17. XXXII. 7-14. XXXIV. 9-27.

DEUTERONOMY. All except XXII. 48-52. XXXIV. 1-3; 5-9.

JOSHUA I. 3-9; 12-15. VIII. 30-35. X. 28.-XII. mostly. XXII. 1-6. XXIII. XXIV. 1-25.

When these two later works have been removed, nearly all that is left belongs to the Prophetic Narrators, or, at least, to the earliest stratum of the Pentateuch and Joshua. There are, however, traces of the hands of yet later editors in many parts of the Pentateuch; and in a few cases (especially Ex. XX.) the

reader might go astray by taking for granted that everything which is neither Deuteronomic nor part of the Priestly Codex is necessarily early.

A simple and striking picture of the history and composition of the Pentateuch may be gained (and at the same time a powerful instrument for the further study of Biblical criticism constructed) by washing all the passages assigned to the Book of Origins in faint blue, for instance, and the Deuteronomic passages in some other colour, leaving the earliest stratum unpainted. Reference to a Bible thus coloured will enable the student instantly to see to which stratum any passage may belong to which reference is made by a prophet or historian, and will also make it easy to read any one document continuously.

The first outcome of our investigation, as regards the main current of Old Testament literature, may now be presented thus :—

Not later than the 8th century B.C. (end of 9th, according to Reuss) : THE PROPHETIC NARRATORS.

8th century : AMOS, HOSEA, MICAH, ISAIAH.

7th century : Idolatrous reaction under Manasseh and Amon, followed by revival of Yahvism. DEUTERONOMY.

6th century : JEREMIAH (prophetic activity begun late in 7th century). EZEKIEL. 'SECOND ISAIAH.' (Isaiah XL.—LXVI.)

5th century : BOOK OF ORIGINS, OR PRIESTLY CODEX.

7th to 2nd centuries : PSALMS. Possibly a few earlier than the 7th, but the great bulk belonging to the 5th—2nd centuries.

NATURAL RELIGION.

THE deep and widespread interest excited, half a generation ago, by *Ecce Homo*, was due only in part to the actual teaching of the book itself. Both the welcome it received, and the apprehension and even horror and pious anger which it aroused, were to be ascribed in no small measure to a secret hope or fear of what had yet to come as the sequel to this "Survey of the Life and Work of Jesus Christ." There was enough, indeed, that offended against the traditional and established Christianity to startle and distress those to whom the author's whole method of treating his subject was strange; and there was, at the same time, a certain caution and intellectual reserve that diminished the interest and attention of readers of a more radical turn of mind, who cared more for the questions left out than for those which were discussed. Still the author had the advantage of keeping, in the main, to neutral ground. So long as he accepted, as the sufficient record of the work of Christ, the matter that was common to the first three Gospels, and meddled with no questions of criticism or of theology, he seemed tolerably safe; and from the great body of Christians who occupy a position between the extremes of conservatism and radicalism in religion, he gained generally a patient and respectful hearing, and often even an enthusiastic one. Certainly few, of any school of thought, could question the interest and significance of that endeavour to form a consistent picture of the founder of Christianity in his purely human relations, "as a moralist speaking with authority, and perpetuating his doctrine by means of a society."

But it was very evident that the matter could not end

here. There was worse or better to come. The questions which the author had deliberately kept out of view were by far the deeper and more searching ones. We might agree in his "rudimentary conception of the general character and objects" of Christ; and whether we called the uniting principle in the kingdom which he came to establish by its old name of "Love," or by its new one of "The Enthusiasm of Humanity," we were within the circle of common Christian ideas, of Christian morality, of Christian experience. But when this principle had done its work, when—to follow the author's own words—men were united together, and cured of their natural antipathies and their selfishness, they were seen to have other enemies beside themselves, and to have need of protections and supports which morality cannot give. Man "is at enmity with Nature as well as with his brother-man. He is beset by two great enemies with whom he knows not how to cope. The first is Physical Evil; the second is Death." "What comfort Christ gave men under these evils, how he reconciled them to nature as well as to each other by offering them new views of the Power by which the world is governed, by his own triumph over death, and by his revelation of eternity," this was reserved for a separate treatise, the subject of which was described, in another place, as "Christ as the creator of modern theology and religion."*

It is not, however, in these definitions of what had to be dealt with in the sequel to *Ecce Homo* that we find the true foreshadowing of *Natural Religion*—it is rather in the following significant passage. After speaking of Christianity as only one of many revelations, and as being very insufficient by itself for man's happiness, which wants, besides, "some physical conditions, animal health and energy, also much prudence, knowledge of physical facts, and resource," the author refers to the other mighty revelation which has been made to mankind in these latter ages.

We live under the blessed light of science, a light yet far from its meridian and dispersing every day some noxious super-

* *Ecce Homo*, pp. 323, 324, Pref. vi.

stition, some cowardice of the human spirit. These two revelations [Christianity and Science] stand side by side. The points in which they have been supposed to come into collision do not belong to our present subject; they concern the theology and not the morality of the Christian Church. The moral revelation which we have been considering has never been supposed to jar with science. Both are true and both are essential to human happiness. It may be that since the methods of science were reformed, and its steady progress began, it has been less exposed to error and perversion than Christianity, and, as it is peculiarly the treasure belonging to the present age, it becomes us to guard it with peculiar jealousy, to press its claims, and to treat those who, content with Christianity, disregard science as Christ treated the enemies of light, "those who took away the keys of knowledge," in his day. Assuredly they are graceless zealots who quote Moses against the expounders of a wisdom which Moses desired in vain, because it was reserved for a far later generation, for these modern men, to whom we may with accurate truth apply Christ's words and say that the least among them is greater than Moses.*

It was not likely that a clear-headed and courageous thinker who had shown himself so susceptible to the influences of the scientific spirit, should confine his view of the revelation in science to that aspect of it in which it is good chiefly for "arranging the physical conditions of well-being." The claims of science in relation to the whole sphere of human life and thought have been pushed far beyond the limits formerly recognised on both sides of the controversy between it and religion; and the period which has elapsed since *Ecce Homo* was written has been fruitful in discoveries and theories which have effected nothing less than a revolution in the current ways of thinking and speaking in regard to some of the most momentous topics of human life. At least it has been within that time that the effects have been most fully realised, not only by the men of science and the theologians, but, directly or indirectly, by the community at large, of those forces which had already been projected into the world of modern thought. And the extent of the change that has been

* *Ecce Homo*, p. 328.

wrought in the aspects of the fundamental questions, both of science and of religion, is most strikingly indicated in the remarkable book which is one of the most important of recent contributions to the great controversy.

When the author of *Ecce Homo* came really to take in hand the further task he had set himself in undertaking to treat of Christ as the creator of modern theology and religion, he would have first of all to determine what he meant by theology and religion; and, the longer he considered the matter, the more plainly he would see how rapidly the conditions of the whole problem had been changing.

And the question might at last resolve itself into this, "In what sense can Christ be said to be the creator of modern theology and religion at all?" or, looking at the matter from a different point of view, "Does Christianity, in our modern society, include all that is covered by the terms theology, religion, and worship?" And so it has come to pass that in place of a treatise on Christian theology, we have one on Natural Religion, or a religion occupying the same field with science, and limited by the same horizon. That "other revelation" of Science has, in the author's view, been assuming more and more the character and functions of a religion. What that religion is, what it has in common with the older faith whose supremacy it disputes, and how far it is qualified to perform the same offices for humanity, is what the author has felt to be the subject of most pressing importance and present interest, and it is this that forms the main topic of his new book, which he has briefly defined as an essay on the province of religion.

His answer to these questions is, in its general outlines, too well known by this time to need any detailed repetition here. His definitions of religion and worship, and his view of the threefold religion the objects of which are verifiable by science, have already become the commonplaces of discussion and criticism.

Religion is "that higher life of man which is sustained by admiration." "It is the influence which draws men's

thoughts away from their personal interests, making them intensely aware of other existences, to which it binds them by strong ties, sometimes of admiration, sometimes of awe, sometimes of duty, sometimes of love." In its elementary state it is "what may be described as habitual and permanent admiration." Religion in the individual is synonymous with culture; in its public aspect it appears to be identical with civilisation. And the definition of Worship will, of course, correspond to that of Religion. Its essence is "some kind of enthusiastic contemplation seeking for expression in outward acts;" it is made up of "the combined feelings of love, awe, and admiration;" and it is directed towards any object by which those feelings may be excited. According to this definition, it is not *exclusively*, then, that religion is directed towards God, but only *par excellence*. "If the object of [habitual and regulated admiration] be unworthy we have a religion positively bad and false; if it be not the highest object we have an inadequate religion; but irreligion consists in the absence of such habitual admiration, and in a state of the feelings not ardent, but cold and torpid" (p. 129).

What, then, are the objects which Science recognises as the highest and the worthiest to receive the homage of this worship? The religion of Science is threefold. Its first form is the worship of the Unity of Nature, that Eternal Law of the Universe the conception of which has been becoming continually more distinct and more impressive, as science has penetrated further and further into the secrets of Nature and marked the workings of Power which is infinite and eternal. Its second form is the worship of the Forms of Nature, that is, the individual objects which excite feelings of admiration or love by their greatness or their beauty. Its third form is the worship of Humanity, distinguished from the others, not as going beyond the known realm of Nature, which, in the full meaning of the word, includes Man, but as having regard to men in their relations to one another. The religion of Nature, or Science; the Religion of Art, or the higher Paganism; the religion of Humanity, or Natural Christianity,—these

all imply a real theology which is verifiable by the methods of inductive science. Together they constitute that Natural Religion, the nature and province of which it is the author's purpose to discuss. It is "simply worship of whatever in the known universe appears worthy of worship;" and, whether this be Nature in its Unity, worshipped by the man of science, Natural forms in their beauty, worshipped by the artist, or Humanity in its moral and social relations, worshipped by those whose religion has Man for its object, in each case the object of such worship may be truly called God, and the worshippers are theists, and have a theology. Science and Art, therefore, are not secular—they have the essential character of religion, and Secularity is defined as "the absence not of one of these kinds of worship, but of all; in other words it is the paralysis of the power of admiration, and as a consequence, the predominance of the animal wants and the substitution of automatic custom for living will and intelligence" (p. 132). And as the secularist is the man who is incapable of habitual and regulated admiration, and is a stranger to the "higher life" either of Science, Art or Morals, so the atheist is not one who "disbelieves in the goodness of God, or in His distinctness from Nature, or in His personality." He must disbelieve "in the *existence* of God, that is"—notice the definition—"in *any* regularity in the Universe to which he must conform himself under penalties." This almost inconceivable state of mind in any sane person is afterwards characterised by the general term of *wilfulness*, and, in a modified degree, is ascribed to those who, "fully believing in an order of the Universe, yet have such a poor and paltry conception of it that they might almost as well have none at all." It is the pitiable state of moral starvation to which a man is reduced who never lets his mind dwell on anything great, who, from an excess of caution, turns away from that contemplation of laws and principles by which the soul of man lives. "For him there is no longer any glory in the universe. For all beauty or glory is but the presence of law; and the universe to him has ceased to be a scene of law and has become an infinite litter of detail, a

rubbish-heap of confused particulars, a mere worry and weariness to the imagination" (p. 32).

Here, in his character of atheist, we should have recognised at once our old acquaintance the typical Philistine, even if the author had not identified him in the next sentence. He is the man who has not got culture, which "would seem to be merely the *alias* which the Natural Religion of the modern world has adopted, being forbidden by orthodoxy to use the name that properly belongs to it" (p. 143).

It is rather puzzling at first, in reading a treatise on religion, to find almost all the terms which belong to the vocabulary of religion employed in a different sense from that which has the sanction of common usage. We have to keep reminding ourselves at first that "God" may stand for Nature, or for Humanity, or for any ideal, either moral or intellectual; that "religion" and "worship" describe an attitude of the mind which is illustrated by the remark that Mazzini declared Italy to be itself a religion, and that an American in Europe translates his American ways of thinking into a creed. We have to remember, too, that "Natural Religion" does not denote the religion that is natural to man, nor yet the belief in a God the evidences of whose existence are found in Nature, but, as we have said, a religion which does not go beyond the known and the natural. A further difficulty is occasioned by the ambiguous use of the words "Nature" and "Science." The former signifies sometimes, as in its commonest acceptation, the physical universe as distinguished from the moral and intellectual life of man, sometimes, and more generally, the universe including man—that is, the whole range of existence that is amenable to the methods of inductive science. And "science" itself has a corresponding two-fold meaning. It is very frequently confined to the "natural sciences," which are concerned with nature in the first and more limited sense of the word. But it is also used for the science which includes humanity in its scope, thus taking in politics, morals, and history—in fact, everything that the scientific mind recognises as within the sphere of *knowledge*

in the world of mind or matter. It is not till we are somewhat familiar with the author's argument that his uses of the technical terms he employs become distinct and self-explanatory, and there is no longer any risk of our taking his words, clear and concise as his style is, to mean something more or something less than his actual thought.

On one point of great interest, if not of actual importance so far as the main argument of the treatise is concerned, the author has had to confess that he has apparently failed to make his position generally understood. In a short preface to a later edition of the book he explains that his purpose was, as he had said at the commencement, "not to try the question between religion and science but simply to measure how much ground is common to both." Hence he made no attempt, he says, to show that the negative conclusions so often drawn from modern science were not warranted, but admitting freely for argument's sake all these conclusions, he argued that the total effect of them was not to destroy theology or religion, or even Christianity, but in some respects to revive and purify all three.

In general the negative view is regarded in this book not otherwise than as I find it to be regarded by most of those to whom the book is principally addressed, viz., as a fashionable view difficult for the moment to resist, because it seems favoured by great authorities, a view therefore concerning which, however unwillingly, we cannot help asking ourselves, What if it should turn out to be true? But if I were asked what I myself think of it, I should remark, that it is not the greatest scientific authorities who are so confident in negation but rather the inferior men who echo their opinions, but who live themselves in the atmosphere not of science but of party controversy; that fashion, it seems to me, is little less influential in opinion than in dress; that it is not on the morrow of great discoveries that we can best judge of their negative effect upon ancient beliefs; and that I am disposed to agree with those who think that in the end the new views of the Universe will not gratify an extreme party quite so much as is now supposed (*Preface to Second Edition*).

We are not then to assume that in arguing for the

sufficiency of Natural Religion for the higher life of man, and dismissing the supernatural as an accident, not an essential, of religion, the author is defining his own theological position, or that he admits that science will in the end establish any claim to limit religion to Nature. Nay, he makes the confession after all, in almost his closing words, that the religion which he has been describing may fail us at the last.

The more our thoughts widen and deepen, as the universe grows upon us and we become accustomed to boundless space and time, the more petrifying is the contrast of our own insignificance, the more contemptible become the pettiness, shortness, fragility of the individual life. A moral paralysis creeps upon us. For a while we comfort ourselves with the notion of self-sacrifice; we say, What matter if I pass, let me think of others! But the *other* has become contemptible no less than self; all human griefs alike seem little worth assuaging, human happiness too paltry at the best to be worth increasing. The whole moral world is reduced to a point, the spiritual city, "the goal of all the saints," dwindles to the "least of little stars"; good and evil, right and wrong, become infinitesimal, ephemeral matters, while eternity and infinity remain attributes of that only which is outside the realm of morality (P. 262).

These impressive words have already been often quoted, and they will not easily be forgotten. The thought which they so powerfully express will haunt the mind of many a reader of *Natural Religion*, even when he is most carried away by the author's own intense interest in his subject and by the vigour and earnestness with which, speaking on behalf of science, he has demanded the recognition of its claim as the religion of the modern world. We cannot help feeling that they are on the side of all our strongest convictions and deepest faith, and that they plead for a religion which science cannot give us, but which is in entire harmony with science, and is capable of being enriched and strengthened by it in a thousand ways.

The author has dwelt upon the surpassing grandeur of the modern scientific view of the universe, as an object of that awe and admiration which he represents as the essence

of religion. "The scientific man," he says, "has a theology and a God. A most impressive theology, a most awful and glorious God." If he meant by this simply that the conception of the universe has been widened and made in every way grander and more wonderful by the discoveries and theories of science, and that we are having ever nobler and more awe-inspiring revelations of God in Nature, few theists, either inside the Christian Church or outside, would question the fact of this fundamental harmony between the revelations of science and of religion, or would hesitate to go with the author when he characterises the former as a revelation *supplemental* to the older one. But of course he means more than this. It is not God revealed *in* Nature, but revealed *as* Nature, that is presented here as the supreme object of the worship of science; and the question is whether this is sufficient for the recognised functions of religion in relation to man's higher life. The author undertakes to show that it is. The scientific man, he says, "feels himself in the presence of a Power which is not himself and is immeasurably above himself, a Power in the contemplation of which he is absorbed, in the knowledge of which he finds safety and happiness. . . . A true theist should recognise his Deity as giving him the law to which his life ought to be conformed. Now here it is that the resemblance of modern science to theology comes out most manifestly. There is no stronger conviction in this age than the conviction of the scientific man, that all happiness depends upon the knowledge of the laws of Nature, and the careful adaptation of human life to them." Again, Nature inspires a genuine love, "though of a lower kind," than love, justice, or goodness inspires. "Nature, even if we hesitate to call it good, is infinitely interesting, infinitely beautiful. He who studies it has continually the exquisite pleasure of discerning, or half-discerning, *laws*." The imagination is set in motion. The contemplation of Nature gives endless delight and surprises into overpowering awe. And even the feeling of personal connection and as it were relationship which a worshipper should have for his Deity is not wanting. The worshipper of Nature

"cannot separate himself from that which he contemplates. . . . The same laws whose operations he watches in the Universe he may study in his own body. Heat and light and gravitation govern himself as they govern plants and heavenly bodies." (See pp. 19—22.) It is difficult to see in this presentment of the analogies between the worship of Nature and the worship of the God of Nature anything more than a proof of the insufficiency of science by itself to fulfil what we have learnt to think of as the highest and most sacred functions of religion, to inspire the love, the sense of "happiness and safety," the personal communion, the conscious life in God, which are of the very heart of faith. We might almost be pardoned if, for the moment, we questioned the seriousness of a writer who could ask us to see a counterpart of the love which unites the heart with God in spiritual communion, in the intellectual pleasure we take in beautiful and interesting things, or to find that communion itself in the sense that we are an integral part of Nature, and that we are subject to the same laws which govern the growth of a tree or the movements of the planets.

The author's strongest point in treating of the religion of natural science is in his representation of the feelings of awe and wonder which enter into religion, and which, no doubt, are in large measure derived from the contemplation of the infinitude of Nature, the "immensities and eternities" by which our little life is surrounded. We are continually receiving, through science, new and more wonderful revelations of God in Nature. And if, as our idea of God has been enlarged, and separated from many particular beliefs about Him which religion had cherished, but which science has dismissed as erroneous or imperfect, we seem to lose something of the distinctness and sense of reality which characterised the more childish or superstitious view, it is because the idea is mightier, truer, more adequate, and therefore less easily grasped by the intellect or realised by the imagination. It cannot be denied that the current conceptions of the personality and unity of God, the methods of His action in the

outward universe, and the ways in which He is revealed in Nature and in History, have all been deeply affected by the doctrines in which science expresses its fullest knowledge and its latest speculations about the universe. Even that "average Christian," for whose theology the author has but small respect, will be found to have unconsciously had his horizon widened, and to feel himself living in a more wonderful and more divine world. It is not, however, quite fair to set off the average Christian against the average scientific man, as far as what we may call the intellectual side of religion is concerned. The latter is one of a comparatively small and select class, the former is one of the great mass of men of all orders of capacity and culture; and it would be more just to select for the comparison a fair type of a fairly thoughtful and intelligent believer in Christianity. It would probably be found that his faith was no longer predominated by the old idea of the supernatural as manifested exclusively or especially in signs and wonders, which the author includes amongst the contents of the current doctrines of supernatural religion; and his belief in a personal Will as the cause of the universe would not stand or fall with the belief that that Will has "sometimes interfered by miracle with the order of Nature." No doubt the criticisms on *Natural Religion* which have appeared in orthodox or in neutral quarters, are not the productions of "average Christians," but of picked men of culture, theologians by profession, or writers who are well acquainted with the present attitude of modern theology; but the position they have taken up with regard to the fundamental question of the supernatural marks the change that has come over men's thoughts in relation to miracle. While none of them perhaps, at least none who write from a theistic point of view, would deny the *a priori* possibility of miracles, and few of them probably would question the fact of those ascribed to Jesus,—they seem almost with one consent to abandon the appeal to miracle as a proof either of the uniqueness of the mission of Christ, or as the ground for believing that the laws of Nature are the expression of a divine Will.

Their appeal is substantially from the science which knows nothing beyond the methods and laws and phenomena of Nature, not to miraculous evidences of the revelation in Christ, but to the testimony of the mind, the conscience, the religious affections and aspirations of humanity, to the unseen and unsearchable Presence revealed as causal Power in Nature, as Righteousness and as Love, first and most manifestly, in our own inner life.

We are evidently in the region of ideas which belong more distinctly to the religion that inspires the higher life when, going beyond the teachings of natural science, we come to that branch of the threefold religion which is identified with the science of Humanity. The author himself frequently asserts its supremacy; and though he makes a point of showing that the religion of natural science or the religion of art may exist apart from morals, and still have its proper effect in keeping life above the lower levels of secularity and conventionalism,* he yet does not contemplate their permanent separation from the religion which is concerned with men's relation to one another. We should not, therefore, be delivered over by science merely to a worship of the awful Being who is revealed in the impersonal forces of Nature, which are as often terrifying and destructive as they are beneficent and life-giving in their effects.

We should read His character not merely in the earthquake and fire, but also in the still small voice; not merely in the destroying powers of the world, but, as Mohammed said, in the compassion that we feel for one another; not merely in the storm that threatens the sailor with death, but in the lifeboat and the Grace Darling that put out from shore to the rescue; not merely in the intricate laws that confound our prudence, but in the science that penetrates them and the art which makes them subservient to our purposes; not merely in the

* See the remarkable pages (120 *sqq.*) in which a portrait is drawn of the artist, who "would rather on his death-bed have it to reflect that he had painted a really good picture, or written a really good poem, than that he had done his duty under great temptations and at great sacrifice;" and of the scientific investigator who thinks "How much better it is to have advanced our knowledge of the laws of the universe only by a step than to have lived the most virtuous life or died the most self-sacrificing death!"

social evils that fill our towns with misery and cover our frontiers with war, but in the St. Francis that makes himself the brother of the miserable, and in the Fox and Penn that proclaim principles of peace (p. 69).

This is well and strikingly said, and the facts to which it calls attention are of avail, as far as they go, to relieve the feeling of helplessness and the sense of nothingness in presence of "the pitiless immensity of the power that is not ours," the "great Necessity," which science substitutes for Providence, the awful impersonal Unity of Nature in which our little moment of individual life—nay, the whole duration of our present world in Time—is but as one beat of the pendulum of Eternity. But suppose our view of human life as well as of nature is tinged with pessimism; suppose we are not able to believe in any preponderance of good over evil; suppose that the unity of Nature and Humanity should seem to us the most evidently realised when man moves calmly on his own path, with the same unimpassioned, irresistible order as that of the forces of Nature, and with as little regard to the consequences for good or evil. Nero or Theebaw may be said to be as true a type of human nature in some of its aspects as any saint or hero; and if we accept the purely scientific view of humanity, and reduce all the springs of human conduct to the working of certain motives and feelings which begin and end with man in his relation to his fellows as part of the known universe, we do not see why the deeds which are called evil should arouse moral condemnation, any more than do the devastations of a hurricane or an earthquake. All that we can reasonably say is that there is some use in visiting with our displeasure and punishing the selfishness or the crime which inflicts injury on others, because this will have its influence in restraining the offence; while it is no use being angry with the fire that has burnt us or the flood that would drown us. There are laws, says our author, which are not pitiless. "There are laws under which churches and philanthropical societies are formed, under which misery is sought out and relieved and every evil that can be discovered in the world

is redressed. Nature . . . includes all the pity that belongs to the whole human family " (p. 68). Yes, but Nature in its unity includes all the cruelty too, all the wickedness, all the darkness as well as the light. If we are to select as worthy of our worship the things which call forth our admiration and love, what are we to do with those which inspire us with horror and fear in Nature, or with sorrow, or anger and condemnation in Humanity? It is one thing to set before our minds an ideal Unity of Law as an object of enthusiastic contemplation, or an ideal of natural Beauty, or an ideal of Humanity. Science is limited to a knowledge of things as they are. It makes us acquainted with a physical world in which the working of the changeless laws of nature issue in countless forms of suffering and destruction as well as of happiness and life; and a moral world in which the virtue and the happiness are set off against a dark background of vice and misery. Any view of nature and life which gives us the thought of a Power working for *good* in and through all this, of a divine purpose being effected, a divine meaning expressed, —this may indeed reveal a unity in which the contradictions are reconciled, and the true, the beautiful, and the good are seen and worshipped as the manifestations of that unity; and it may enable us to set before ourselves an ideal of virtue, of holiness of love in humanity. But this is to go beyond what science reveals, unless, indeed, science takes cognizance of those faculties of the human mind which are concerned in that religion which at present is represented as being under a cloud, that faith in an unseen world and a living God which has generally been assumed to be of the essence of religion.

And this suggests the further remark that the word "Humanity" does not stand only for the facts of our outward and inward life in our relation to one another and to the universe. It includes all the aspirations, the affections, the hopes and beliefs which connect it with that which is above and beyond humanity, and above and beyond the nature of which it is a part. Our author's persistent use of the term Natural Religion for a religion which is directed towards

the unity of Nature as apprehended by science, has almost made us forget the meaning which rather belongs to it by right of general usage. And he himself seems to have forgotten, or at least to have dismissed from his view, as having no claim to be even considered by the philosopher and man of science, that Theism, which both exists as a distinct type of religion, and is the ultimate faith which is partially obscured in the Christian and other systematised theologies by certain associated doctrines which it seems impossible to reconcile with it. Its inspiration is an affection which responds to a divine call, its revelation is in the law of truth in the reason, of right in the conscience, of love in the affections. How far this faith in God as a living God, transcending Nature, and revealing Himself in the hearts of His children, is a part of the spiritual inheritance which, in the case of Christian civilisation, can never be separated from the teaching of Christ and the principles which underlie the doctrines of Christianity, is a question which need not here be discussed. Certain it is that an increasing number of those who refer their faith to the historical revelation embodied in the Gospels, as well as those who take the position of what is called pure Theism, as distinguished from any particular traditional form of it, do refer their faith, in the last resort, to the normal inspiration of God in the soul, and see no more reason for doubting the veracity of the faculties which report to them concerning the supernatural world than that of the senses and the intellect by which they know the facts of the natural world. And with regard to the branch of Natural Religion which our author bases on a sense of the relations of man to man as members of the human family, we may see how in the Christian or Theistic view it is not less "natural" to refer the law of right, and the feelings and motives which connect men in a common *brotherhood* and build up States, to a source in a supreme righteousness and love that are not ideal but real.

We have spoken of the Theistic view of the universe as a part of the common heritage of Christendom, received in due course of historical descent from the founder of

Christianity, who himself had carried on the great line of religious development the history of which is to be read in the Old Testament. The author of *Natural Religion* makes the same claim for "the religion of ideal humanity," by which phrase he expresses what he conceives to be the essence of Christianity. It is a religion which is independent of supernaturalism, but at the same time is historic, not abstract, not breaking with the Christian tradition or discarding the Christian documents as obsolete. This view is set forth in the highly-interesting and important chapter on "Natural Christianity." We must be content to refer our readers to it for the author's extremely suggestive remarks on what constitutes the true unity of the Bible, which he finds to be "the idea of morality inspired and vivified by religion" (pp. 169—176); also for the distinction drawn between Christianity considered as supernatural law enforced by rewards and punishments, and as a religion according to its larger conception (pp. 158—161). The author concludes that, in the former sense, Christianity is not likely just now to have a revival. But, as there is a religion "which is concealed under the name of culture, and which lies at the basis of all art and science," is there not similarly, he asks, "a religion hidden under morality, and may not this moral religion be called Natural Christianity?" His answer is that the "ideal religion of humanity" may claim this title by right of historic descent. "The miracles of the Bible, if the world should ultimately decide to reject them, would fall away, and in doing so would undoubtedly damage the orthodox system. But the Natural Christianity sketched in this chapter would not be damaged." No, nor would Christianity that is supernatural, in the true acceptance of the word, be damaged either. But then, it is not the miracles only that Christianity is asked to part with. It is the higher supernaturalism of the Bible—the belief in a personal Deity, a living Spirit in conscious relations with the human spirit, the God whom Christ worshipped. We are invited, in the name of science, to eliminate from Christianity the conception of a Being whom its founder spoke of in words of matchless simplicity and reality as a

living God, a Father whose love responds to our love, who knows our thoughts and hears our prayers; a God whom we worship not only in admiration, awe, and love on our part, but in a spiritual communion in which He comes to us as we draw nigh to Him, and which death can only make more near and real. But if we are to get rid of the supernatural in this its higher essential meaning, and imagine a Christianity without a personal God and a future life, might not what is left be better called "unnatural" than "natural" Christianity?

This residuum, however, is what the author seems to think alone worth considering as a form of religion which, to judge from the tendencies and pretensions of science to-day, is likely to survive the revolutions of modern thought; and he connects with it much of the equanimity with which he tries to contemplate the possible loss of the supernatural element from the current beliefs and worships. He asks whether we may not look forward to a revival of the essential part of Christianity. "May we not hope to see a religion that shall appeal to the sense of duty as forcibly, preach righteousness and truth, justice and mercy, as solemnly and exclusively, as Christianity itself does, only so as not to shock modern ideas of the universe?" Well, this depends upon what the modern ideas of the universe are which shall have justified their claims to such consideration, and whether the negations of science are to be considered as established, as well as its affirmations. The author, as we have seen, only admits the negations for argument's sake, and he considers that they are characteristic of the inferior men rather than of the greatest scientific authorities. This being the case, it does seem too much to expect the Christian Church to put "Humanity" for "God," even for argument's sake, till the negations of science have proved to be something more than a fashion of opinion. The author's argument, however, goes much further, and is advanced more confidently, than this. He says that, as virtue can only show itself in our relations to our fellow-men, the religion which leads to virtue *must* be a religion that worships *men*. But we fail to see that he justifies this position by the very true

remark: "If in God Himself we did not believe qualities analogous to the human to exist, the worship of Him would not lead to virtue; the worship of God not as we believe Him, but as we see Him in non-human nature, would be likely, taken by itself, to lead to pitiless fanaticism" (p. 167). Christian Theism emphatically affirms that the words, love, goodness, justice, mean to us nothing as describing the attributes of God if they do not mean the same thing as when they are used of human character. But it is a very violent measure to turn this affirmation of supernaturalism to its own destruction, and to say that if you worship a God whose image is reflected in humanity, you are in fact worshipping men.

If Christianity, in so far as it embodies a doctrine of the supernatural, has played its part and is to be finally discredited by the new revelation of science, it may be time to call upon it to give place to the worship of Nature, to the higher Paganism, to the religion that begins and ends with Humanity. But the author's resolute determination to look facts in the face and be satisfied with no unrealities does seem to fail him when he tries to persuade us that there is anything of the character of reconciliation in the proposal that Christians should agree, for the time being, to terms by which Science holds all its own, and Christianity gives up just what has hitherto been allowed by common consent to be its supreme possession.

It is so evidently more serviceable, in dealing with a speculative book, to discuss some of the points which do not command our assent, or to follow out some line of thought suggested by what we have been reading, that it hardly need be said that the view we have taken of the author's general position does not afford any measure at all of the value we set upon his wonderfully interesting and stimulating book. Nor have we made the vain attempt to give, in the compass of a short article, any adequate idea of the whole course of its argument, or the sum of its practical conclusions.

It is impossible to read the book, and exercise our own independent judgment in doing so, without a distinct intellectual and moral gain. The boldness and freedom with

which the author discards every merely traditional method of dealing with religion, the determination with which he clears away the conventionalisms, the make-believes, the timidities with which it is unhappily so liable to be surrounded, is in every way wholesome and refreshing. Where he is least convincing, he is not least stimulating, and when we hesitate to accept his position, or are dissatisfied with the answer he gives or suggests, we are forced to ask ourselves what our own position is, and what answer we ourselves should give. When we find him so dealing with the distinctive terms of theology and religion as scarcely to leave one of them possessed of just its current meaning or its current limitations, we may demur to his new definitions; but at least we are compelled to consider what we ourselves mean and understand by the words we are constantly using—whether they stand for facts in our own religious experience, or are among the sacred conventionalities which a spurious reverence forbids us to meddle with. And we are started on a line of inquiry the most fruitful in practical issues, when we have been made to feel the necessity of knowing whether the most vigorous forces actually at work in fashioning the lives of men are for us or against us, what beliefs are worthy of the name, and what is the faith by which we really live. There is a moral enthusiasm and seriousness of purpose throughout the whole treatise which is notable in these days of sceptical indifference or of aimless diletantism. Even when the author is evidently, and perhaps confessedly, not satisfied with the view he is urging, and where, at any rate, he does not commit himself to it, he is always bent on making the best, and not the worst of it. Indeed, in this respect we do not think that in his representation of the Science which occupies such a large space in his argument, he has really done what he says—in his new explanatory Preface—he felt bound to do in pursuance of his plan, viz., to take the scientific view “frankly at its worst.” He has assumed, for the sake of argument, that science does not recognise as an object of knowledge the existence of any reality which its own methods will not avail to discover.

But he has not taken it as estimating the quality and worth of life by its meaner origins, interpreting the great by the small, the grand by the paltry, and minimising the wonder and the beauty which we are to discover and admire. Nor does he take it in that form in which alone he says it penetrates, either of useful information or else of a negative doctrine opposed to religion. It is not science at its worst, but in some respects at its best, which presents us with an idea of the universe which is vast, awful, and inspiring, and which includes in its survey the phenomena of the life of man, "with whatever more awful forces stir within the human heart." And in taking it thus the author has done a genuine service both to the science with which he has connected the emotions and thoughts most in harmony with religion; and to the theology which will never be true to the facts of religion until it has intensely realised the universe as the realm of universal law, and seen the revelation of God in the grand course of Nature, in the world of matter and of mind—God in Nature, God in Humanity.

We have said enough on the few points we have been able to consider in the author's teaching to show that we do not think he has succeeded, even from the point of view which he has assumed (which is not necessarily his own personal position), in vindicating for the new disturbing forces a reconstructive power by which they may be qualified to succeed to the inheritance of Christianity, and build up a Church with Nature and Humanity as its God, and Civilisation or Culture as its religion. And while we may see no reason for refusing to grant the distinction drawn between *religions* and *a religion*, and to extend the secondary uses of the word worship to the emotions of awe and admiration which may be felt in the presence of Nature in its unity, or in the contemplation of the virtues of the saints and heroes of humanity, we are not prepared to sacrifice, at the bidding of Science, what seem to us the highest and deepest meaning of the words. And we think that the attempt to identify the essential qualities of the religion of Nature, or Science, and the religion of God, or religion

par excellence, must always fail when it is brought to the test of the facts of the highest life of man.

We lay down the book, then, after repeated perusals, and say that it has seemed richer each time in suggestiveness, and more impressive in its earnestness and serious courage, more searching in its criticisms of life. And yet the feeling of disappointment and misgiving does not pass away. Instead of having been reassured and made more hopeful, we have felt increasing doubt whether such high enthusiasms and eager interests and admirations as the author has connected with Natural Science, with Art, and with the Science of Humanity will ever exercise the true controlling power of religion, except in the case, perhaps, of the comparatively few whose nature is more highly strung, and who belong—to borrow the author's phrase—to the "genius party" in science; or are capable in the possible measure of their influence on the "average man" of ever lifting humanity as a whole to any high religious conception of life, or of taking the place of that faith in the living God and a Future Life, of which Science, *per se*, professes to know nothing, but which is the inspiration of duty and the sanction of hope and love. It is the author's own saying that, "when the supernatural does not come in to overwhelm the natural, and turn life upside down, when it is admitted that religion deals in the first instance with the known and the natural, then we may well begin to doubt whether the known and the natural can suffice for human life. No sooner do we try to think so than pessimism raises its head" (p. 261).

We entirely demur, however, to the justice of the representation of supernaturalism here as coming in to "overwhelm the natural and turn life upside down." This can only be said of supernaturalism as identified with the miraculous—and with the miraculous in a sense which seems to be retiring more and more from the foreground of Christian doctrine, even where it has not disappeared from view altogether. To make the belief in the supernatural revealed in the constant order of Nature stand or fall, with its alleged manifestations in certain events which were supposed to be

beside that order, is to confuse the whole view of the subject; and we can only wonder that a writer so anxious to dispel the misconceptions occasioned by the misuse of words should have himself introduced a verbal confusion into such an important passage as we have quoted above. He himself has said that "the thought of a Supreme Being . . . is excited at least as much by law itself as by the suspension of law;" and he cannot mean that the natural is overwhelmed and life turned upside down by the faith that sees in the steadfast order of nature, and in all the course of human life, the working of a divine will and the working out of a divine purpose. It seems strange that this faith should have been scarcely recognised in an essay on the province of religion, except apparently in inseparable connection with certain views of the miraculous credentials of Christianity and all the associated doctrines of traditional orthodoxy.

The author does not deny—indeed, he frequently asserts with emphasis—that Christianity has in it something far higher and deeper, and more ennobling, than the religion of Nature or of Art. It is when he contrasts the "average scientific man" with the "average Christian" that he represents the latter as having so much poorer a type of religion. And so he has, no doubt, if he has nothing better than the idea of God that has been "degraded by childish and little-minded teaching," by which "the Eternal and the Infinite and the All-embracing has been represented as the head of the clerical interest, as a sort of clergyman, as a sort of schoolmaster, as a sort of philanthropist" (p. 19).

It must be admitted that there is a vein of exaggeration and caricature in this; and keenly alive as we may be to the constant descent of the popular religion from its high argument, and the way in which the imagination has been allowed to materialise and degrade instead of heightening and vivifying the conceptions of religion, we think, as we have already said, that the author has not allowed for the extent to which the teachings of science have already enlarged the conception of God, even in connection with the

current beliefs of average Christians. They certainly are apt to withstand the conclusions of science when these seem to come into direct conflict with what they have been accustomed to think of as the infallible Word of God in the Bible. But even here our average Christian begins to show some signs of discrimination; and surprising concessions are every now and then made, which are so many victories of science and common-sense. And as to the "definite facts and actual computations" by which the scientific man is said, rather oddly, to realise infinity and eternity, there are few of those who are within reach of the merest elements of ordinary education who do not get some glimpse into those infinite vistas of space and time which science has opened to the mind.

And this suggests the obvious remark that, in fact, neither science nor religion, considered as two different things, have ever been able to exist independently of one another. If on certain points they have seemed to come into collision and to be mutually exclusive, there are a hundred respects in which they are inseparable, a hundred ways in which they influence one another. Man cannot live by science alone, neither can he live by religion alone. The intellectual part of our nature requires, and always gets in a healthy life, its share of nurture and its sphere of action. So also does the spiritual and emotional part. The man of science and culture stands in the same actual relation to the unseen spiritual world (if it exists) as does the most unscientific of Christians, and he may have the more spiritual faith of the two if his whole nature is cultivated; but he has it not by virtue of his intellectual knowledge by itself, but by the religious feeling and the consciousness of a divine presence which accompanies it.

It is all very well, in theory, to represent science as realising the awful thoughts of infinity and eternity. These thoughts, of and by themselves, are simply bewildering and baffling to the intellect; and the idea of the "immensities" and the "eternities," if they are only filled by the "silences" from which comes no word of mind, or will, or love, are to the heart of man too solemn and terrible to inspire a

feeling of "safety and happiness." What there is of religious adoration and trust in these excursions of the mind "as far off as the fixed stars," and beyond the beginning of time, is due, we may venture to believe, to the real, though it may be the obscurely felt and scarce recognised, presence of the Being who fills the universe. Certainly the theist will be the last to deny that science, in so far as it gets at the truth of things, is helping to reveal God by giving us a truer knowledge of the laws by which He governs the universe of Nature or of Man, and by "dispersing every day some noxious superstition, some cowardice of the human spirit." If he has a living religion, and not merely a set of opinions petrified into obsolete dogmatic forms, he will welcome with eagerness the wonderful revelations, made by science, of the methods of the divine working in Nature, including the organic laws of human society and individual character. But then he will also think it the most natural thing in the world that God should reveal Himself to man in other ways than those which science is inclined at present to recognise; and that if man is indeed His child "made in His image and likeness," He will be with him in the hidden life, in some real spiritual communion, in dim mysterious feelings of awe and love, or in the commanding voice of conscience and the uplifting power of divine affection. When, therefore, it comes to asking how far science can provide us with a working substitute for faith, and what function the Church can fulfil when she has become universal by limiting her creed to that residuum of deity which may be left when we have taken away everything which is not included in Science, we may ask whether, in the nature of things, the religious life is capable of being so manipulated, and what would be the gain to science which would compensate for the loss to religion, supposing the elimination were effected.

The author speaks of some common *action* which might be for the first time possible if we would but confine our attention to the things in which science and religion agree. But this is possible in any case when we unite for a common object affecting our intellec-

tual or moral life. And as to the "doctrine of civilisation" which is to redeem an unscientific and Philistine world, is not its diffusion the chief object, however imperfectly appreciated and carried out, of all the most powerful and flourishing institutions of society? What else is the use of our schools and universities, our literature, our art exhibitions and science lectures, our philanthropies, and all our contrivances for making humanity richer in knowledge, in moral good, in happiness, in essential life? Why have the immense interests and almost resistless intellectual forces which Science has at its disposal been able, with all this machinery, to do so little to regenerate the world? Surely such a weak thing as the Church is represented as being cannot have had any power to interfere.

The author reproaches it, with only too much justice, though in exaggerated terms, for its failure to present to the conscience of the nation a true ideal of national greatness, or, indeed, any ideal at all.* "Its teaching," he says, "is so archaic as to be in great part scarcely intelligible without the aid of ancient history, while the methods of tests and exclusions has drained it of intellectual vigour, and has left it mainly under the control of anxious, nerveless minds; so that it is hardly listened to by men of the world, except on the ground that Anility and Puerility after all are forces, and might do untold mischief if they were needlessly provoked. The religious world, which ought, one would suppose, to cherish the high ideal that the community wants, has, in fact, an ideal almost lower than that of the community" (p. 135). So far as this is true, the Church has been leaving the field more and more free for the operation of those new and vigorous forces which science has at its disposal. And yet the author's complaint is that "science only penetrates either in the form of useful information, or else in that of a negative doctrine opposed to religion; as itself a main part of religion, as the grand revelation of God in these later times, supplementing rather

* We must refer our readers to the admirable pages, in which the author exposes the false ideals, or rather the absence of any ideal in our national life (pp. 133—135).

than superseding the older revelations, it remains almost as much unknown as in the dark ages" (p. 209). If this be so Natural Religion would seem to be in not much better case than Supernatural, even when the latter is described in the scathing words which we have quoted, and which apply only too truly to much that passes for religion in these days.

Science is free where religion is fettered; it is strong, buoyant, self-asserting, where religion is timid and conventional; it concerns itself with practical interests, and provides for the happiness and safety of the community, while religion, in its prevailing forms, has no close association with men's ordinary thoughts and feelings and their strongest motives of action. And yet science has done so little for the higher life! The inference would seem not an unsound one that science has not yet proved its claim to fulfil the functions of religion, and that the Church may still have time to reform itself, not by any reversion to an obsolete past, or by a more strenuous preaching of doctrines which are out of harmony with the best culture and the most deeply felt interests of the age; still less by an act of practical self-effacement, which would, as the phrase goes, "reform it off the face of the earth;" but by awakening to a new enthusiasm, a new trust in every revelation of truth, every source of light and knowledge. The author's description of what the Church of Natural Religion should be which would be equal to the functions required of it by the present age, will apply almost to the letter to the Church of God which bears its witness to the unseen spiritual life and is founded on the rock below the shifting sands of opinion and the knowledge that passes away. It is called to undertake new duties, to be, as it once was, a power that holds society together, and keeps an ideal of civilisation before it. "The clergy of such a Church, if it should have a clergy, would be subjected to no tests of opinion, but only to tests of character and competence. It would be held that liberty of opinion was the first condition of efficiency as teachers." It must be bound by no rigid formularies and articles; it must have its life not in the past, but in the present and the future. "Life looks onward, not backward."

The preparations for such a vital reform have been long going on, openly or without observation, in all the Churches of Christendom; but the hindrances to its practical realisation are numerous and formidable enough to discourage the most sanguine. If they prove insuperable, we may be sure that it is revolution, not reformation, that is imminent. Religion and science are hardly likely ever to agree to such articles of peace as those we have been called upon to discuss. But if religion will but come boldly forth from the cloister, and breathe the air of freedom, and have its being in the great world of life and thought, and learn to look "not backward, but onward," it may yet convert its rival or enemy into its fast ally, and find that it has once more on its side all the strongest convictions, and the most ardent hopes and aspirations, and the deepest faith of humanity.

THE EDITOR.

PROGRESS AND POVERTY.*

DURING the last half-century much thought and investigation have been devoted to the study of the conditions and prospects of poverty. What can the State do to lift to a richer level the poorest stratum of its subjects? has been the problem of problems with thinker after thinker, with philosopher and prophet and poet and practical man of the world. And what has resulted from all this thought and from many a hard-won legislative triumph? If we see our way any clearer, can we see our way to *doing* anything? Or are the conditions of the poorest decidedly better than they were? Undoubtedly, those who will read these pages, and most of those whom our readers employ, are respectively better supplied with necessities and luxuries than were people in like position in the early part of this century. And perhaps the poorest boy in a large town has occasional enjoyments which were beyond the attainment of princes fifty years ago. But the question is not whether shoemakers in regular work to-day are better off than the regularly employed shoemakers of the past, or whether more bread and groceries a head are consumed per annum now than in the year 1840. The question is, whether we have at the poorest level of the social strata a class whose struggle for the necessities of life is as hard and as hopeless as that of the corresponding class in the past; and whether this class is as large as ever. And more, are we any nearer to a remedy for the ills of the very poor; do we know any better how to prevent the existence of masses of dense poverty?

* *Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions, and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth. The Remedy.* By HENRY GEORGE. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1882.

As to the probable numbers and poverty of our very poor we cannot consult a more hard-headed and reliable authority than Professor Fawcett. In 1871, when Free Trade and kindred forces had received at least as fair a trial as since, and had provided their arrays of statistics startling enough to silence the most querulous grumblers, Professor Fawcett wrote as follows* :—

We are accustomed to hear much boasting about the vast wealth of England. We are told that our exports and imports are rapidly increasing ; glowing descriptions are given of our Empire upon which the sun never sets, and of a commerce which extends over the world. Our mercantile marine is ever increasing ; manufactories are augmenting in number and in magnitude. All the evidences of growing luxury are around us ; there are more splendid equipages in the parks, and the style of living is each year becoming more sumptuous. This is one side of the picture ; and if we could look upon it and close our eyes to other sights and close our ears to other sounds that are around us, we might fold ourselves in the mantle of self-complacency, and repeat the platitudes so often uttered that nothing can exceed the happiness and prosperity of England. But let us look on another side of the picture, and what do we then observe ? Side by side with this vast wealth, closely contiguous to all this sinful luxury, there stalks the fearful spectre of wide-spread poverty and of growing pauperism ! Visit the great centres of our commerce and trade, and what will be observed ? The direst poverty always accompanying the greatest wealth. . . . Official returns show that in London there are never less than 125,000 paupers, and that as each winter recurs the number rises to 170,000. There is abundant reason to conclude that a number at least equally large are just on the verge of pauperism, often struggling with admirable resolution to obtain their own livelihood, and frequently suffering far more than is endured by the recipient of parochial relief. But it is not only in our large towns that this widespread poverty is to be observed ; the condition of the rural population is scarcely more satisfactory.† . . . How

* *Pauperism : its Causes and Remedies.* The substance of a course of lectures in the University of Cambridge. Macmillan.

† If our personal observations do not convince us of the justice of Mr. Fawcett's sentence as to rural life, we must remember how easily the poor can now move into the towns and swell the ranks of poverty there.

comes it that the augmented produce is so distributed that the condition of those who till the soil has not only not improved, but has in some cases retrograded? How, again, does it happen that the greater is the wealth accumulated in our large towns, the deeper seem to be the depths of poverty into which vast multitudes sink? By an official return just issued it is shown that there is at the present time (1871) an annual increase, amounting to £10,000,000, in the export and import trade of this country. . . .

Mr. W. J. Fox, who was, perhaps, at one time, the most distinguished orator of the party (Anti-Corn Law League), when addressing a large meeting in Covent-garden Theatre, asserted that the abolition of protection would exterminate pauperism; and he predicted that in a few years the ruins of the workhouses would mark the extinction of protection. . . . If any one, a quarter of a century since, could have foreseen all that was about to take place; if he could have known that trade was soon to be trebled; that railways would be taken to almost every small town in the kingdom, would it not have appeared absolutely incredible that all these favourable agencies should have produced so little effect that *it may now be fairly disputed whether the poverty of the poor has been perceptibly diminished?* There has, no doubt, been an unprecedented accumulation of wealth, but this wealth has been unhappily so distributed that the rich have become much richer, *whilst the poor have remained as poor as they were before.*

This may fairly be taken as the verdict of our most skilled inquirer. To say, in the face of such evidence, that the condition of our very poor is progressing surely, although slowly, is rather stupidity than optimism. An unskilled judge will more rationally conclude that, slowly but surely, things are getting worse.

But, it will be replied, we, at least, see our way to grappling with the advance of this evil. Those who have depicted these harrowing facts, and have sympathised most radically with the poor, have also discovered with scientific precision the causes of poverty and its remedy.

Yes; we are told by the same authority that the causes are very obvious, and the remedies are simple, though not easy. There is no disputing them. On this point, happily, politicians of both parties are agreed. There is a patriotic concord as to the only means of deliverance from our most

distressing and alarming ill at home. The remedy is educational and not revolutionary. Thrift and abstinence from improvident and injudicious marriages, &c., will prevent poverty and low wages. Without these any other attempt at remedy will only make the condition of the poorest worse. To encourage hopes of alleviation from any other sources in lieu of these is cruelty. The false, mistaken kindness of the Poor-Law and of benevolent private effort has hindered people from seeing and learning the natural and inevitable consequences of common human actions. All we can do for the permanent improvement of the poor is to teach them how to help themselves by conforming to the irresistible laws of nature.

And so, many who have been most anxious for the enrichment of the poor, if necessary even at the expense of the rich, are compelled by sheer common sense to own themselves and all philanthropy and statecraft helpless. Their helplessness has been enormously self-compensating. Their conviction of the impotence of the State or of money to lift out of their poverty the recurring generations of the very poor has filled them with more pitying inventive many-sided personal zeal. The characteristic of those who have been most prominent and energetic and self-sacrificing of late in attempts to cope with the masses of poverty has been a certain hardness. Hardness has become the religion of philanthropists, and every religion has its phrases which degenerate into cant on the lips of some of its devotees. "No pauperising" has become a second "No Popery" shriek. "Is there a market for you?" has been the successor of "Are you saved?" Yet no one who knows them for a moment doubts that there has been a nobility and heroism and tenderness and stern martyr-like self-repression about many who have seemed hard as flint in their dealings with the poor. They have been merciless as the gentlest warrior may be merciless in some dreadful critical battle upon which hangs the fate of unseen homes and unborn babes. And the very voices that have cried alike to kid-gloved alms-givers, whose ready hands were in their well-filled pockets, and to tender-hearted

Communists eagerly grasping at the pockets of the State, "Hands off, in the interests of the unborn poor," have been the first to say that the rich may find plenty to do for the poor, in beautifying and refining their homes and haunts, and in sharing with them some of their own most costly privileges. Much energy has been liberated which would have been spent in political agitation had there been any measure to fight for which, like the abolition of the Corn Laws and Protection, promised wide-spread relief to poverty. This energy has had its out-put in varied and blessed channels which might otherwise have never been opened. Such bodies as the Kyrle Society and others, which bring the rich into close contact with the poor, probably number among their most active members men and women who might have been leading Revolutionists had not the unanswerable science of political economy taught them that nothing great can be hoped for from legislation; that no new legislative stroke, however revolutionary, can diminish poverty, that the laws of population and supply-and-demand are as unerring as the law of gravitation. We have concluded that patience is a necessity, and have made a virtue of this necessity. The utmost which our intelligence would allow our democratic sympathies to do has been to give a moral, but unasked-for support to trades-unions, &c. We may have wished that the country would turn its attention to Mill's doctrine about the un-earned increment. But we have at the same time felt that this would be of very little use to the poor. For we have seen that, with every increase of their wealth, there must be a fatally disproportionate increase in the number of hungry mouths. Practical legislative effort has been forbidden by those dogmas, those unquestionabilities of political economy which have inherited that abandoned air of absolute finality which was once supposed to attach exclusively to the formularies of the clergy. I am not joking or exaggerating. There are hundreds of men, beneath middle-age, of vigour and ability, to whom inaction on behalf of poverty has been intensely painful and yet a solemn duty. If current doctrines have checked nothing else, they have checked hope and thought in the

direction of solutions of our problem. From such a point of view there has seemed to educated Englishmen to be an ineradicable hopelessness in things themselves. They have seen all that Mr. Mallock has cleverly palmed off upon himself as his contribution to a new science; and more, for the science which has forbidden their hopes has been much more definite and elaborate than any that can possibly group itself around his fragment.

Mr. Mallock's work * reminds us that it may not be waste of time to emphasize this fact, that the science of political economy has been intensely anti-revolutionary in its bearings. The philosophising radicals whom he would fain deter in their course of destruction really need nothing more deterrent than their own theories supply them with. His book shows no familiarity whatever with the common leading tenets of our English political economists. Had he devoted a single page of his work to a *résumé* of the main principles enunciated by Mill, Fawcett, and Thorold Rogers, he might have spared his efforts to prove the impossibility of universal pecuniary equality,† and the need of any further ingenuity in this direction; unless his object is to fortify the hearts of those two splendidly-dressed ladies in the carriage whom he shields from Mr. Bright's wanton shafts. He has mistaken the combination of Radical and political economist in the same man for a proof that political economy is the source of Radicalism. But it is easier and more natural to suppose that the man made political economy his study because, to begin with, he had democratic sympathies, than that his desire and hopes of ameliorating the condition of the masses sprang from his devotion to political economy, which has hitherto been a revelation of the complex and permanent difficulties presented by nature to any attempt to alter existing proportions in the distribution of wealth. Mr. Mallock does not even seem to be aware that political

* *Social Equality: a Short Study in a Missing Science.*

† His book should rather have been entitled, "Pecuniary Equality," or "Economic Equality." A veritable work from his hands on social equality would be most interesting, especially if he broke his convenient silence as to the fact that he has in Mr. Matthew Arnold a foeman worthier of his peculiar metal than Mr. John Bright.

economy has generally been regarded, alike by philanthropists and socialists, as the "dismal science," forbidding hope in their direction. *E.g.*—"With regard, however, to voluntary poverty, it will be one main object of these pages to prove that the leniency and want of firmness with which it has been treated may probably be regarded as the most powerful of all the agencies which have produced the widespread distress which afflicts even the most wealthy countries."^{*}

Philosophic Radicals like Mill and Fawcett have been so anxious for national education, because they have felt that only an educated people could rise to a scientific appreciation of the real difficulties which beset their financial progress. Ill educated people might imagine that, if the State were to appropriate the land and to distribute the capital of our millionaires, poverty would be annihilated. An educated people will be able to understand economic laws, to see which are laws of nature, and which, "subject to certain conditions, depend on human will," to see how helpless the State is unless the people who compose it conform to the permanent laws of nature.

Let us try to state in a few sentences how the problem of poverty will present itself to a people well enough educated to read Mill and Fawcett.

These economists teach that wages tend always to a certain minimum rate; that there is a certain minimum of earnings on less than which people cannot, or will not, live; and that the natural state of things tends to force the wages of the worst paid labour down to this minimum. According as this minimum is lowered or raised will the whole scale of wages in a country be lowered or raised; for the wages of the higher grades of skill are acted upon by the same causes as force up or down the lowest grade. Wages tend down to this minimum rate because population tends to increase as fast as wages will allow. If through any improvement, lessening the cost of common articles, the value of wages is increased, or if emigration

* Fawcett, *Pauperism*, p. 9.

raises the wages of those who remain behind, the downward tendency will again operate, because population will increase with the increased ease of livelihood.

To say the same thing in slightly altered language, the rate of wages depends on supply and demand. The Capital of the Country, or the Wages Fund, furnishes the total wages of that country to the masses of the people. Thus capitalists will have to pay a rate of wages large or small according as the population of the country is so scarce or so plentiful that there is little or much competition against one another on the part of the people for the lump sum of capital at their disposal. But the higher wages are, the more rapidly will population increase, and the increased competition of wage receivers will thus always tend to bring down the rate of wages to the minimum on which the masses of the people can or will subsist. If capitalists were to pay a higher rate of wages than that fixed by the inter-action of supply and demand, they would increase the difficulties of a future day, for they would enable population to outstrip its natural limits. And this is the effect on a smaller scale of all alms-giving to the poor, and of a lenient Poor-Law. And so much more are Communistic schemes forbidden by the facts of life.

Thus have our scientific political economists stated the causes which impede the progress of the poorest classes. They have elaborated and enforced this main thought with pages of arguments and facts which are eloquently and simply set forth in such chapters as those of Mill on "The Law of the Increase and Production from Land" (Book I., 12, 13), and those on wages (Book II., 11—13). To sum up the case in a motto from Mr. Mill, which Mr. Mallock might have taken for the hat-band of his newly-dressed scarecrow, "The niggardliness of nature, not the injustice of society, is the cause of the penalty attached to over-population." (I. 13, ii.)

To shirk the acknowledgment of, or to be sceptical about, these iron conditions which environ poverty, has hitherto been condemned as rank ignorance or criminal folly by the very men who have often been regarded by society as

dangerous democratic doctrinaires. At the same time, the force of these ideas has silently seized the minds of all people sufficiently educated to entertain abstract questions, and an unmentioned Malthusianism dominates the thought of our most Conservative Poor-Law reformers and charity organisationists.

I have dwelt thus lengthily on the condition of dominant economic thought in England, because only those who realise the air of finality which prevails on this subject can appreciate the enormous importance of Mr. George's *Progress and Poverty* as a new contribution to the science of political economy. The kind of sacred obligation which attaches, in the minds of our most serious and sober social reformers, to the principles I have quoted, accounts, I suppose, for the silence that has been accorded to the book and has kept most English readers unaware that there has been circulating in our libraries for some two or three years a well-sustained impeachment of the main current principles of political economy. Only a skilled economist is capable of dealing adequately with the chain of Mr. George's argument. The damaging effect upon the influence of our economic writers which has ensued from their blank silence is very dangerous and lamentable.* They, beyond most men, have been trusted by thoughtful people as are pilots who know the shape and character of shoals in unsounded depths. We expected them at least to speak, if other guides, so evidently competent as Mr. George shows himself, declared their old warnings to be hocus pocus.† It is the specialists who must thoroughly sift Mr. George's complicated attacks upon their life-work. I can only lay

* A hundred thousand copies have been sold in America, the cheapest edition there being 2s. Since the sixpenny edition appeared in England, in September, about 20,000 copies have been sold (November).

† Professor Fawcett has lately mentioned Mr. George by name, but not the characteristics differentiating his work from the political economy of his own school. M. E. De Laveleye has an article on "*Progress and Poverty*," in the *Contemporary Review*, November, 1882. He agrees in his main conclusions with Mr. George, but his article fails to thoroughly grapple with the book by its omission to notice Mr. George's account of industrial depressions.

before my readers the leading conclusions he has arrived at, and the bearing they have upon popular thought, political and social. I would premise, however, that the book is, of its kind, unusually easy reading, that it is worthy at once of a poet and a man of science, full of observant detail, and chastened, honest emotion, which we may suppose are due to the writer's original artisanship, and that nothing I say about it can give a fair account of the unity and force of the work as a whole.

Mr. George opens with a statement, touching beyond description, of the problem which I preferred to couch in the language of Professor Fawcett in order to show that the opposing parties are agreed as to the actually existing concomitance of "Progress and Poverty," and of "Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth," and because the verdict of Professor Fawcett as to the facts will be accepted by Englishmen who might be indisposed to accept the statement of an American.

The great fact that poverty and all its concomitants show themselves in communities just as they develop into the conditions towards which material progress tends, proves that the social difficulties existing wherever a certain stage of progress has been reached, do not arise from local circumstances, but are in some way or another engendered by progress itself.

The new forces, elevating in their nature though they be, do not act upon the social fabric from underneath, as was for a long time hoped and believed, but strike it at a point intermediate between top and bottom. It is as though an immense wedge were being forced, not underneath society, but through society. Those who are above the point of separation are elevated, but those who are below are crushed down" (*Progress and Poverty*, "The Problem").

All agree then in asking, "*Why, in spite of increase of productive power, do wages tend to a minimum which will give but a bare living?*" But in his reply Mr. George flings himself into direct conflict with those current statements which I have enumerated. He denies that wages are drawn from capital.

If it be true that wages depend upon the ratio between the

amount of labour seeking employment and the capital devoted to its employment, then high wages (the mark of the relative scarcity of labour) must be accompanied by low interest (the mark of the relative abundance of capital), and, reversely, low wages must be accompanied by high interest. This is not the fact, but the contrary. Eliminating from interest the element of insurance, and regarding only interest proper or the return for the use of capital, is it not true that interest is high where and when wages are high, and low where and when wages are low? Both wages and interest have been higher in the United States than in England (I, 2).

The counter proposition which Mr. George lays down as to the source of wages is, "*That wages, instead of being drawn from capital, are in reality drawn from the product of the labour from which they are paid.*" On the face of it this seems very absurd. Cannot every one see that the capitalist pays the wages of his *employés* long before the goods they have made are sold? Yes, but to think accurately on economic processes it is an universal axiom that we must put out of our minds, as much as possible, the thought of money—mere counters in the process of exchange—and set our minds exclusively on the wealth which money represents. Mr. George contends that before the Saturday night, when wages are paid, the labourers have presented the capitalist with his goods as they existed at the commencement of the week augmented in value by the week's labour expended upon them. His capital on Monday was worth £1,000, and on Saturday it is £1,000 plus the value added by the week's work; and he receives this before he pays the wages. It has been more convenient to him not to have sold the goods during the week. Had he done so and received on Saturday night their money's worth before he paid the wages, it would have been evident to him that he received the capital at the hands of the labourers before he paid them their wages out of it. And so Mr. George asks, "As in the exchange of labour for wages the employer always gets the capital created by the labour before he pays out capital in the wages, at what point is his capital lessened even temporarily?"* The

* Book I., ch. 3.

current theory that wages are drawn from capital finds its most plausible shelter in the case of agricultural work. But if readers have followed me so far, they will understand Mr. George's meaning when he asserts that the farmer before he pays on Saturday night has got an increased amount of money's worth in his land. It is not the custom that farms should change hands except at stated seasons. If it were, and valuation were made on any Saturday, any farm would fetch so much more than its holder gave for it on the previous Monday, and he could get this increased amount before he paid the wages; in which case it would be evident that the labourers had advanced something to him, and not he to the labourers. Mr. George does not question that capital is a valuable auxiliary to labour. I must ask my readers' patience when I say that his book indeed claims to be written in the interests of capital. What he does deny is that wages are drawn from anything more solid than, or over and above, the product of the labour which created them and something else into the bargain. In simple primitive cases the truth is evident. If a labourer devotes himself to gathering berries, and is paid at the end of the week a certain share of the berries, no one would say that he was paid out of capital existing beforehand.

Capital has never to be set aside for the payment of wages when the produce of the labour for which the wages are paid is exchanged as soon as produced; it is only required when the produce is stored up, or what is to the individual the same thing, placed in the general current of exchanges without being at once drawn against—that is, sold on credit. But the capital thus required is not required for the payment of wages, nor for advances to labour, as it is always represented in the produce of the labour. It is never as an employer of labour that any producer needs capital; when he does need capital, it is because he is not only an employer of labour, but a merchant and speculator in, or an accumulator of, the products of labour. This is generally the case with employers (I., 3).

Readers must see for themselves how Mr. George, alike

from simpler and complex instances, elaborately illustrates and fortifies this conclusion, that—

If each labourer in performing the labour really creates the fund from which his wages are drawn, then wages cannot be diminished by the increase of labourers, but, on the contrary, as the efficiency of labour manifestly increases with the number of labourers, the more labourers, other things being equal, the higher should wages be (I., 5).

It is manifest that if Mr. George be right, our problem is not so eternally hopeless as it would otherwise seem to those who cannot anticipate any popular submission to Malthusian conduct. Our author next confronts these Malthusian theories to which he has been led by the proviso, "*other things being equal*," in his last sentence. It was the doctrine of the Rev. Mr. Malthus, and political economists ever since have, with varying modifications, accepted the doctrine, that, to use the words of Mr. Mill* :

"After a certain, and not very advanced, stage in the progress of agriculture, it is the law of production from the land that, in any given state of agricultural skill and knowledge, by increasing the labour the produce is not increased in an equal degree; doubling the labour does not double the produce; or, to express the same thing in other words, every increase of produce is obtained by a more than proportional increase in the application of labour to the land." And this law applies not only to agriculture†:—"All natural agents which are limited in quantity . . . yield to any additional demands on progressively harder terms." A greater number of people cannot, in any given state of civilisation, be collectively so well provided for as a smaller. The niggardliness of nature, not the injustice of society, is the cause of the penalty attached to over-population."‡

Thus the increasing population of any country have not only to compete against one another for wages, but have to buy all their food, tools, and clothing at an increasing cost of production as soon as improvements in production cease to multiply in proportion to the increased difficulty in acquiring the increased demand for raw material. Right-

* *Political Economy*, I., 12, ii. † *Ib.* I., 12, iii. ‡ *Ib.* I., 13, ii.

eously, then, did Mill pen that famous note about the squires and clergy. Patriotic is the bishop of that once famine-smitten diocese of factory-hands, if, as is reported, he punishes the curates who marry. But what says Mr. George?

He first examines—too lengthily for quotation—the inferences from the facts of various countries, boldly selecting India, China, and Ireland, in behalf of whose populations, ravaged with chronic hunger, Malthusians have pathetically besought the world to suppress its prejudices. Mr. George's reply with regard to India is well worth reading if it be only as a piece of nervous and persuasive English. The misrule of man, not the superabundance of population, is the cause to which he traces recurring famine.

As to Ireland, he has a like account to give. After describing the conditions under which tenants have worked, he goes on :

But even under these conditions it is a matter of fact that Ireland did more than support eight millions. For when her population was at the highest, Ireland was a food exporting country. Even during the famine, grain and meat and butter and cheese were carted for exportation along roads lined with the starving, and past trenches into which the dead were piled. For these exports of food, or at least for a great part of them, there was no return. So far as the people of Ireland were concerned, the food thus exported might as well have been burnt up or thrown into the sea, or never produced. It went not as an exchange, but as a tribute—to pay the rent of absentee landlords (II., 2).

Examining the inferences from analogy in support of the Malthusian theory, Mr. George elicits as the real law of population—not that population will always increase with increased abundance, but that a contrary tendency will set in. "Give more food, open fuller conditions of life, and the vegetable or animal can but multiply; the man will develop."

That besides the positive and prudential checks of Malthus, there is a third check which comes into play with the elevation of the standard of comfort and the development of the intellect,

is pointed to by many well-known facts. The proportion of births is notoriously greater in new settlements, where the struggle with nature leaves little opportunity for intellectual life, and among the poverty-bound classes of older countries, who in the midst of wealth are deprived of all its advantages and reduced to all but an animal existence, than it is among the classes to whom the increase of wealth has brought independence, leisure, comfort, and a fuller and more varied life (II., 3).

He does injustice here in ignoring the fact that Mill and others have propounded as a possible remedy for the tendency to over-population, extensive emigration—schemes which, by suddenly raising the “standard of comfort” amongst a population, and by giving them experience of a better condition, will make them less likely to throw away their new comforts by imprudent over-populating. And Malthusians may answer that, if these conditions which Mr. George apprehends come into operation, of course, the evil they forebode will be averted in the way they recommend and desiderate. So it is necessary for Mr. George to advance a “disproof of the Malthusian theory;” and to this he applies himself.

The question of fact into which this issue resolves itself is not in what stage of population is most subsistence produced? but in what stage of population is there exhibited the greatest power of producing wealth? For the power of producing wealth in any form is the power of producing subsistence—and the consumption of wealth in any form, or of wealth-producing power, is equivalent to the consumption of subsistence. . . . If I keep a footman I take a possible ploughman from the plough (II., 4).

“Does the relative power of producing wealth decrease with the increase of population?” The question is declared to be one of fact, and not for abstract reasoning.

That the production of wealth must, in proportion to the labour employed, be greater in a densely populated country like England than in new countries, where wages and interest are higher, is evident from the fact that, though a much smaller proportion of the population is engaged in productive labour, a

much larger surplus is available for other purposes than that of supplying physical needs. In a new country the whole available force of the community is devoted to production—there is no well man who does not do productive work of some kind, no well woman exempt from household tasks. There are no paupers, no beggars, no idle rich, no class whose labour is devoted to ministering to the convenience or caprice of the rich, no purely literary or scientific class, no criminal class who live by preying upon society, no large class maintained to guard society against them. Yet with the whole force of the community thus devoted to production, no such consumption of wealth in proportion to the whole population takes place, or can be afforded, as goes on in the old country; for, though the condition of the lowest class is better, and there is no one who cannot get a living, there is no one who gets much more—few or none who can live in anything like what would be called luxury or comfort in the older country. That is to say, in the older country the consumption of wealth in proportion to population is greater, although the proportion of labour devoted to the production of wealth is less—or that fewer labourers produce more wealth; for wealth must be produced before it can be consumed (II., 4).

Indeed, we should not be engaged in this inquiry, which occupies the attention of Malthusians as keenly as that of Mr. George, were it not for this very fact that “want appears where productive power is greatest and the production of wealth is largest.”

It is intensely interesting to speculate as to what answer Mr. Fawcett will make when his silence is broken, or he has unravelled Mr. George's tangled skeins of argument. It is open to a student of Mill to anticipate that all Mr. George alleges is true, on the Malthusian theory of any old country, such as that which Mr. George antithesises to a new colony, until the old country has reached that “Stationary State” (Mill, *Political Economy*, IV., 6), in which the increase and improvement of productive arts and sciences has ceased to keep pace with the increased pressure of population, and capital and population have ceased to overflow into new countries. But our author might fairly ask the objector to point to such a country or the likelihood of any such prospect.

Of course Mr. George, in his anti-Malthusian ardour, is not foolish enough to question that often it may be poverty-producing for a particular individual to have a large family. Nor, in questioning the *possibility*, does he deny the *conceivability* of this globe being over-populated. What he does deny is—the very plausible induction of a Malthusianising law of population from the frequently observed fact that an individual impoverishes himself by improvidence in marriage, or the deduction of such a law from the admitted conceivability that on the surface of a globe thickly populated the abstract theory of Malthus would be realised.

Mr. George claims, then, to have discovered, in his investigation into the source of wages and the Malthusian theory—

That the cause which, in spite of the enormous increase of productive power, confines the great body of producers to the least share of the product upon which they will consent to live, is not the limitation of capital, nor yet the limitation of the powers of nature, which respond to labour. As it is not, therefore, to be found in the laws which bound the production of wealth, it must be sought in the laws which govern distribution.

At this point it is cheering to one who, like myself, has had all his old schooling in political economy exposed as absurd, to be told that there is one great law laid down by the standard political economists which he has not to unlearn. And the law as to which there is this relieving concord is an important one. In the words of Mill—"It is one of the cardinal doctrines of Political Economy, and until it was understood no consistent explanation could be given of many of the more complicated industrial phenomena." It is the law of Rent, and is stated as follows by Mill—"The rent, which any land will yield, is the excess of its produce, beyond what would be returned to the same capital if employed on the worst land in cultivation."* Or, in Mr. George's almost identical terms—"The rent of land is determined by the excess of its produce over that which

* *Political Economy*, II., 16, iii.

the same application can secure from the least productive land in use." Any one unfamiliar with this law will see its truth when stated in this slightly shifted form—"The ownership of a natural agent of production will give the power of appropriating so much of the wealth produced by the exertion of labour and capital upon it as exceeds the return which the same application of labour and capital could secure in the least productive occupation in which they freely engage" (III., 2).

The produce of any piece of land has to be divided into Rent, Return to the Farmer for his own labour and capital, and Wages. Or, classing the reward of the farmer, *quâ* farmer, for his labour of superintendence, as wages of superintendence, and calling the return to his capital interest; $\text{Produce} = \text{Rent} + \text{Wages} + \text{Interest}$; or, $\text{Wages} + \text{Interest} = \text{Produce} - \text{Rent}$.

Thus wages and interest do not depend upon the produce of labour and capital, but upon what is left after rent is taken out; or upon the produce which they could obtain without paying rent—that is, from the poorest land in cultivation. And hence, no matter what be the increase in productive power, if the increase in rent keeps pace with it, neither wages nor interest can increase (III., 2).

Mr. George proceeds on the same lines to gather the law regulating wages. In a new colony it is evident that a man's wages will be what he can earn by working for himself on land for which he has to pay no rent. Any one who employs labour will have to pay the equivalent of what a labourer can earn for himself on land as yet unappropriated; otherwise as long as there was land unappropriated he would get no one to work for him. At first, then, in such a new colony, wages are very high. But as fast as the better land is appropriated, and people who work for themselves have to work on inferior lands, the rate of wages will fall to the amount that can be earned on those inferior lands. Thus, according to the law by which rent rises to a greater and greater share of the produce as a country is more and more thickly populated, and there is less and less

unappropriated land, wages at the same time fall in rate to a smaller and smaller share in the produce, because the amount which a labourer can earn for himself by leaving his master, and working at unappropriated land or natural resources is becoming less and less.

And if this be true, the rate of *all* wages will gradually fall as there is less and less opening for labourers on non-rent-producing land. For employers of all kinds of unskilled labour will only have to give the same wages, or a shade more, than men can earn for themselves on the as yet unappropriated land. And the various kinds of employers of skilled labour in all its ascending grades will only have to give each so many shades more than can be got on this best unappropriated land. Thus, in proportion as the best unappropriated land to which recourse can be had is of a lower and lower productiveness, the wages of all kinds of labour, skill, and superintendence will fall. And we get as the universal law of wages that "*Wages depend upon the margin of production, or upon the produce which labour can obtain at the highest point of natural productiveness open to it without the payment of rent.*"

The plausible, and at first sight unquestionable dictum, that the rate of wages depends on supply and demand, is only true of each separate kind of labour. The wages of shoemakers, or jewellers, or clerks, will, of course, depend on the supply and demand in their respective occupations. But beneath the temporary causes regulating the *relative* values of wages of clerks, &c., as compared with jewellers, &c., is the common permanent cause operating on the rates of wages in *all* occupations, and raising *all* or lowering *all* according to the rate that prevails for the lowest stratum. Mr. George asserts that to speak of supply and demand as a law covering the whole question of wages is an absurdity in terms. For "supply" is seen to be the same thing as "demand" when each is logically traced to the material which it stands for. The "supply" of the universe is the whole labour of mankind; and the demand of the universe is what collective mankind possesses to offer in return for supply—viz., the whole labour of man-

kind. And so to talk of *universal* over-production, *universal* over-consumption, or over-population (short of an overcrowded globe) are absurdities in phraseology.

Having shown the effect upon wages and rent of the increased influx of population as long as there is land to be had in a new country, Mr. George proceeds to examine what effect material progress, the increase of population and of improvements in the productive arts, will have.

Improvements in the arts of production will counteract the tendency of wages to sink beneath the cause which we have just found to be in universal operation. Like increase in population, these improvements will also add to the amount of production which goes to rent; for all productions above what is yielded by land at the margin of lowest cultivation will still go to rent. However much the productiveness of a factory, a shop, or a field may be increased by improved methods of production, the owner of the bit of land will be able to subtract from the produce raised on his ground, be it in a factory, a shop, or a field, all that is produced beyond what could have been produced on an equal bit of the poorest land in cultivation, or the most inconvenient site eligible. The greater the improvements the more will rents rise. And as $\text{Wages} + \text{Interest} = \text{Produce} - \text{Rent}$, Wages and Interest may well be low, as they are in an old and wealthy country as compared with a new and undeveloped one.

But material progress has a still further tendency to increase rent and diminish the comparative return to labour and capital.

Speculation for land, of course, sets in with material progress. Land of inferior quality, where land is to be had, must be resorted to before certain lands of superior worth are cultivated, because speculators hold back lands from use with a knowledge of their certain rise in value, and thus the wage-adjusting margin of cultivation is forced even lower. Here Mr. George's American experience has turned his eyes to facts which will surprise Englishmen. This speculation in land, he concludes, is

the force, evolved by material progress, which tends con-

stantly to increase rent in a greater ratio than progress increases production, and thus constantly tends, as material progress goes on, and productive power increases, to reduce wages, not merely relatively, but absolutely. It is this expansive force which, operating with great power in new countries, brings to them, seemingly long before their time, the social diseases of older countries; produces 'tramps' on virgin acres, and breeds paupers on half-tilled soil (IV., 4).

This brings our author to the cause he assigns for industrial depressions.

Given a progressive community, in which population is increasing and one improvement succeeds another, and land must constantly increase in value. This steady increase naturally leads to speculation in which future increase is anticipated, and land values are carried beyond the point at which, under the existing conditions of production, their accustomed returns would be left to labour and capital. Production, therefore, begins to stop. Not that there is necessarily, or even probably, an absolute diminution in production; but that there is what in a progressive community would be equivalent to an absolute diminution of production in a stationary community—a failure in production to increase proportionately, owing to the failure of new increments of labour and capital to find employment at the accustomed rates.

This stoppage of production at some points must necessarily show itself at other points of the industrial network, in a cessation of demand, which would again check production there, and thus the paralysis would communicate itself through all the interlacings of industry and commerce, producing everywhere a partial disjuncting of production and exchange, and resulting in the phenomena that seem to show over-production or over-consumption, according to the standpoint from which they are viewed.

The period of depression thus ensuing would continue until (1) the speculative advance in rents had been lost; or (2) the increase in the efficiency of labour, owing to the growth of population and the progress of improvement, had enabled the normal rent line to overtake the speculative rent line; or (3) labour and capital had become reconciled to engaging in production for smaller returns. Or most probably all three of these causes would co-operate to produce a new equilibrium, at which all the forces of production would again engage, and a season of activity

ensue; whereupon rent would begin to advance again, a speculative advance again take place, production be again checked, and the same round be gone over again (V., 1).

Whatever may be the fate of this newly propounded account of industrial depressions, it is evident that it *has* the appearance of *accounting* simply for phenomena which have hitherto been the battle-ground of conflicting theorists, and which, one after another, have been proved untenable by one leading economist or another. General over-production, whilst we all want more than we have. General over-consumption, whilst people are standing idle who would gladly supply consumers with what they want. Speculation in *goods*, which is known to have a beneficially equalising effect in its play. Over-population, when crowds of able-bodied men are in need of goods and are ready to make goods in return for what they need. These incoherent causes dwindle into insignificance and inadequacy as *accounting* for depressions compared with the undoubtedly and universally operative force to which Mr. George points.

Thus the cause of industrial depressions, and of increase of want with increase of wealth, is stated to be the private ownership of land.

Mr. George gives us vivid illustrations of his law in active operation in San Francisco, California, and the United States :—

The present commercial and industrial depression which first clearly manifested itself in the United States in 1872, and has spread with greater or less intensity over the civilised world, is largely attributed to the undue extension of the railroad system, with which there are many things that seem to show a relation. I am fully conscious that the construction of railroads before they are actually needed may divert capital and labour from more to less productive employments, and make a community poorer instead of richer; . . . but to assign to this wasting of capital such a widespread industrial dead-lock seems to me like attributing an unusually low tide to the drawing of a few extra bucketfuls of water. The waste of capital and labour during the civil war was enormously greater than it could possibly be by the construction of unnecessary

railroads, but without producing any such result. And, certainly, there seems to be little sense in talking of the waste of capital and labour in railroads as causing this depression, when the prominent feature of the depression has been the superabundance of capital and labour seeking employment.

Yet, that there is a connection between the rapid construction of railroads and industrial depression, any one who understands what increased land values mean, and who has noticed the effect which the construction of railroads has upon land speculation, can easily see. Wherever a railroad was built or projected, lands sprang up in value under the influence of speculation, and thousands of millions of dollars were added to the nominal values which capital and labour were asked to pay outright, or to pay in instalments, as the price of being allowed to go to work and produce wealth. The inevitable result was to check production, and this check to production propagated itself in a cessation of demand, which checked production to the furthest verge of the wide circle of exchanges, operating with accumulated force in the centres of the great industrial commonwealth into which commerce links the civilised world (V., 2).

It is not so easy to trace concrete instances of this law in operation in an old country like ours, with its elaborate industrial development. But we have only to think of the enormous rents in our great cities to see that, if what goes to capital and labour out of their joint production is that production *minus* rent, then rent and speculation for rent must have the same effect in England as elsewhere, must lower the rate of wages and diminish the return to capital which otherwise would accrue from material progress until the return to labour and capital is so small that production is checked, and the symptoms of industrial depression ensue.

Thus Mr. George has led us on step by step to a conclusion startling in its simplicity. I can see no flaw in his process. The facts tally with one another. They must be summarised in Mr. George's own words :—

The simple theory which I have outlined (if, indeed, it can be called a theory which is but the recognition of the most obvious relations) explains this conjunction of poverty with wealth, of low wages with high productive power, of degradation amid

enlightenment, of virtual slavery in political liberty. It harmonises, as results flowing from a general and inexorable law, facts otherwise most perplexing, and exhibits the sequence and relation between phenomena that, without reference to it, are diverse and contradictory. It explains why interest and wages are higher in new than in older communities, though the average, as well as the aggregate production of wealth is less. It explains why improvements which increase the productive power of labour and capital, increase the reward of neither. It explains what is commonly called the conflict between labour and capital, while proving the real harmony of interest between them. It cuts the last inch of ground from under the fallacies of Protection, while showing why Free Trade fails to permanently benefit the working classes. It explains why want increases with abundance, and wealth tends to greater and greater aggregations. It explains the periodically recurring depressions of industry without resource either to the absurdity of "over-production" or the absurdity of "over-consumption." It explains the enforced idleness of numbers of would-be producers, which wastes the productive force of advanced communities, without the absurd assumption that there is too little work to do, or that there are too many to do it. It explains the ill effects upon the labouring classes which often follow upon the introduction of machinery, without denying the natural advantages which the use of machinery gives. It explains the vice and misery which show themselves amid dense population, without attributing to the laws of the All-Wise and All-Beneficent defects which belong only to the short-sighted and selfish enactments of men" (V., 2).

Private ownership in land, then, stands condemned, unless Mr. George's account of low wages and industrial depressions can be disproved. And this condemnation of private ownership has a totally different basis from the many that have been often advanced previously. Hitherto educated people in England, though perhaps not on the Continent, have generally felt that the various schemes for the extrusion of our present landowners have been as questionable in expediency as in justice, and that their possible alleviation of our present evils was small and unpromising compared with the risks entailed. But if Mr. George's political economy be correct, it becomes a public cruelty and wickedness to allow private ownership to continue unmitigated as at

present. And the paramount problem is as to how the required change is to be effected.

Mr. George's proposed remedy is as simple in appearance as his demonstration of the evil. He would not have the State directly extrude a single landowner. He would throw all taxes on ground rent.* Thus land, having lost its rent-producing value for private owners, would cease to be the subject of speculation as at present, and the common cause of industrial depression would no longer exist. Capital and labour would be relieved of their present load of taxation, every penny of which, as Mr. Fawcett told his hearers the other day, presses indirectly on the denizen of the dingiest garret. There would be no new expense of collection; no wasteful State management of landed property; no positive need for people who use land productively, or who are rich enough to indulge in the enjoyments of large landownership, to give up any of their domains. Improvements would not be impeded as at present, for the tax would be confined to ground rent, which valuers can approximately eliminate from the total value of the land to its owner. And even if there were some risk that improvements would not escape taxation, they would not be taxed in so many ways as at present.

I have here dealt with less than the first three-fifths of our author's volume. The remainder, which space forbids me to notice now, deals with the justice of his proposals and their probable economic and social effects. As to these chapters, M. E. de Laveleye's words will be more telling than any of my own.

"I can but unreservedly approve the elevated views of the future in store for modern society which terminate Mr. George's book. I also believe that if Democracy do not succeed in effecting a more equitable distribution of property and of the produce of men's labour, it will perish amid corruption and anarchy, and finally end in Cæsarism.

* He carefully distinguishes between ground rent and interest on improvements which is not to be taxed; for, unlike ground rent, it is produced by effort or labour.

The picture which the author draws of the vices which growing inequality is developing in the noble institutions of America is really fearful, and, I suspect, not in the least exaggerated."*

It only remains for me now to point out how the propositions of our author, granted their economic proveability, are likely to strike a public at present strongly under the dominion of the views I have enlarged upon in the earlier part of this paper.

I speak of the probable effect upon educated people in all classes. I do not allude to the appeal which may be made to the greed of the masses, nor do I attempt to estimate the effect the book will have upon people who, if intelligent enough to read it, are yet sufficiently ill-educated or fanatical to lump together all the wide-spread craving for social change as motived by jealousy of the rich. The direct appeal to the masses will be nothing more than has been made by other schemes; indeed it will be less forcible, for the masses will be slow to sympathise with Mr. George's regard for capital. At present, Democracy in England trusts its Parliamentary and political leaders. Till they are won, no scheme at present has any chance of success. The kind of appeal inherent in this new political economy is one which will have as much cogency with educated and patriotic landowners as with other kindred minds.

1. A dead weight will be lifted off the hopes of all who have hitherto turned away from politics, because economic science has compelled them to see that whatever the State may imagine, she can no more relieve the burdens of poverty than she can stop people from marrying. A great amount of hope, enthusiasm, and intelligence will be set free, and will turn aside for a time from their exclusive devotion to slower personal methods of helping the poor towards this rift in the clouds of pessimism and hopelessness. If there is anything in this discovery it is the discovery of a new Cobden, and it will call forth such political energy as has had no object or manifestation since some one found out that Protection made every mouthful of the poor man's

* *Contemporary Review*, November, 1882.

food harder to get, and Cobden and his friends gave tongue to the discovery. There is even an element in this new discovery which will fire the imagination of philanthropists far more than did the Anti-Corn Law Agitation. It was cruel enough to maintain laws which made every mouthful of food dearer. But it is an aggravation of this cruelty to maintain a state of things which has not only kept back from the poorest classes of the nation the fresh food which Free Trade has furnished, but must always leave them and all classes of the community to be tossed backwards and forwards between plenty and poverty by upheavals and depressions, as it were of mother earth herself, which we know must succeed one another, but cannot foresee or avert. The appeal of economic science will be, not any longer as hitherto, in the name of mercy to hold off our hands; nor will the appeal of the new economic creed be to take something from the rich and give it to the poor, but to cut away the perennial cause of industrial calamity and to take care that that unearned increase of wealth, which is the mechanical outcome of increasing population and productiveness, shall no longer be allowed to impoverish labour and capital. The appeal is essentially to the thoughtful.

2. There is nothing "communistic" in the scheme. It will not interfere with, or seek to check, any natural inequalities in wealth which flow from inequalities in genius, thrift, or industry. "Social equality" will be as far off as even Mr. Mallock could wish it to be. M. E. de Laveleye's fear seems to be that the relief to taxation would be chiefly advantageous to capital.

3. It is not easy to say who will be most interested in opposing or supporting the reform. Unlike other schemes, this does not affect merely agricultural rent. The landowner with a thousand acres will lose less than many an owner of a little patch of ground in a crowded neighbourhood. The Corn Law Reform was chiefly resisted by "the landed interest," and every one thought that the landowners would be great losers; but the result has been that rents have increased enormously. The owners of agricultural land, so many of whom have "farms on their hands" at

the present time, will all benefit *as farmers and capitalists*; and who will deny that in countless instances it would be a happy thing for agricultural England, and for themselves, if a greater number of landowners worked their farms themselves, and earned as capitalists what they would lose in rent? This would naturally occur in cases where the tenant farmer is at present in the shakiest condition, and where it is least desirable for himself or his neighbours that his existence as tenant should be prolonged. The larger farmers, who are possessed of capital, would probably become owners instead of tenants, as they would be the chief competitors in the new state of things for any land in the market. Evidently the reasons for resistance upon the part of the counties would be much less violent than they were at the time of the Corn Law Repeal. And the forces on the side of the reform in towns would consist of all who are capitalists rather than rent-owners.

4. If Mr. George's economic arguments be accepted by politicians as sound, it will not follow that they will be acted upon as thoroughly or as speedily as he recommends, even by those who heartily accept them. He will get very few educated English people to act with him upon his conclusion that the nation has a right to claim compensation from the landlords for past wrongs rather than landlords from the nation for the injury done to them by fresh legislation. At the same time, I believe, most people will be surprised to see how much Mr. George can urge, in the name of justice and necessity, against any compensation except to widows and orphans. But a distinguishing characteristic in the application of this new economic theory is that it can be made gradually without inflicting any of the individual cruelties of sudden revolutions. Taxes will be gradually shifted on to the land if there prevails even a strong suspicion of the economic truth of these new propositions; and it is not absurd to argue that so the scheme may become law without either compensation or cruelty.

5. And supposing that the work should be proved to be a tissue of economic fallacies, it is too brilliant a production to be lost sight of rapidly. For a generation to

come it will be talked about more than most books, if it be only by English-speaking economists, who will find in it the richest illustrations and the most elaborate specimens of the fallacies which economists exist to confute. If it be a failure as an attempt to account for industrial depressions, it will have done at least this service to political economy, that, for good or evil, it will have brought home with unprecedented force to the public mind that law of rent, of which Mill says, "It is one of the cardinal doctrines of political economy."

I have said enough to call the attention of readers better qualified than myself to the study of *Progress and Poverty*. Let those who condemn the author for extravagances remember that, at worst, he has not imposed upon them in the problem, that it exists and cries to heaven and earth for solution.

GEORGE SARSON.

*PFLEIDERER'S VIEW OF ST. PAUL'S DOCTRINE.**

THERE is much loose talk afloat about Paul as the real founder of Christianity. This is a favourite thesis of the Positivists, and is intelligible enough on their part. The catholic and mediæval form of Christianity, which alone Comte knew, might easily, when contrasted with the Christianity of the Gospels, produce such an impression on a mind like his. But it would be about as correct to say that Comte was the founder of Humanity.

Still, in such a statement there is just as much truth as leads us to characterise it as a loose, rather than a false, one. Humanly speaking, it is impossible to see how Christianity could have passed into human history without Paul. It seemed likely, but for him, to become only another of the sects that swallowed up, in a dusty desert of Judaism, the river of the water of life. But, then, humanly speaking also, it is hard to see how Christianity could have become what it has been for Europe without that association with the Roman Empire which has to this day invested the Church with so much practical power and prestige at the cost of so much simplicity, purity, and spiritual force. It would not be true to say that the Roman Empire was the foundation of the Christian Church. Neither can it be accurate to say that Paul was the real founder of Christianity. The *form* of the organised Church to-day is largely, perhaps mainly, due to elements, not always vicious, borrowed from the political world. And, in the same way, the current and popular forms of organised doctrine may be said to owe

* *Paulinism: a Contribution to the History of Primitive Christian Theology.* By OTTO PFLEIDERER, Doctor and Prof. of Theology at Jena. Translated by Edward Peters. 2 Vols. (Williams and Norgate. 1877.)

more to Aristotle and Paul than to Christ. But it was neither Paul nor Aristotle that made these doctrines winged words any more than it was the effete Roman Empire that made Christianity the creed of Europe. The dynamic element of the Church did not come from the Empire. And it was not Paul that sent life and blood coursing through the doctrinal systems of Christian belief. Paul was but an apostle, after all. He was not a Saviour. Original as he was, his system, no less than his mission, was derived. And the question is in respect of his system, with which alone we here deal—what was its derivation? He has much to say himself about the way in which he derived his commission. He has but little expressly to say about the process by which he derived his creed. If I may use the language of a philosophy that is happily becoming influential in England, he is copious and explicit about the origin of his divine knowledge in its immediacy, but he was little concerned to pursue and record closely the steps of the process by which it became mediated in the action of his mind.

But there are two reasons why at the present moment an inquiry like this should be of special interest and unusual fascination. In the first place, having so recently lost the great English apostle of the method of development, it lies close to our hand to remember that in the sphere of religious history this idea has come to play a prominent and fruitful part. Indeed, there is no other method than the evolutionary now possible to the historian of doctrine. "The true criticism of a doctrine is its history," says Baur; and the word is most true. It is a waste of time and a contempt of providence now to treat the past of any doctrine as if it were a dead and mechanical thing. Doctrines are not fetishes, however some people may treat them. They are living creatures with a reasonable soul. They have a power to grow and vary in the struggle among faiths for existence. The engrossing intellectual interest in the history of the Church is to watch the development of doctrine from its first crude germs to its highly organised forms. And the more profound our belief, and therefore

our interest in any doctrine is, the more eagerly and sympathetically shall we practise our new power of standing by its childish years, watching its tottering steps, and marking its growth in wisdom and stature and in favour with God and man.

Nor are we satisfied to have traced the growth of a doctrine in the Church or in the world alone. The history of the child does not begin with its introduction to society, or even its first glimpse of the light. Darwinism has, we may almost say, called the science of embryology into being—at least, it has given that science an extraordinary and fertile interest. Let us apply this inevitable metaphor to the matter in hand. The scientific study of the development of doctrines cannot leave out of account the period of their gestation in those creative spirits who bore them into the world. The origins of Christian theology in Judaism and in Platonism have been so well discussed, that we may take some credit to ourselves if we still believe any connection to exist at all. But, after all, that is not the most fascinating *preparatio evangelica*. It cannot compare for absorbing and even passionate interest with that preparation which transpires in silent, dramatic, nay, tragic, process within a vast and fiery soul like Paul's. We are compelled to go beyond the philosophical *entourage* and the social *milieu*, which made a cradle for our creed's infant years, into the psychological processes and genetic stages through which it passed while it was made in secret, and curiously wrought in the deepest parts of the apostle's soul.

That is the first impulse which acts so powerfully towards the genetic study of beliefs—the general spread of the historical and developmental method in all departments of scientific research. And that is the positive factor in this new and living interest in the dogmatic past. But there is another and a negative factor as well. It consists in the great change which has taken place in the ideas of inspiration and revelation. The old Jewish and mechanical theory of inspiration is gone. The account it gave of the origin of Paul's system left no room whatever for development either in the history of the Church or in the soul of the apostle.

He was simply the copyist of a certain theological paradigm which was thrown upon the screen of his inspired soul, and held there long enough to be reproduced in a complete and infallible replica. It is clear that such a theory offered no encouragement to any speculation about the origin of the Pauline doctrine. It was almost blasphemy to speak of the Pauline doctrine. It was not Pauline. It was immediately divine. All that was left for human and rational exertion to do was simply to piece together in various forms, in a more or less mechanical way, the system which the Spirit had strangely enough left in a rather slipshod and discontinuous shape. The transcript of Paul's mind which resulted from such treatment might be likened to a mosaic of the apostle picked out upon the tessellated Roman pavement of the Catholic Church. It was allowable to form a rational harmony of the Epistles, but only in the same mechanical sense as it was permitted to form an historical harmony of the Gospels. As for dreaming that certain sides of Paul's belief were more completely developed than others, and that there were consequent contradictions which he himself had not harmonised to his own mind in a systematic way—such a dream only escaped contempt because too dangerous. Well, that theory—that view of Inspiration—has broken down along the whole line. The living consciousness and individuality of prophet and apostle has become a real and powerful factor in his mission and revelation. And consequently to the question still asked, and more imperatively asked, about the origin of the Pauline system, we must answer in a biological, instead of a mechanical, way. It was a new era for Christian thought and Christian piety when it was found that Paul's system was a part of himself; when we were made to see, as it were, by the critical microscope a continuous circulation maintained between his heart and his brain. It is a newer and richer era still which shows us not the fact merely, but the process; Paul's system *growing* out of himself by psychological necessity; not merely reflecting himself, but in the very process of developing from himself; his thought in the act of springing from his nature.

There are many points of deep and touching analogy between this greatest and tenderest of the apostles and the tenderest and, in some respects, the greatest of the prophets. Leaving for the time all other resemblances, we are here reminded of one in particular. They were both "born prophets" in a sense almost unique. Their mission was more closely identified with their character than in the case of any of the rest. Amos was a prophet but for the nonce. He was the herdsman of Thekoa, who went on a special errand for his master, and when it was done resumed his crook and quiet. Even Isaiah carries less of his individuality into his vocation, and owes more to his call than to his predestination for his work. But Jeremiah was a prophet from the womb (i. 5). His personality was intertwined and almost identified with his vocation, and his call comes in no outward experience like the vision that ordained Isaiah (vi. 1), but in the very structure and idiosyncrasy of his mind and soul. So it was with Paul, notwithstanding the crucial episode at Damascus. From his beginning the tinder was laid for that spark—nay, more, it had been carefully saturated with intense combustibles all through his life. Both his character and his training were charged with a divine intent, a latent providence, and a prophetic strain, which did as much to produce the conversion as the conversion to give them free voice and course. When, therefore, we can trace the peculiar gospel of Paul as already implicit in his pre-Christian character and culture, we by no means depreciate the quality or question the reality of his Inspiration. We do but widen its compass and deepen its tone. To fuse the Pauline and the historical Christ, for example, implies a divine teleology in the whole previous development of Hebrew thought. We extend the action of the prophetic providence which bestowed him as no hasty boon upon the world, but as a deeply-considered gift, selected early and prepared long, choicely distilled, and duly matured for the special use of the Master of the Feast—himself, as it were, a lamb slain from before the foundation of the world.

Now it is this characteristic and genetic origin of Paul's

creed that is shown to us in Pfleiderer's book. It is an exposition of Pauline doctrine from the genetic, or what may be called the embryological, point of view. I am speaking of the first volume only. The second contains an account of the development of the Pauline system in the Church after it passed from the apostle's own age and control.

The first great scholar to rehabilitate Paul, of course, was Baur. All that has been done since has been done on the basis he laid. But Baur's exposition of Paul's system, fresh, original and searching as it was, was not attached to the apostle's religious life, culture, and experience in a sufficiently close and organic way. The great step in that direction was taken by Holsten. It is Holsten that has given the key and impulse to all the latest, best, and truest interpretation of Paul. He broke ground first, so far as I know, in a pamphlet, published in correction of Baur in 1853, and dealing with the crucial point of Paul's attitude to the law, as set forth in the third chapter of the Epistle to the Galatians. Then in 1867, he published in book form, an expansion of an article which he had contributed to Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift*. And now he is publishing the completest form of his theory in the shape of a commentary on the Pauline epistles. Pfleiderer is, and professes to be, a disciple of Holsten, though sometimes criticising him freely. His *Paulinism* is the result of Holsten's book of 1867, and develops the theory in a more complete way than Holsten had done so far; though Holsten's present work aims at being even more complete than Pfleiderer's. It is only in his masterly introduction that Pfleiderer keeps up the form of a spiritual and intellectual biography of the apostle. In the rest of the first volume he arranges his chapters according to subjects,—Sin, The Law, Righteousness, &c. Holsten is dissatisfied with his pupil's method in this respect, and his commentary is written, not from the purely exegetical point of view, but with the object of tracing the genetic process by the aid of the documents themselves. Not *in* the documents. That point is worth attention. It has been usual, in the delight of finding Paul to be a man whose convictions grew upon

him like our own, to spread the development of his system over his whole life and try to trace it in the positions successively occupied in his great epistles. Pfeiderer seems to some extent to support this view. But Holsten declares it to be extreme. He distinguishes between the real period of development in Paul's views and the subsequent period of their mere modification and application to fresh circumstances. The period of true development or transformation was the three years subsequent to his conversion, in which he fought his way out of Judaism into Christianity. It was then that he besieged and took the intellectual position which afterwards he only fortified more strongly. Holsten's words are worth quoting: "Whoever enters society as an apostle to preach the gospel of a new life must have the development of his own conscience and all the warfare that entails behind him. It is because the apostle believes that he demands belief and gets it."

But what is the precise problem that Holsten and Pfeiderer set before them? Loosely put, it might be said to be this: Given the man Paul, Pharisaism, and Judaic Christianity, to construct the Apostle. But that is a very loose and by no means distinctive way of putting it. Their problem is to find a key which shall at once explain the conversion of Paul and his special and peculiar gospel. The current idea is that Paul became converted into a Christian, and then gradually the idea developed in his mind that Christianity was universal and antinomian—a gospel to the heathen as well as the Jew. But in the Epistle to the Galatians, when challenged about his mission to the heathen, he narrates his conversion. Now, on the usual theory, that course was quite irrelevant on his part. It was not his Christianity, his conversion, that was challenged, but his universalism. It is clear that Paul felt that the keynote of his distinctive gospel was also the keynote of his conversion. We have not been without efforts even in England to trace some preparation in Paul's previous life for his sudden conversion. Mr. R. H. Hutton has made perhaps one of the best of such efforts. But, as Pfeiderer says, they

have all laboured under this disadvantage, that they were hypotheses which there was no means of testing. Now, he says we have got a canon. "We require the psychological antecedents of his conversion to exhibit at the same time the root of his peculiar gospel." We seek "such a psychological explanation of the conversion of Paul as may contain at the same time the germ of his special doctrine." It is clear that one tendency of this quest and of this book is to accentuate the value of the rational dogmatic intellectual element in the conversion of the Apostle without destroying its specially religious form and reality. It may be regarded with particular attention by those who think that they can safely extract the intellectual sinew from the deepest religion, and leave the "unbraced and downgyved" residuum of piety and goodness to stand for genuine faith.

What, then, is the key which affords at once a psychological explanation of the conversion and the gospel of Paul? It was the idea of the crucified Messiah. "Is that all?" says the scorner. "*Nascitur ridiculus mus.*" But we have been brought up in Paulinism. We cannot easily realise how gritty that idea was in the teeth not only of the Pharisees, but of the apostles and the Jewish Christians generally. They did not glory in the cross. They extenuated it. Christ was to them Messiah, not because of the cross, but in spite of it. In the first teaching of the apostles in the Book of Acts, the cross, as such, has no saving efficacy. But to Paul Jesus was the Messiah, not in spite of, but because of, the cross. He did not extenuate it; he emphasized it. It was to him primary; to the others secondary. He valued the resurrection because of the cross, not the cross because of the resurrection. To the other Christians, the cross was at best the fulfilling and completion of the law. To Paul, it was the abrogation and replacement of law. It did not give us power for the old kind of righteousness, but instituted a new kind. He found here a happy solution of the great Pharisaic antinomy, that the people must be righteous before Messiah could come, and yet it was the coming of Messiah that was to make

them a righteous people. It was this new kind of righteousness, the righteousness of the cross and of faith—the ideal not the actual righteousness—that was needed to prepare the way for the Messiah's glorious coming. The cross was the central point of his gospel. Was it the central factor in his conversion? It was, just because it was so utterly incompatible with the Pharisaism which to Paul was true Judaism. If Christ was right, the Pharisees were not only wrong, but ruined. There was no middle ground of escape. They had cursed and killed the Messiah, and no crime of their national history could compare with that, because it was for the Messiah they existed. The question of the divinity of the cross was one of life or death for Pharisaism. And Paul was too thorough-going in mind and in temperament, far too acute and passionate in his religion, not to see that. He therefore hated with no common hatred, the Christians who declared that they could prove by the Scriptures and by the resurrection that the Crucified was the Messiah of God. Being a Pharisee, however, he was amenable to both those lines of argument. He shared with the Christians the Jewish method of interpreting and venerating the Old Testament. And the resurrection was a cardinal Pharisaic doctrine. Add to all this the supplementary evidence flowing in the way of moral impression from the gladness with which the Christians took suffering for the sake of their faith, and we begin to see that the awful possibility of the cross being his nation's glory instead of a malefactor's shame must have grown upon him, and made his position as inquisitor a perfect torment to him. Throw finally into the scales of wavering conviction the moral and spiritual echo which he heard among the Christians, of a note with which he was early familiar in the prophetic and ethical side of the Old Testament. Let all this act on his peculiar and epileptic temperament, and we have the conditions for that scene near Damascus—the most momentous probably for history of any outside the life of Christ himself. He has poor ideas of the supernatural who refuses to call this a supernatural revelation because there was no physical reality before Paul's eyes in the air, and because the event

was led up to by a prolonged and fevered process in the very depths of the apostle's rational soul.

Having shown that the suffering and crucified Messiah is the master key to both the conversion and the gospel of Paul, Pfleiderer goes on, in the greater part of his first volume, to trace with detail the development of Paul's theology from this central and formative thought. There is space here neither to follow nor to criticise him. This is the part of his work that will seem most novel and striking, as well as most dangerous to some existing beliefs. Put briefly it may be said that Pfleiderer's method of accounting for the genesis of some of Paul's great beliefs is a method of compound reflection. And this does not mean only that the Pauline system is an intellectual projection or reflection of the apostle's Christian consciousness. It implies that ; but what is particularly meant is this—that the apostle had a habit of thinking back from conclusions to new premises which were more or less incongruous with those from which he started. This is exemplified with special force in the doctrine of Law.

The question is this—What necessity was there that this incurred penalty [of sin] should be suffered at all, when the divine willingness to show grace existed before the expiation, and, indeed, was necessary to make it possible? . . . [The usual explanation] has no slight obstacle to encounter in the presuppositions of Paul himself. . . . The law is to him not a thing valid unconditionally and eternally, and therefore against Christ Himself. It is something which has intervened for a passing purpose between promise and fulfilment—the purpose being to increase sin and awaken mankind out of the impotent slavery of its bondage into faith. Now, how can this law, so temporary in its scope from the first, and so subordinate to Christ, raise against Christ, its Lord by the very constitution of things, a claim which could be satisfied only by his death of expiation and blood? Does not a claim which was to be valid only for a certain period expire of itself at the end of that period without the need for any other release? . . . This contradiction is very simply explained by the genesis of the system, and the point is the most instructive one from the deep insight it allows us into the structure of Paul's dogmatic thought.

For so much is clear. If Paul's notion of the law with its religious inadequacy and its temporary significance had been his original notion, and the origin and basis of his system, then he could not possibly have conceded what he does. He could not have conceded that the claims of a law rated so low must be satisfied only by the accursed death of the Messiah as a vicarious expiatory sacrifice. The law would have been for him (as it was for John) a lower and dawning stage, which vanished of itself in the light of grace and truth in Christ; and the death of Christ would have had no relation whatever to the extinct claims and threats of the law. But the fact is, that with Paul it is just the reverse. Like every Jew he held from first to last that the law was the unconditional decree of the divine will, and its validity was unlimited. Its abrogation by the death of Christ, opening a new way of salvation, could therefore only take place in such a way as at once to admit and satisfy its claims. An adjustment or compromise should thus be effected between the new principle of grace and the legal principle of justice—such a compromise as we found in the expiatory death of Christ. The expiatory death of Christ has abrogated the law. That point is established. Proceeding then from that, he faces the farther task of reconciling this conditional and passing validity with the unity and unchangeableness of God. . . . Paul did this by deducing from the temporary intercalation of law between promise and fulfilment, the inference that it had, in the divine intention from the first, merely this conditional and intermediate character, and was not an absolute and final end. *Thus Paul, starting from his initial hypothesis of the indestructible validity of the law, and still influenced by it in viewing the death of the cross as an expiatory sacrifice, was ultimately driven by the logical consequences of the doctrine of the cross itself to a conclusion about the law which completely destroyed his hypothesis.* This striking discord . . . might easily be concealed from the mind of its author—the experience of all times furnishes similar examples. On the other hand it was probably the main reason that the system of Paul could not be taken up by others without undergoing a change, nor be retained in its original sense in the Christian community.* (I. 101—4.)

The logical process, it may be seen, is the psychological reversed. The light from his experiential premisses (to risk

* I have ventured somewhat to amend and simplify Mr. Peters's careful translation. The italics are mine.

pedantry), impinges at an angle on the surface of his first conclusion, only to be reflected at the same angle to a position in the rear of the premiss. This position, though in the process the goal, becomes in the system the premiss, and the psychological *terminus ad quem* becomes the logical *terminus a quo*. Paul's belief, for example, as to the pre-existent Christ, is reached by a process which, starting from the glorified Christ of the present, concluded towards the glorious Christ of the eternal future, and then rebounded on a belief in a Christ glorious in all past eternity. But in Paul's scheme of reality everything is represented as flowing from the act and quality of surrender by which the Son gave up his premundane glory, and though he was rich, yet for our sakes became poor. So the objective value of the death of Christ, in Paul's system is ascribed to his habit "of fixing the connection between the ethical consequence and its religious foundation in an immediate and objective fashion without reference to the subjective psychological process by which it [the connection] is brought about." That is, the objective Atonement is but the hypostatized projection of the moral and spiritual process which the death of the cross sets up in the Christian soul. "That which is realised in the Faith in the Crucified by means of an inward moral process, viz., the dying of the old man, or of the flesh (the principle of life which rules the natural man), is connected by the Apostle with the crucifixion of Christ, as if it had actually happened there once for all as an objective fact. Christ himself has, through His death, died to sin (is placed out of all relation to it) : Sin (thought of as an objective power) has been put to death on the cross" (I. 23).

To take one example more, Paul's experience of sin led him to conclude that sin was an independent power or principle in the universe. This conclusion rebounded beyond his own datum of experience, nay, beyond human consciousness, and settled in his view of sin as an objective reality anterior to man altogether, a preadamite principle which only "entered" the world by the orifice of the first transgression.

It would follow, of course, from such accounts of the

origin of these beliefs that parts of the Apostle's system, while not necessarily in themselves false, are in the system inconsistent and incompatible with the rest, though the inconsistency is one that he himself was not aware of. And our author, while extending the continuity of Paul's doctrine over his life (before as after his conversion), curtails it considerably in respect of the logical coherence and complete assimilation of his whole scheme.

Now, without elaborately criticising this account of the Pauline creed in any serious way, these remarks may be allowed to stand.

We note first, and briefly, by what a strange Nemesis the system of that Pharisaism which was so sternly opposed by Jesus, returns through Paul to colour and define, to a partial extent at least, the thought of all these Christian centuries, and some would say to reproduce the vices which made Christ its foe.

Secondly, I, at least, do not feel forced to deny the truth or reality of Paul's great doctrines, because the method of their revelation to Paul's mind has been shown to me, and I am enabled to see their psychological mediation. They may be untrue—I do not think they are—but they are not untrue *for that reason*. To discredit them on that ground is to reproduce in our own sphere an error which we justly condemn when Haeckel commits it in his. All the facts of Darwinism about our origin from apes do not destroy the reality of our spiritual nature to-day. How we came to be does not settle for us what we are. In the last and spiritual resort it is the end which explains the beginning, and not the beginning the end. He is *Alpha and Omega* who has the keys of life and death. And so here. Because Paul did not come by these truths in a violent way corresponding to special creation, have we any right to say that they are not truths? Have we any presumption against them even? Is not all our best truth at once immediate and mediated? Do we trust our vision the less when we learn that between the thing and the thought are interposed not only a fine nervous mechanism, but one or more acts of judgment, by heredity made latent, and all but unconscious? Must a

conclusion always be less reliable in the sphere of reason than an inspiration? Is intuitive truth the only truth, and immediate vision the only certainty? Is God less sure and immediate to us because Christ is our mediator? Is the Father less of a present reality because no man cometh unto the Father except by him? Must it affect the substantial truth of a doctrine to find that it came "by the hand of a mediator," "by a dispensation of angels," by the intervention of certain steps in a psychological process? Let us beware in our own sphere of the error of thinking that we have exploded an idea when we have seen it arising, and found it to be derived and mediated instead of due to special and direct revelation. The truth of a doctrine depends far more on its quality than on the mode of its introduction to us men. To recur to a previous illustration; there is more fine gold in Jeremiah, who has little to say about the circumstances in which he received his "word," than in all Ezekiel, who almost buries his prophetic Revelation in the imposing details of the act of Inspiration. It is the Revelation that is the best test of the Inspiration. It is not the Inspiration that guarantees the Revelation. Were this but well understood, it might dethrone some extant Christian idols, but it would also take the wind out of many anti-Christian sails.

If Paul, in his central idea of the cross, grasped, as I believe he did, the thought of Jesus himself, the probability is that his rightness there would exercise an organic influence for rightness in his farther development of it. If it be true, as Pfleiderer says, that "Paul's whole doctrinal system is neither derived from tradition nor the result of abstract speculation, or extraneous philosophical dicta,* but is derived from reflection on the blessings of salvation granted in the death and resurrection of Christ, as these presented themselves to the faith of Paul as facts of his inward experience," in so far as that is true, it seems to me greatly to raise the value and truth of his system. It is not extravagant to ascribe unusual vision to that unique

* This, observe, is not to say that it owed nothing to tradition or antecedent thought, a statement which our author plentifully refutes.

spiritual experience. We need not hold that his system is at every point final or complete. We cannot so think. A complete system, even from an apostle, would be the death of his eternal idea. We may well enough be able to give this living idea of the reconciling love of God to man in Christ Jesus a philosophical form better corresponding on some points to the thought and needs of our time. But let us be sure that we grasp the central idea as thoroughly as did Paul before we set to amend his work or dismiss his results. We may still feel, I think, that on the whole the theology of Paul is the best account that has yet been given of the dogmatic side of the Christian religion, unless we follow the religious fashion of the day, and become agnostic pietists, who deny the possibility or need of any theology at all.

And the last remark is this. We find in those unconscious, though not fatal, inconsistencies of Paul's system an explanation of the disheartening differences that have discredited theology to the modern mind. What is bred in the bone will come out in the flesh. If the Act be in any respect self-contradictory, its working is sure to be marked by confusion. Paul's system has been regarded as the common charter of all theologians, and, at the same time, as completely coherent and infallible. It was beyond criticism. It was only to be expounded and enlarged. The flaws in his system consequently have only repeated themselves enlarged in these developments of it. Current theology is Paulinism magnified. We are not surprised, therefore, to find that his incongruities and hiatuses are enlarged also. If the Bible be not harmonious, and yet be received as a supreme and coherent dogmatic authority, we must expect that the theologies and institutions developed from it shall be inharmonious also. And herein there is much hope for the future. In the first place the presence even of incongruities in Paul's system need not, any more than the discovery of its genetic origin, destroy our faith in its divine origin. The apparent mal-adaptation in parts of Nature does not destroy for us all faith in its divine creation. It only prolongs the divine action beyond the initial fiat up to our own day, releases deity from a godless and fateful finality,

brings the Creator to our very doors, and makes God our Salvation nearer than when we first believed. And in the second place, thought has already approached the task of framing a theology which shall be not merely Biblical, but rational. We may look forward to a development which shall cease to repeat, on an enlarged scale, the maladjustments of the first gigantic, but imperfect, effort of the Christian consciousness to render an account of its own belief. No longer burdened with the figment of apostolic infallibility, we may well go on sustained by the pre-eminence of apostolic insight. It is but very, very slowly that thought can and should progress on these, the profoundest themes of the mind and soul. Remembering this we can have but little sympathy with those who already would almost make a clean sweep of the apostolic creed. It is just possible that, on the whole, Paul did know better about some things than even the nineteenth century. But if the nineteenth century or the twentieth should be able to correct Paul, assuredly it is not the old Paul, the devotee of new truth and the champion of fresh "revelations of the Lord," the martyr of conscientious fidelity, the preacher of the manifold unsearchable riches of Christ and his treasures of wisdom and knowledge—it is not that Paul that will rise up in judgment against the men of this generation. If he rose to judge us at all it would be because we were too little bold in our thought, too shallow, and too full of a spurious and almost "too superstitious" reverence for the prestige of his own great name.

P. T. FORSYTH.

THE ABOLITION OF JUDICIAL OATHS.

It is not sufficient that a witness feels himself bound to speak the truth from a regard to character or to the common interests of society, or from fear of the punishment which the law inflicts upon persons guilty of perjury. Such motives have, indeed, their influence, but *they are not considered as affording a sufficient safeguard for the strict observance of truth.*—Taylor : *On the Law of Evidence*, II., 1120.

Our law, like that of most other civilised nations, requires a witness to believe, not only that there is a God and a future state of rewards and punishments, but also that, by taking the oath, *he imprecates the Divine vengeance upon himself* if his evidence shall be false.—Phillips : *Treatise on the Law of Evidence* (c. 3).

. . . For auoyding some restraint of his libertie for a time, or for the onely retaining of his woonted credite and estimation, that a man which hath any feare of God at all, or but any tender sparke of Godlinesse and true religion ; would wilfullie (through periurie) throwe his owne body and soule into hell ; neither *lawe* nor yet any *nation* in the world that I can reade of, did euer presume.—*An Apologie of svndrie proceedings by Iurisdiction Ecclesiasticall*. Part III., Chap. vii., p. 79.

IN considering the question whether it is desirable to abolish the administration of oaths in a Court of Justice, it is above all things necessary that we should clearly understand and always remember the assumptions and principles on which that custom is based. It is assumed that no one can be relied on to speak the truth or to keep his promise unless he is first sworn. It is assumed that he who has taken an oath will speak the truth, or, at least, be far more inclined to do so ; and this for the very obvious reason that an oath is a prayer by which a juror calls down on himself exceptional evil if he does not tell the truth. It follows, as a practical corollary from these principles, that the oath is useless, except to those who thoroughly realise its exceptional character, and believe the assumptions

which give it a unique influence as a truth-compelling power.

These assumptions do not correspond with our actual experience. "No one," says Max Müller, "is so sure to go wrong, whether in public or in private life, as he who says in his haste 'all men are liars.'" On the other hand, the assertion that the oath can be relied on to make men truthful must be regarded either as an utter delusion or as a piece of vain rhetoric. Perjury is of common occurrence, and is said to be on the increase. It would be a mere waste of time to prove its existence. But it may be well for us carefully to consider the circumstances in which it is committed, in order that we may arrive at a proper estimate of the precise value of the judicial or forensic oath.

Witnesses may be divided into three classes—those who will speak the truth to the best of their ability, whether they are sworn or not; those who will tell a lie when it is their interest to do so, whether they are sworn or not; those who will tell a lie when it is their interest to do so, when they are *not sworn*, but who will tell the truth when they are sworn. Our first difficulty arises from the fact that we cannot always distinguish these different types. Here, for example, is a "white-haired old gentleman, the very embodiment of respectability, who turns his venerable face to the committee, incipient tears visible in his eyes, and makes a most affecting appeal to them, asking, in a voice broken by emotion, whether a man who has lived all his life in the borough without a stain upon his character ought to be exposed to the insult of such questions." The committee unseated the employer of that venerable man; "I know," says Serjeant Ballantine, "that he had received five hundred sovereigns which he had distributed most honourably in bribing the electors."*

The oath is administered to all who do not choose to say that they have conscientious objections against its administration. It is worse than useless in the case of the conscientious man whom it insults with a doubt as to his

* *Some Experiences of a Barrister's Life*, II., 49.

integrity. This was felt at Athens, where, according to Cicero, when an upright citizen had given evidence, and was approaching the altars for the purpose of confirming his affirmation by an oath, all the judges exclaimed, with one voice, forbidding him to swear.* The oath is powerless over the reckless liar, and therefore is no protection to society; while it certainly is a mockery of sacred things, as horrible as it is useless. The case for the retention of the oath, therefore, rests upon the power which it has to convert liars into truthful men.

At the outset, we cannot have a very high opinion of a set of people who can only be trusted to speak the truth in order to avoid the torments of hell. They remind us of what Johnson said of another kind of habitual liar. When Boswell argued that it was as well for men to drink freely because of the old proverb, *In vino veritas*, "Why, sir," said Johnson, "that may be an argument for drinking if all men were liars. But I would not keep company with a fellow who lies as long as he is sober, and whom you must make drunk in order to get the truth out of him."†

In the affairs of ordinary life we do not put people on their oath, and if a man takes an oath unsolicited, we are apt to condemn him for the use of coarse and blasphemous language, and to suspect the honesty which requires such confirmation. In *Hamlet*, the Player Queen deprecates the idea of a second marriage in the strongest terms—

Nor earth to give me food, nor heaven light !
Sport and repose lock from me, day, and night ! . . .
Both here, and hence, pursue me lasting strife,
If, once a widow, ever I be wife !

But Queen Gertrude, who has gone through it all, and knows the binding power of an oath, says quietly—

The lady protests too much, methinks.

And when, in the story of "Five Hundred Dollars," Mr. Isaacs, the Jew pawnbroker, says: "So help me gracious, I have not the least soospicions, like the babes unborn, those

* *Table Talk*.

† *Epist. Attic: Lib. I., 16.*

goods are stolen," we know at once, before the narrative explicitly states the fact, that the assertion is a bare-faced lie.

The same suspicion clings to the unvaracious man when put upon his oath. "If there is a man whom I could induce to lie," says Cicero, "I could easily persuade him to commit perjury." At any rate, such a man might easily fall into perjury, the old habit of untruthfulness proving too strong for the new, or very unusual, sense of awe.

From what has been said, it will be observed that there is not an antecedent probability that the oath will be of much use if administered. But the untruthful man has various ways of avoiding the test; ways provided for him, or invented by him. You cannot boast much of the efficacy of physic unless it is taken, and in the present day no one need take this physic unless he likes. He has only to say that he has a conscientious objection to taking an oath, and he may make affirmation instead. But how are you to know that such a non-juror will tell the truth? He may avail himself of this permissive legislation because he does believe in the terrors of the oath, because he does feel its truth-compelling power, and because he does not intend to be compelled to tell the truth by the fear of hell if he can possibly help it.

These thinking they're obliged to troth
In swearing, will not take an oath.

But supposing the witness has consented to be sworn without intending to speak the truth unless it suits his purpose, there are various ways in which he can avoid the religious obligation of an oath, in which he is materially assisted by the law. The law, for security's sake, demands that every witness shall be sworn in the manner which is binding on his conscience. The Highlander is only bound by the oath which he takes holding up his right hand; the Irish Catholic when he kisses a Testament marked with a crucifix; the Welshman, when three fingers are placed upon the book at one time. That being the case, three ways are open by which the wit-

ness may escape the religious consequences of perjury. He may take the ordinary oath, which is not binding on his conscience, and if nothing is said, he is free to lie as much as he likes, so far as religious terrors are concerned. At the Assizes at Carlisle, a Highlander was sworn on the Testament, and gave certain evidence; afterwards he was sworn holding up his right hand, and refused to repeat the evidence already given, saying "Na, na. Ken ye not there is a hantle of difference betwixt blawing on a buke and domming one's ain saul?" An Irishwoman at Liverpool, under similar experiences, recently made a similar remark, quietly saying that she supposed that she might say what she pleased, so long as she was not sworn upon the blessed crucifix.

Another mode of evading the terror of the oath is to take it in appearance only. At one time a witness did not consider himself bound if he kissed his thumb instead of the book or remained silent when the oath was administered.* And I see no reason why an unconscientious person, anxious to escape the pressure of the oath, should not tell a lie if asked what oath was binding on his conscience, so that he might be sworn and still tell lies without subjecting himself to the religious penalties of perjury. And if a witness chooses to tell such a lie, the law protects the liar, for he cannot then be further asked if he considers any other form of oath more binding.†

But a witness may be sworn, and yet not feel the terrors of the oath. He must believe in a God whose judgments are retributive, at the least; he must believe, according to the theory of the oath, that he is calling down exceptional penalties upon his head if he utters a falsehood. Now the law, as generally administered, takes no step to ascertain whether the witness believes in the special punishment of perjury. Any witness above fourteen years of age is sworn, and no questions are asked on this most vital point. But clearly such religious terrors cannot influence the Atheist. The Testament which he kisses cannot restrain the man who

* Tyler: *Oaths, their Origin, Nature, and History*, p. 48.

† Taylor II., 1125.

believes that the Gospel is a myth, or that strange product of the nineteenth century, the pure Theist, animated with a positive hostility to Christ. The general belief in divine retribution is not enough; it is necessary that the witness should believe that falsehood is a venial offence, and that perjury is an unpardonable sin. Clearly the Court may delude itself with the idea that it is dealing with a witness who feels the constraining power of an oath.

But in cases in which the terror of the oath is felt, there are many ways in which its truth-compelling power is modified. The question naturally arises: Can perjury be forgiven, or is it indeed that sin against the Holy Ghost which can never be pardoned here or hereafter? If it can be forgiven upon repentance or after confession to a priest, it is obvious that when the punishment has dwindled down from eternal woe to transient risk its terror will be much diminished, and its restraint over falsehood will be reduced to a minimum. This Butler shows with all the power of his matchless irony,

The Rabbins write, When any Jew
Did make to God or man a vow
Which afterwards he found untoward
And stubborn to be kept, or too hard,
Any three other Jews o' th' nation
Might free him from the obligation:
And have not two Saints power to use
A greater privilege than three Jews?
The court of Conscience, which in man
Should be supreme and sovereign,
Is't fit should be subordinate
To ev'ry petty court i' th' state,
And have less power than the lesser
To deal with perjury at pleasure?

.

Why should not Conscience have vacation
As well as other Courts o' th' nation;
Have equal power to adjourn,
Appoint appearance and return?

—*Hudibras*. II., ii., 291—320.

And indeed the law itself encourages a witness to look upon some kind of perjury as venial :—

However gross be a man's false-swearing to a matter of fact, still if that matter of fact be not material to the issue or cause in question (and who but a learned lawyer can determine its materiality ?) it is not perjury, "because," says Sir Edward Coke, "it concerneth not the point in suit, and therefore in effect is extrajudicial." . . . How easily would human nature extend the temporal immunity to the spiritual obligation ; and argue that because the English law cannot apply its penalties to that case, neither would the false swearing be visited by the Almighty.*

And if one kind of perjury is venial, it would be easy to suppose that God might forgive the other also.

On the other hand, if a man believes that having once perjured himself he will go to hell and suffer everlasting torments, on the principle of "Once forsworn and ever forlorn"; having thus made the worst of the next world, what is to prevent him from getting the most earthly profit he possibly can out of his certain damnation ? Now this is precisely the view of the matter which was taken by those engaged in securing witnesses in connection with Custom House oaths. "There were houses of resort where persons were always to be found ready at a moment's warning to take any oath required. The signal for the business for which they were needed was this inquiry 'Any damned soul here ?' "†

Even if the witness had a due sense of the awful nature of an oath, habitual swearing would soon bring the familiarity which breeds contempt. "The feeling of sanctity that probably once attached to an oath becomes deadened in the minds of those who are taking it every day, and an easy manner and a composed demeanour are acquired by persons constantly in the witness-box."‡

Of this we have a good illustration in the following instance :—Mr. Ballantine severely cross-examined a young man, whom the late Lord Hatherley regarded as a very

* Tyler, 50, 51.

† Tyler, p. 54.

‡ Ballantine, vol. II., 23.

ingenuous witness exposed to a cruel ordeal. As the witness was going out of the court he was heard to whisper to a friend, "Why, the old gent believed every word I swore!"—as if it was the best of jokes to find so gullible a judge.

There is little *a priori* probability that the unvarnished person will be constrained by the oath which he has avoided taking, or by the terrors which he has learned to mitigate or to dispel. But now let us follow the witness into a Court of Justice and see how far its atmosphere assists the terrors of the oath—how far the oath prevails, in actual practice, to elicit the true facts of the case under consideration.

In the first place, the solemn and impressive words of the oath ("The evidence you shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God") are reduced to a mere form, or rather degraded into a horrible mockery by being gabbled over in a most perfunctory manner by a Court official. This oath renders the witness liable to be punished if he tells a lie in any question which is relevant to the point at issue, but counts it no crime if he tells lies about anything else. As it takes a clever lawyer to tell what is relevant to the case, this is a trap to catch a careless liar; a strong temptation to the man whom interest prompts to speak falsely if he only dare.

The witness has to give his evidence before a judge, who in these days is honest and straightforward; not taking bribes from both sides, as once upon a time; not open to the censure of Pope:—

Meanwhile declining from the noon of day,
The sun obliquely shoots his burning ray,
The hungry judges soon the sentence sign,
And wretches hang that jury-men may dine;—

not open to the approbation expressed for the Duke of Argyll in 1752, "Anybody can get a man hanget that's guilty; but it's only Callumore can hang a man wha's no guilty ava."*

But honest gentleman though he be, the modern judge is only a man. He has his little weaknesses: fond of his

* *Jefferson: A Book about Lawyers*, II., 214.

jokes, if he thinks himself a wit ; anxious to air his rhetoric, if he is an orator ; liable to make up his mind a little too soon, and unconsciously to become a pleader rather than a judge. He presides over the Court to take care that the game of Law shall be played in honest accordance with the rules of the game ; but there is a good deal of horse-play tolerated, in which the judge does not disdain to take his part. In one word, by his manner the judge may do much towards rendering a witness incapable and evidence worthless.

Then the witness, pledged to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, is examined by a barrister, who will only let him tell as much as he has in his brief, or as much as he thinks it will be well to disclose. How great a difference there may be between telling the truth as far as the assertion goes, and telling the whole truth, may be seen from a case tried before Mr. Baron Parke, in which a woman was acquitted of the charge of murder on the ground of the small quantity of arsenic found. Dr. Taylor had given evidence to that effect, and Serjeant Ballantine did not ask a single question in cross-examination. The Judge, after he had summed up, expressed his surprise to Dr. Taylor at the small amount of arsenic found ; upon which the medical expert said that if he had been asked the question he should have proved that it indicated, under the circumstances detailed in evidence, that a very large quantity had been taken.*

In the olden time, at any rate, an unscrupulous prosecution knew how to manipulate witnesses, and the process was made easier by the fact that witnesses were not sworn on that side.

Is not the winding up witnesses,
And nicking, more than half the bus'ness ?
For witnesses, like watches, go
Just as they're set, too fast or slow ;
And, where in Conscience they're strait-laced,
'Tis ten to one that side is cast.

Hudibras, II., ii., 359-364.

* *Ballantine*, vol. I., p. 1C1.

The witness has reason to complain that when he is called by one side he is invariably treated as though he were a partisan of that side ; so that the simple, child-like honesty of a Winkle is covered with confusion and disgrace, while the impudence of a Sam Weller is crowned with immortal glory. On the other hand, the opposing barrister, in his cross-examination poses as the bitter enemy of the witness, seeking any advantage which can be gained for the cause which he represents, and not very scrupulous always how that end shall be attained. "Knowing how necessary it was" (such is the astounding statement of Mr. Jeaffreson), "to put the witness in a state of extreme agitation and confusion, before touching on the facts concerning which he had come to give evidence," Erskine so "confounded" the Manchester "bagman" that he could not tell his right hand from his left. On another occasion a witness had sworn that one sleeve was longer than another. "You will," says Erskine, slowly, having risen to cross-examine, "swear that one of the sleeves is—longer—than the other?" Witness: "I do swear it." Erskine (quickly, and with a flash of indignation): "Then, sir, I am to understand that you positively deny that one of the sleeves was shorter than the other?" Startled into self-contradiction by the suddenness and impetuosity of this thrust, the witness said, "I do deny it." Erskine (raising his voice, as the tumultuous laughter died away): "Thank you, sir; I don't want to trouble you with another question." *

Such treatment scarcely tallies with the directions laid down by that great lawyer, Sir Edward Coke, with respect to examination by a commissioner, which will equally apply to a barrister, if the object be to ascertain the facts of the case. "Forasmuch as the witesse, by his oath, which is so sacred as he calleth Almighty God (who is truth itself, and cannot be deceived, and hath knowledge of the secrets of the heart), to witness that which he shall depose, it is the duty both of the commissioner and of the examiner, gravely, temperately, and leisurely, to take the deposition of the witesse, without any menace, disturbance,

* *Jeaffreson*, II., 254.

or interruption of them in hinderance of the truth, which are grievously to be punished." *

Now it is quite clear that the administration of an oath does much to aggravate the position of a witness—difficult, at the best. You swear a man, you command or persuade him to call down upon himself the most fearful penalties if he does not speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. You then allow him to be examined-in-chief by a man who is instructed not to elicit the whole truth; you then allow him to be cross-examined by a man who does all he can to prejudice his evidence, by asking some questions which throw doubts on his integrity, by puzzling him into self-contradictions, or by terrifying him into utter confusion. And if he is ever attaining that equable frame of mind which is alone consistent with the proper discharge of his duty, it is always possible to insult him, or to terrify him, or to confuse him with the reminder, "Now, sir, remember that you are on your oath." When Goldsmith said that he would tell the truth and shame the devil, Johnson replied, "I wish to shame the devil as much as you do; but I should choose to be out of the reach of his claws." The oath sharpens the claws of the—cross-examining barrister.

Enough has been said to show that the oath does not exercise the truth-compelling power which it is assumed that it possesses. We now proceed to ask whether the theory of the imprecatory oath is not itself the survival of a decaying superstition rather than the expression of an enlightened faith. Can it be believed that God will treat as a comparatively venial offence the worst of falsehoods, deliberately and artistically manufactured, uttered from the basest motives, and with the most terrible results, *if unaccompanied by an oath*; and will doom to present woe, to future exposure, or to endless torture, the poor wretch who, hindered by examination-in-chief, and bewildered by cross-examination, has failed to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, after having acquiesced in the hastily-muttered and scarcely-understood,

* *Institutes*, IV., 278; quoted by Tyler, p. 85.

"So help you God"? Who can believe that it is a venial offence to swear to a falsehood in one attitude, and the worst of crimes if we assume another posture? This superstition, of which numerous examples have been given, is condemned by Cicero :

Who is influenced by an imprecation of the gods and is not influenced by the voice of a good conscience? The same punishment, consequently, which is assigned by the immortals to the perjurer is also appointed for the liar. For those immortal powers are wont to have their anger and vengeance roused, not so much by the forms of the covenanted words of an oath as by the perfidy and malice of over-reaching and fraud.—(*Orat. pro Q. Rosc. Com.* 16.)

And if God does not Himself recognise any great difference between falsehood and perjury, and will not of Himself inflict such very different punishments, is it conceivable that He will allow men to dictate a new mode of governing the moral world? As Lord Sherbrooke so well says: A man "cannot seriously believe that God has devolved on him the power of fixing his own punishment, nor that he can

"Snatch from His Hand the balance and the rod,
Prejudge His justice, be the God of God."

Do we believe—can we believe—that God will interpose, specially or miraculously, to answer a prayer framed on such an expectation? Judgment by ordeal is not resorted to, because not believed in, to-day. Let us see how such a faith will work when put in practice. " ' May God strike me dead now at this moment, and here where I stand, if I am not innocent,' said a prisoner at the bar. As the speaker's guilt had been clearly ascertained, every hearer was painfully moved by the abominable self-imprecation. A thrill of horror ran through the Court. Then the judge, Baron Alderson, said, in a cold matter-of-fact voice, ' Prisoner at the bar: as Providence has not interposed in the behalf of society, the sentence of the Court is that you be transported for twenty years.' " *

* *Jeaffreson* II., 393.

Now this story is instructive in many ways. The miserable fellow presented the principle of the oath from a slightly different point of view, and immediately a thrill of horror ran through the Court. Had he been a witness, sworn in the usual slipshod way, and perjuring himself after a frequent custom, no horror would have been excited by the lie which doomed him to hell, and yet how much worse is endless torture than sudden death. On the other hand the cool conduct of the judge showed how little he believed in the principle underlying the awful bravado of the prisoner.

There are two ways of getting over the difficulty presented by the oath regarded as an imprecation. One is to maintain that the great majority of men do not regard the words "So help you God," as implying execration or imprecation. But if this means that the majority of Englishmen understand the oath in a different sense to that which the theory of the law implies, the sooner they are enlightened on that point the better.

But some say that the words, "So help you God," do not involve imprecation. Such is their assertion, but authorities seem to speak pretty clearly upon this point. "An oath," says Mr. Taylor, "is a religious asseveration by which a person renounces the mercy and imprecates the vengeance of heaven, if he do not speak the truth."*

Doubtless a similar significancy once attached to the outward attitude assumed during the oath. The act of kissing the New Testament, which we have already had described as "blowing upon a buke," was once no doubt generally understood to mean what is specially expressed in the oath formerly taken in the Commissary Court. Placing his right hand upon one of the Holy Evangelists, the witness pronounced these words after the judge, "I renounce all the blessings contained in this book if I do not tell the truth, and may all the curses therein contained be my portion if I do not tell the truth."†

The assertion that the words, "So help you God" mean no more than the recognition of the Divine presence is met by

* II., 1115.

† Tyler, p. 190.

the fact that while the Separatist refused to be sworn, he was quite willing to make the following affirmation :—

"I, A. B., do, in the presence of Almighty God, solemnly, sincerely, and truly affirm," &c.*

Now if the oath had really only meant the recognition of God's presence, the Separatist would have been informed of that fact, and there would have been no ground for his conscientious scruples. But, so far from this being the case, the distinction between calling God to witness and calling God to punish in an especial way, is recognised in our law. By 22, George II., c. 30, it is enacted that the Moravian "who shall be required on any lawful occasion to take an oath shall, instead of the usual form, be permitted to make solemn affirmation."†

In the same way Barclay, in his *Apology*, draws a distinctive doctrine, calling God to witness and taking an oath :—

The using of such forms of speaking is neither swearing nor so esteemed by our adversaries. For when, upon occasion, in matters of great moment, we have said, *We speak the truth in the fear of God and before Him, who is our witness and the searcher of our hearts*, adding such kind of serious attestation which we never refused in matters of consequence; nevertheless an oath hath *moreover* been required of us with the ceremony of putting our hands upon the book, the kissing of it, the lifting up of the hand or fingers together with this common form of *imprecation*, So help me God. ‡

When we are told that the oath is only a religious asseveration, and merely involves the addition to a moral incentive of a religious influence, we are very much reminded of the way which certain nurses have of saying how nice the physic is which they are about to administer, how painless the operation which they would fain perform. But when the physic is once taken, the operation once undergone, further attempt at deception would only add insult to injury. This innocent religious asseveration is an

* *Taylor*, II., p. 1125, note 5.

† *Tyler*, p. 11.

‡ *An Apology for the True Christian Divinity*, p. 523.

asseveration with imprecation, however it may answer some people's purpose to give a more general definition.

But, again, it is said, "You call it an imprecation. Well, what if it is? Do you believe in the principles of the Lord's Prayer? If so, when you pray, 'Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us,' is not that an imprecation?"

His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, writing in reply to Lord Sherbrooke's article in the *Nineteenth Century*, says:—

Lord Sherbrooke puts it thus: It is, if the words be carefully considered, the renouncing of God's mercy, the invocation of a curse, the assumption that we know better than Deity how He ought to treat us, that we have the right and the power to direct what the treatment should be. If these words be true of "So help me, God," are they not equally true of "Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us"? By this rule of interpretation we are saying every morning and night, "If I do not forgive others, do not forgive me." Is this also a renouncing of God's mercy and an invocation of a curse—an assumption that we know how we ought to be treated, and a direction that so we shall be? Either this, also, is a presumptuous sin, or Lord Sherbrooke's interpretation will not stand. As the Lord's Prayer came from the Saviour of the World, I must believe that the interpretation must be an error, or its rebuke would fall on Him who taught us so to pray.*

My answer is, in the first place, that according to the Revised Version, Matthew reads: "And forgive us our debts as we also have forgiven our debtors," a petition which embodies the following precept of Christ: "Therefore, if thou . . . rememberest that thy brother hath ought against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way; first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift." That is the spirit in which Christ would have us to pray; and it is always possible for us to fit ourselves for such a prayer by first forgiving our brother—never possible for us to pray in the spirit of Christ unless we have—ever possible for us to

* *Nineteenth Century*, Sep. 1882, pp. 475—6.

urge a new prayer: Forgive us our debts, for *now* we have indeed *forgiven*. Or it may be put in another way. When we are at our best we forgive one another—we who at our best are weak and feeble; and if this be so, how much more will God forgive us? This is what Luke makes Christ say, "Forgive us our sins, for we also forgive every one that is indebted to us." How could we dare to ask for mercy on any other condition?

We do pray for mercy,
And that same prayer doth teach us all to render
The deeds of mercy.

But, supposing we take the prayer to mean, "Forgive us our sins past, present, and to come, in the same proportion as, and only as long as we forgive our fellow creatures"—that prayer would also have the sanction of Christ's teaching; for, in the parable of the Unmerciful Servant, He illustrates the principle of conditional forgiveness on the part of God—forgiveness which will last as long as we show a similar forgiveness. And this would seem to be the main point which the parable was spoken to illustrate, "So likewise shall my Heavenly Father do also unto you, if ye, from your hearts, forgive not every one his brother their trespasses." Now, to pray that this may be so, is to pray that God's will, as revealed by Jesus Christ, may be done; that the inexorable law which rules the spiritual life shall have its way, and not be miraculously tampered with; it is to pledge ourselves to walk in accordance with the divine methods, and to be imitators of God as dear children, well knowing that we cannot be as perfect as God, if we are not also as merciful.* We cut ourselves off from the divine mercy only so long as we cut off our fellow creatures from the blessing of our forgiveness. Indeed, the unforgiving spirit in us brings a cloud between our vision and the heaven of God's love, and renders the closest communion impossible. This is a very different thing from selecting our own punishment, an

* cf Matt. v. 48, Luke vi. 36.

artificial punishment, and praying God to inflict it if we deserve it and do not keep faith with Him. In the latter case we bring down on ourselves a punishment which would otherwise not be inflicted ; in the former case we ask that a law of the spiritual life may be carried out, which will be carried out whether we pray for its fulfilment or not.

Cardinal Manning says that the Lord's Prayer came from the Saviour of the world ; and implies that the oath and the Lord's Prayer must stand or fall together. Perhaps it may be permitted to recall the fact that the Saviour of the world has exhorted his disciples to "Swear not at all," but to take care that their communication be Yea, yea, Nay, nay, seeing that whatsoever is more than this cometh of the Evil One—i.e., The Devil. So that Christian England would not be stultifying itself if it gave up The Devil's Oath and retained the Saviour's Prayer.

There is obviously a difference of opinion as to whether the oath is to be understood as an oath of imprecation ; and if so, whether such a prayer will be answered by God. Which-ever view is taken, there are reasons which should induce us to desire its abolition. If you believe in it, why insist on its imposition ? Clearly, it cannot improve the evidence of the thoroughly honest ; it cannot overcome the dishonesty of the utterly corrupt, nor has it made the more or less untruthful man entirely reliable. As it has failed in the object for which it was imposed, why do you, who believe in its terrors, insist on dooming the utterly corrupt or the careless witness to suffer God's wrath, and to undergo the punishment of an eternal hell ? It would be bad enough to do this if the object contemplated were achieved, if a few were doomed to hell in order that the evidence of the many might be made reliable ; but to do this with no such corresponding advantage is to be guilty of the grossest cruelty. That may be said of all oaths which Sir Edward Coke says of oaths which have no warrant of law, that they are rather *tormenta* than *sacramenta*.

But if you do not believe in the underlying theory, if you do not believe that the superficial act—the mode of taking

the oath—determines the perjury or otherwise of the false evidence, why countenance an appeal to heaven in the principle of which you do not agree? You insist on the expression of a view of the Divine Providence which you believe to be false, in order that you may receive as truth the evidence which is given by one in whose right hand there is, in your opinion, a delusion at least, if not a lie.

If it be contended, in spite of all that has been said, that the oath does bring the truth out of the unvarnished man who happens to be superstitious, and that the end justifies the means, there is force in that argument. Only, unfortunately, precisely the same plea has been submitted for profane swearing, and by this reasoning all blasphemy is perfectly justifiable. Mark Twain tells us, in his *Idle Excursion*, that the old captain "was deeply and sincerely pious, and swore like a fishwoman. He considered swearing blameless, because sailors would not understand an order unillumined by an oath."

It is argued that the oath ought to be retained because it expresses the national belief in the existence and in the moral providence of God. But what, after all, is the value of such a confession, when any witness over fourteen years of age willing to take an oath is asked no question as to what he believes? What use is such a theological test, when a man may reject the oath without assigning his special reasons for doing so? He is not called upon to explain whether he believes in the God by whom the witness swears; whether he treats as credible the Gospel which the witness kisses; whether he simply objects to his veracity being put to that test, or protests against the self-imprecation which the theory of the oath presupposes? Hopelessly imperfect, however, as the test is in one way, it is very efficient in another. It divides all witnesses into jurors and non-jurors. It throws on the non-juror the slur of imputed scepticism; and while inviting jurors to swear according to their conscience, and permitting non-jurors to make simple affirmation, renders it possible for judges, like Lord Ellenborough, and barristers like Erskine, to offer insults such as these: A member of the Society of Friends

whose dress did not indicate the sect to which he belonged, having claimed to be examined on affirmation, was rebuked by the judge for attempting to deceive the Court by appearing in the guise of a reasonable being. A religious enthusiast, carrying out the principle of the law that he should be sworn in the manner that was binding on his conscience, offered to swear holding up his hand, and gave as his reason that the angel in the Book of the Revelation standing on the sea, held up his hand. To which Erskine replied, "But that does not apply to your case; for, in the first place, you are not an angel, and, in the second place, you cannot tell how the angel would have sworn if he had been on dry ground, as you are." *

Such swearing may be superstitious, but the law has no right to demand it as a supreme safeguard of veracity at the risk of its being held up to such consummate mockery.

If the oath does express the theistic faith of the British Empire, the faith which it expresses is this: That the Highlander may swear falsely with impunity so long as he refrains from holding up his right hand; that the Catholic Irishman may do the same so long as he does not kiss a Testament marked with a crucifix; that the Welshman is safe so long as he does not put three fingers on the book. To insist on this expression of the national faith either proclaims us superstitious or threatens to drive those who are not superstitious into unbelief.

But certainly the retention of the judicial oath, under all the circumstances which have been detailed, is an expression of the British character. It illustrates most forcibly the charge brought against our nation, by Mr. Matthew Arnold, in his Liverpool Address, that we are sadly deficient in lucidity, *i.e.*, that we have no perception of the want of truth and validness in notions long current; no perception that they are no longer possible, that their time is finished, and that they can serve us no more.

It is contended that we cannot be sure of getting reliable evidence in a Court of Justice apart from the palpable interposition of religious motives. The religious sentiment

* *Jeaffreson*, II., 253.

may, however, be invoked, and yet may not produce exactly the result which is anticipated. In the Hindoo Law provision is made for pious falsehood, which is called "The Speech of the Gods," and it is allowable to give false evidence for the purpose of saving a life which would be forfeited to the rigour of the law.*

And, indeed, those who feel that—

Earthly power doth then show likest God's
When mercy seasons justice—

may well suppose that the Heavenly Father will Himself condone perjury if committed in the exhibition of a God-like mercy. Lord Mansfield directed a jury to find a stolen bracelet of less value than forty shillings, in order that the thief might escape the capital sentence; and when the prosecutor urged that the fashion of the bracelet cost twice the money, the judge turned towards the jury and said, with solemn gravity, "As we stand in need of God's mercy, gentlemen, let us not hang a man for fashion's sake."† That is to say, on the plea of mercy he directed them to commit perjury.

The fear of hell will not always prevent men from false swearing. We protest against the common notion that you may take an unprincipled liar and galvanise him with the terrors of hell, and convert him forthwith into a miracle of truthfulness. With unblushing effrontery, for the mere delight of speaking falsely, or for motives of obvious self-interest, the thoughtless idler and the purchased liar give their perjured evidence. Even when the fear is strong—as strong as though the heavens were opened and the throne of God stood revealed, as though earth yawned and the flames of hell shot up from below—still the terrors of the nearer tribunal will soon blot out the apocalyptic vision. A nervous witness, having been encouraged by the judge, felt that after that he could swear anything he liked, showing that the awe of an earthly tribunal had excluded all other thoughts.‡

There is also the torture of cross-examination to be taken into account. Grant that a man believes even that sudden

* Tyler, 233.

† Jeaffreson, II., 217.

‡ Ballantine, I., 234.

death will be the consequence of perjury ; there are states of mind in which sudden death would be preferable to sudden disgrace. Grant that a vague belief in some undefined consequences if we perjure ourselves is in the mind ; that is powerless beside the certainty of present discomfiture. Grant that hell yawns before the disconsolate man, yet on the brink of the abyss he is struggling with a taunting, gibing, intellectual power, till it seems to him that the torments of hell are to be preferred to the agony of that contest. But most probably he forgets the future doom he has called down on himself, in his present bitter straits.

Nor can the vivid sense of God's presence produce a thoroughly reliable witness. Let us consider for a moment what are the attributes of such a witness. He must have accuracy of observation, vividness and distinctness of memory, lucidity of expression, and perfect honesty of purpose. Now it is quite clear that no terror, inspired by an oath, can act retrospectively and correct an inaccurate observation into an accurate one. No one can suppose that the act of taking an oath can endue us with the power which an imaginative writer supposes we shall one day possess of outstripping the career of light, so as to arrive at a given point in time to see the precise picture of the past as if it were still present. If we had that power we might perhaps correct the imperfect observation of the past. Nor can we suppose that vivid and distinct memory can be given, in ordinary conditions of the body, of that which attracted little attention at the time, as some uneducated persons in their dreams are said to reproduce, with exactness, the music and the French conversation which they heard with their outward ear but never understood at the time. And certainly lucidity of expression is either a gift of nature or a slowly acquired art, and cannot be superinduced by the imposition of an oath, unless we believe that God infallibly inspires and saves from mistake the witness who has called in the divine aid by means of an oath. Above all, it may be affirmed with confidence that the presence of religious sentiment does not necessarily bring with it an atmosphere of absolute sincerity. Perfect sincerity is not the character-

istic even of the most private prayer. It is only what we are vividly conscious of that we can vividly imagine to be known to Omniscience. It is on this account that private prayer, or the ministerial explanation which the conscience makes in the House of the Soul is no truer than some other ministerial explanations. All this George Eliot shows in connection with her masterly analysis of the character of Bulstrode. Speaking of the Confessional, the Rev. A. McKennal says : " So long as there is a motive for concealment, so long shall we practise concealment. The priest is practised in the art of worming secrets out of his penitents. He has to learn the science of casuistry, to acquire the skill in cross-examination of a lawyer, and hence the insincerity of an act where there should be on the one side only the strictest truthfulness, and on the other, perfectly unsuspecting confidence." *

We must sometimes walk alone in utter unconsciousness of God's presence, however profoundly we feel Him near in the highest aspiration of spiritual communion, and nothing seems more obvious than this, that in the intellectual process of giving evidence, the awe-inspiring fact of God's presence cannot always be remembered through a long examination, through a severe cross-examination, and through a more or less protracted re-examination ; and that if it could, it would often produce a distracting, and therefore, in all probability, a distorting influence.

The oath being thus powerless in so many cases to accomplish its assigned task, what provision shall we make for the treatment of witnesses? We cannot, under the present system, prevent perjury, but if only due skill be used, it can be discovered. According to Serjeant Ballantine, " cross-examination is the only means by which perjury can be exposed." We may still use the same means to discover the falsehood of the witness ; and for this purpose it may be better not to excite the terror sometimes inspired by self-imprecation. The oath may frighten into imbecility an otherwise useful witness ; it may destroy good evidence : but, in relation to false evidence, it acts as a

* *Christ's Healing Touch, and other Sermons*, p. 52.

danger-signal. "Mind, you are on your oath," warns the witness that what he is about to say is important, and that if he contradicts himself upon this point, he will be detected and punished; and hence, if he is telling a lie, he will take care to make it a consistent one. On the other hand, if the cross-examination is carried on without any demonstration—no remark being made by counsel when critical points are raised—the witness is thrown off his guard; he exposes himself, or, if not, the falsehood mingled with the truth is easily eliminated.

A well-known and certain punishment inflicted by the law for all false evidence given in connection with the question at issue before the Court will produce a deterring effect. Sometimes, no doubt, it is the fear of legal consequences rather than of divine wrath which influences men now. It is not always easy to gauge the comparative force of motives; but doubtless there are cases in which men, like King David, fear to fall into the hands of men more than into the hands of God. One historical instance goes to prove this. "The Ministers of Honorius were heard to declare that if they had only invoked the name of the Deity, they would consult the public safety and trust their souls to the mercy of heaven; but they had sworn by the sacred head of the Emperor," and they would not expose themselves to the *temporal penalties* of sacrilege and rebellion.* And Tertullian complains that it was the only oath which the Romans of his time affected to reverence.

In conclusion, it may be remarked that there is only one real safeguard against untruth, and religion may help us to that all important end. We get a glimpse of the right method to be pursued in the following incident:

When a child, eight years old, was brought up as a witness, it was mentioned that she was competent to give evidence because she had been twice instructed by a clergyman as to the nature of an oath. But the judge (Mr. Justice Patteson) would not admit her evidence, observing that he must be satisfied that the child felt the binding obligation of an oath from the general course of her religious instruc-

* Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, Chap. xxxi.

tion, and that the effect of the oath upon the conscience should arise *from religious feelings of a PERMANENT NATURE*, and not merely from instructions confined to the nature of an oath, recently communicated to her for the purposes of the trial.*

This principle is capable of a wider application. "Never," says Mr. Caird, in his famous Sermon on Religion in Common Life, "in the highest and the holiest sense, can one become a religious man until he has acquired those habits of daily self-denial, of resistance to temptation, of kindness, gentleness, humility, sympathy, active beneficence, which are to be acquired only in daily contact with mankind." Hence the only safeguard against falsehood which piety can provide is through the cultivation of a habit of veracity developed in practical life under the influence of religious motive and sentiment. By cultivating such a habit till it works with automatic precision, and not by galvanising ourselves into truthfulness by the sudden flash of divine revelation, can we hope to be really truthful. "How shall we be believed?" says Gregory Nazianzen. "By our word and by a life which makes our word worthy of credit." "It is not the oath which gives credit to the man, but the man to the oath."† It is not in jerks of horror-goaded utterance, not in awe-stricken words such as might be uttered on some mountain of transfiguration, but in the calm custom of unfailing and abiding sincerity, that the truth should be spoken by the followers of him who bade his disciples to swear not at all, but to let their communication be "Yea, yea ; Nay, nay"—who came into the world for this purpose, and was born to this end, that by every act and deed of an upright life, and in ever varied tones, now of loving gentleness, and anon of stern denunciation, he might bear witness to the Truth.

CHARLES CLEMENT COE.

* *Taylor on Evidence*, Vol. ii. 1119.

† *Æschylus*, quoted by Tyler, p. 238.

AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN.*

MRS. DE MORGAN has given her readers a very acceptable book. The memoir of Professor De Morgan has all the charm which ought to be found in the recollections of a life marked, not by moving incident, but by strong individual character. One can weary of remarkable events, never of remarkable force or ingenuity of mind.

Augustus De Morgan was born in 1806 in India; he was brought to England as a child of seven months old, and owed little to his Indian birth, of which he was, nevertheless, in a fashion proud in after years, except the infirmity in his sight, familiar to all who knew him, and a constant element, more or less, in the shaping of his career. His first good school was that of the Rev. J. Parsons, at Redland, Bristol; here he was well taught in classics, but his love for mathematics does not seem to have been specially stimulated by the school routine. In 1823 he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, subsequently came out as fourth Wrangler in the Tripos of 1826, and began to study seriously for the Bar. Already, however, two leading features of his character had shown themselves, and it soon became clear that they were destined to have absolute control over his future career. The first was his liking, and great natural gift, for mathematics; the second was that sturdy self-assertion of intellect and conscience which, not necessarily, yet so often leads men into unorthodox, unpopular, and self-sacrificing paths. Both of these influences

* *Memoir of Augustus De Morgan.* By his Wife, Sophia Elizabeth De Morgan. With Selections from his Letters. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1882.

were at work when, in 1827, young De Morgan, himself a Cambridge man, and with an orthodox training, threw himself cordially into the scheme and hopes of the newly-invented London University. In the following year he was elected to the Chair of Mathematics.

It is with the University College in London, for a few years at first called the London University, that De Morgan's life and work will always be connected in the public memory; and in spite of his own protest at the close of his career, and the unspent force which to the present time makes that protest effective, the hope may be expressed that a permanent and fitting way will yet be found to perpetuate the memory of his thirty-four years of faithful service to the College. The story of Professor De Morgan's connection with and severance from the College is largely the story of his life. His love for mathematics and natural aptitude as a teacher made the opening at University College acceptable to his wishes; but a yet stronger inducement to him to become a candidate for the Chair was his warm approval of the principle which was laid down as fundamental by the promoters of the new institution—namely, that the highest academical training should there be given without any reference in teachers or pupils to religious convictions. Mr. De Morgan had already made friendships that deepened and strengthened his own fairly reasoned-out persuasion that religion is a private affair for a man's own soul. Some too hasty expressions might escape him now and then in those early days, marking his dislike of the practice of those who wear their religion on their sleeves, and think it well to do so; but "it was easy to see that a deep religious feeling underlay the contempt for observance which his early training had caused, and that his consciousness of the care and fatherhood of the Almighty was a sacred thing belonging to himself alone, not to be profaned by contact with human forms or inventions" (page 20). We quote these words because they really give the key to the religious bearing of his whole life: utter sincerity and simplicity of feeling accompanying deep convictions, and a boundless trust in a Goodness and

Intelligence over all. Among the friendships contributing to what was thus already a steady bias of his own mind, none was stronger or more beautiful, quite apart from the important domestic relation it led to later on, than that which he formed with William Frend, a man much his senior, and of character tried as gold is tried. Not the least interesting portion of an interesting book is Mrs. De Morgan's too brief sketch of her father's life and principles. While as yet De Morgan was dreaming, we may suppose, of neither sweetheart nor wife, except under the mysterious symbols of the pursuit to which his heart was given, his friendship with Mr. Frend was confirming him in independence of character and in a noble readiness for self-sacrifice.

The long connection of Professor De Morgan with the London University and University College was, in its leading features, but not the prominent ones, a course of steady, laborious teaching, and the devotion of the best hours of a lifetime to the objects of the institution, and the welfare of his pupils. It is this that a host of pupils look back to with gratitude, and can but think of as making his name inseparable from the history of the College. But the prominent features of the long connection of De Morgan's name with the College, those that have been best known to the outside world, and that are now chiefly recalled by this volume, are not the continuous work, which could lend few striking materials for description, but the acts on his part from time to time of adhesion or of secession. They may be enumerated thus: In 1828 De Morgan was elected the first Professor of Mathematics; in 1831 he resigned his office on a question of principle and practice affecting the status of the professors, and consequently the true welfare of the institution; in 1836 he resumed the Chair; in 1853 he made a strong remonstrance in a matter touching, as he thought, the leading principle of the College; and in 1866 he finally resigned, again on a question of principle. Immediately on his first appointment as teacher of mathematics, Mr. De Morgan had joined in a protest, addressed to the governing body of the College, which shows his sense of the difficulties

he might have to encounter. The question as to the rights and tenure of office of the teachers as against the controlling power of the governing Council arose as a difficulty even before the work of the College began. It is of necessity a vital question. The same critical contention, under a modified form, is well known to have led, only a year or two ago, nearly to a disruption in one of the largest and most famous endowed hospitals of London. Under all sorts of modification the question is a perpetually recurring one. It was a vital matter to the newly-appointed professors, in 1828, to know whether they held their offices independently of any change of opinion, or of fresh views of expediency, on the part of the Council, or whether they were liable to dismissal. In 1831, the Council dismissed from his office a professor in the Medical School, at the same time stating "that nothing which has come to their knowledge with respect to his conduct has in any way tended to impeach either his general character or professional skill and knowledge"; and Professor De Morgan, in high disapproval of this arbitrary act, resigned.

In 1836, on the sudden and tragical death of his successor in the Chair, Mr. De Morgan stepped in to cover the emergency, and eventually resumed his post, deeming the recurrence of such action of the Council as took place in 1831 to be sufficiently guarded against for the future. And, in fact, the further difficulties he encountered had a different occasion, though they touched the same critical point of dispute. A legacy left to the College Library in 1853 was accompanied by a condition that the three professors named in the will as trustees for the choice of books should be members of the Church of England. The Professor of Mathematics was thus disqualified to perform an interesting duty by his being a Nonconformist; and here, accordingly, if the legacy were accepted under such a condition, was a religious distinction made between the professors in an institution which professed to know nothing about religious differences either in teachers or in pupils. Professor De Morgan, after a vigorous protest, let the matter pass. And looking back, and considering human

nature to be what it is, and the offer of books to have been saddled by the testator, and not by any act on the part of the College, with this provision which would not affect the character of the gift, one sees that the question of principle might well be allowed to pass, and even without the transaction deserving so harsh a name as a moral "shuffle."

Still, Professor De Morgan was justly sensitive on this double point, the strict observance of the fundamental principle of the College, and the preservation of the independence and full rights of every professor. The events of 1866 in connection with Mr. (now Dr.) Martineau's candidature for the Chair of Mental Philosophy and Logic in University College are probably well known to the readers of this Review. Mrs. De Morgan puts together in this volume three important documents, two of them not before published, which give every assistance needed for understanding the course taken by Professor De Morgan. The first of these documents is the letter addressed by Professor De Morgan to the Council of the College, conveying his resignation of his office, and his reasons for the step. The second is the statement of fifteen professors, addressed to the proprietors, containing the arguments on the side of those who defended the action of the Council. The third is a private letter from Professor De Morgan to his old friend, the Rev. William Heald, in which something more perhaps of the inner mind of the writer comes out, and otherwise, than in the letter to the Council. All three are interesting papers; two of them will be turned to eagerly by many who, sixteen years ago, felt warmly on the points under discussion. Perhaps at the time, too scanty justice was done to a presumably honest wish on all sides in the Council to appoint simply the best man, taking all things into account, to the post. The most eminent man among the candidates, the one of largest experience, and of widest thinking, was by consent Mr. Martineau. Whether his appointment would have been the best in the interests of the College remains the undecided question which Professor De Morgan thought the Council decided in the negative on

unworthy or mistaken grounds. His letter to the Council is in many respects a remarkable one. His fresh, pungent way of stating things, and his uncompromising mode of reasoning out a matter, are well illustrated in it.

There is in this letter, we may observe by the way, a literary nut to crack, not the only one which this volume offers to us. We submit it to the ingenuity of our readers. "The acceptance," Professor De Morgan says, "of the conditions of that legacy [Dr. Peene's in 1853] did not drive me from the College, because, after much deliberation, and not a little help from what I now see to be sophism, my love for the College and the life I led in it barred the way with *De minimis non curat lex*. But I ought to have seen that *minimum* is the first step from *nihil* to *totum*; and when St. Denys, with his head under his arm, had made that first step, I ought to have foreseen the second" (page 340). This allusion to St. Denys is very puzzling. We have looked at it "amosgepotically"; we have considered whether, after all, it might be "Ocular and Elizabethan"; and we can make very little of it. It is true, Mrs. De Morgan interprets in a footnote; but we submit that the interpretation obscures, not explains. Professor De Morgan, with his racy, original way of saying strong things, meant probably something very good.

This is a small matter. We may quote another passage from this letter of resignation, which shows at any rate something of the pressure of high feeling under which it was written:—

I proceed to show, he says, that (supposing me willing to remain) I am as worthy to be extruded as Mr. Martineau to be excluded.

I have for thirty years, and in my class-room, acted on the principle that positive theism may be made the basis of psychological explanation without violation of any law of the College. When in elucidating mathematical principles it is necessary to speak of our mental organisation as effect of a cause, I have always referred it to an intelligent and disposing Creator. The *nature of things*, the *eternal laws of thoughts*, and all the ways by which that Creator is put in the dark corner, have been treated

by my silence as philosophical absurdities not worthy to have their silly names intruded upon those who are to be trained to think. Were I to remain under the new system, I should hold it a sacred duty and—ah, poor human nature!—a malicious pleasure to extend and intensify all I have hitherto said on the subject.

Again, for more than thirty years I have been as strong a Unitarian as Mr. Martineau. If I have not raised my voice in this matter, it is because I have been deeply engaged in other things, because I do not care what unreflecting people think they think, and because I have found that the great bulk of reflecting men of all sects keep their Trinitarianism caged in a creed, and are, in every practical application of religion except pelting Unitarians, as truly Unitarian as Mr. Martineau himself. Were I to continue in this college, under even the ghost of a gag, I should soon be heard (without the walls) on a subject to which I have paid long and close attention. I should soon bring the question to issue whether the installed Professor is or is not a subject for such discussion as has arisen about the candidate for admission. . . .

Return to the old principle. If the College fall, it will fall with honour. No concession of narrow minds, philosophical or theological, will save it. The enemy will give one sneer more, the friend nine cheers less. Thing'embigot, who says that his son shall not enter the College if Mr. Martineau teach there, never meant to send his son in any case. The late Vicar of St. Pancras, then a lessee in Gower-street, found the noise of the playground disagreeable, and sent word that if the nuisance were not abated he should withdraw his patronage; he had been an inveterate opponent. He was left to subtract his negative quantity if he pleased. Let Thing'embigot learn the same rule of algebra.

On the other hand, the enemy of religious disqualification, if the present course be persisted in, must decide whether his son shall be educated under selection carried up to its logical extent in the professed fear of God, or exclusion nibbled at up to compulsion of circumstances in the concealed fear of man as to religion, and another *fear of God* as to philosophy. I should myself be puzzled to make a choice, for if there be a tincture of atheism in the second fear of God, there is a tincture of blasphemy in the first. Of the two different ways of putting man in the place of God, I think the world at large would prefer the first.

My best wishes remain with the College which I leave, but I wish to make myself clearly understood on the question which has been opened. I trust that by return to and future maintenance of the sound principle on which it was founded, in which there is more religion than in all exclusive systems put together, the College will rise into prosperity under the protection, not of the Infinite, not of the Absolute, not of the Unconditioned, not of the Nature of things, not of the chapter of accidents, but of God, the Creator and Father of all mankind (pp. 342 to 345).

These words may be supplemented by a sentence from a letter on the same subject to Sir John Herschell :—

I would not have objected to leaving the existence of God and His action on the minds of men an open question for the best qualified candidate to treat in his own way ; but the interference of the College as a college, and a settlement of that question *officially*, is a step in which it concerns me, with my way of thinking, to take a part. . . . I have told them [the Council] *totidem verbis* that they had acted from *fear of God* in philosophy and *fear of man* in religion (page 369).

We quote these passages with no purpose except to illustrate the mind and character of Professor De Morgan. In these events of 1866, which touched him so nearly, his whole bearing, as in all else in his life, was full of simple dignity, very straightforward, regardless of petty or selfish interests. We demur to the necessity he felt himself under to resign his office ; and we lament that he took the action of the Council too deeply to heart, and regarded himself as henceforth cut off from sympathy with the College in which he had laboured faithfully for a lifetime ; but all the more we must honour the vindication of a great principle which he deemed to be in peril, and the readiness with which he accepted painful things as a portion of that needed vindication. The controversy itself, and discussion of the controversy, can never be revived with any advantage or interest ; but Professor De Morgan's part in it was so singularly illustrative of the great side of his character, as also in a measure of some weaker, but not less amiable, features, that it possesses permanent interest for those who love or revere his memory.

Professor De Morgan's theological and religious position has sufficiently appeared in these remarks upon his connection with University College. His theology, and something more, may further be gathered from the passage of his Will with which Mrs. De Morgan fittingly closes the memoir:—"I commend my future with hope and confidence to Almighty God; to God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, whom I believe in my heart to be the Son of God, but whom I have not confessed with my lips, because in my time such confession has always been the way up in the world" (page 368).

He was a Unitarian, and not unwilling, as he declared, to bring his theology into public speech and profess it before the world, if any doubt should ever be cast upon his perfect freedom to do so. But what interests us more than this is a very fine spirit of openness to new impressions and to the haunting mystery of a world of which science does not reveal the secrets. Few men have ever possessed the scientific faculty more decisively, or have been more strictly bound both by temper and by destiny to the logical exercise of the wits; and few, at the same time, have escaped more completely from any narrow satisfaction with the things known, or have entertained more candidly the possibility of reaching some higher apprehension of realities. We are glad that Mrs. De Morgan has reproduced in this volume the just strictures which Professor De Morgan passed upon a principle laid down by no less an authority than Mr. Faraday. In his lecture on "Mental Training" before the Royal Institution, in 1854, Faraday had said: "The laws of nature, as we understand them, are the foundations of our knowledge of natural things. Before we proceed to consider any questions involving physical principles, we should *set out with clear ideas of the naturally possible and impossible.*" To this De Morgan objected:

We stared when we read this—set out in physical investigations with a clear idea of the naturally possible and impossible! We thought the world had struggled forward to the knowledge that a clear idea of this was the last acquisition of study and reflection combined with observation, not the possession of our

intellect at starting. We thought that mature minds were rather inclined to believe that a knowledge of the limits of possibility and impossibility was only the mirage which constantly recedes as we approach it. We remembered the Platonic idea, as clear as the crystalline orbs it led to, that the planetary motions *must* be circular, or compounded of circular motion, and that aught else was impossible. We remembered with how clear an idea of the impossibility of the earth's motion the first opponents of Galileo started these maxims into the dispute. We doubt if in any mediæval writer the principle on which they *acted* has been so broadly laid down as by our author in the phrases above quoted. The schoolmen did indeed make laws of nature the foundation of their knowledge, and clear ideas of possibility and impossibility helped them in the structure. But they rather *did* it than *professed* it. *

Accordingly, Mr. De Morgan's guarded feeling towards the unexplained phenomena of Spiritualism, for instance, is by no means justly expressed by the word credulity. Rather, his knowledge, competent in its own sphere, became baffled and conscious of its failure in another sphere, and led him to a wise suspense of judgment.

Professor De Morgan's zealous labours in aid of higher education in the country, and in some movements of social progress, are well known. These must be thought of apart from the work which he undertook more immediately in the line of his own pursuit. To the latter belong the share he took, during a long course of years, in the proceedings of the Astronomical Society, and his numerous writings of a purely scientific character. In the former, we may reckon his long and most useful series of publications for the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, from its foundation, in 1826, to its dissolution in 1844,—his active and disinterested efforts to make known to the country at large the benefits of a decimal system of coinage, and to urge its adoption upon the Government,—his strenuous protests against "cram" in education, and the stress he laid upon the right formation of habits as of more weight than any acquisition of knowledge :—"If we take care of the habits,

* *Athenæum*, March, 1855. Memoir, p. 192.

the acquirements will take care of themselves" (page 227) ; and lastly, some books of a more popular order, full of fresh ingenious ways of treating old themes, or of curious knowledge picked up through years of wide reading and patient research.

For something of the enormous amount of work achieved by Professor De Morgan, the world has, perhaps, to thank his dislike for the country and the sea. He writes to Mr. Frend in 1834 :—

No letters from you, from which I conclude that your thoughts are of trees, only interrupted by the slopping of the waves, which are always fiddling at the sand, till I long to give them a thump, and tell them to be easy. The prettiest thing about the sea is the straight horizon and the isochronism of the waves in deep water, but near the shore they do not keep time like my pendulum (page 80).

He was contented with his London routine, and to be incessantly at work, while still showing as clearly as any man a keen enjoyment of domestic life and of the society of congenial friends. The following letter, written nearly at the close of his life, possesses points of interest beyond the account he gives in it of his idea of hard work :—

My dear Heald,—I think I shall be able to keep up the institution of a summer letter, though I may not be so long as usual. It is the forty-fourth observance.

You think, one letter of yours says, that I am feeling the effects of hard work ; in fact, that I have been working too hard. Rid your mind of the idea. I have never been *hard* working but I have been very *continuously* at work. I have never *sought* relaxation. And why? Because it would have killed me. Amusement is real hard work to me. To relax is to forage about the books with no particular object, and not bound to go on with anything.

You remember that my amusement used to be Berkeley and the like. Quite true. I did with Trinity College Library what I afterwards did with my own—I foraged for relaxation. I used to shock you with my reading of Voltaire, who existed in that

library in about eighty quarto volumes. So you called me an atheist vagabond, fancying that Voltaire was an atheist: he was, in fact, theistic to bigotry, and anti-revolutionist to the same extent.

I read an enormous deal of fiction—all I could get hold of—so my amusement was not all philosophical. I have never worked hard—never got so far as a headache. If I felt tired, I left off (page 393).

Many bright recollections of friends are to be found in this memoir, and they form by no means its least charm. Especially attractive is the long friendship, and the well-sustained correspondence in evidence of it, between Professor De Morgan and Sir John Herschell. "Looking back," said Sir John Herschell, after Mr. De Morgan's death, "on our long friendship, I do not find a single point on which we failed to sympathise; and I recall many occasions on which his sound judgment and excellent feeling have sustained and encouraged me," (page 399).

The selection of Professor De Morgan's letters in this volume is enough to show with clearness the characteristics of the man; yet it is too brief. We could have wished for many more of these letters, so suggestive, often witty, always wise and kind, and abounding with delightful nonsense.

From the following letter to Mr. Frend, in 1834, we have already quoted one short passage:—

I was not surprised to find, on my return to town on Friday, that you had decamped, seeing that you take pleasure in the wilderness. Neither must you be astonished that I did not exceed by a single day my estimate of the time I could bear the viridity of extra-urban scenery. . . . While my health is recovering from the effects of the raw atmosphere I have been breathing, I write this in preference to more serious occupation. This is no joke, I assure you; whenever I return from the country I am knocked down for some days, and could be ill with very little contrivance or external instigation, which never happens if I stay in town. And yet I have been only two days regularly in the wilds. To give you some account of my progress, I went to stay with a clerical friend, who lives six miles from any town

or village, except the thing he calls his parish, and a lone house he calls his rectory. So, he having no vehicle except a four-legged apparatus called a pony, we slung my baggage across the beast, and crossed the country on foot, like a gipsy migration, talking mathematics over his head, to his very great edification. Indeed, he (the quadruped) looked as wise and profited as much as some of my preceding pupils have done. How people live in such lone houses I know not. Conceive me reduced to clip hedges to pass away the time till dinner, which I did with great *gout*, seeing that it is reducing trees to something like regularity, and diminishing the sum total of foliage. From thence I went to Oxford, where I was thrown upon my resources for a whole evening. The only incident worth notice was that, having strolled out and picked up some second-hand books at a book-stall, rather Cornelius Agrippa looking sort of things, a good-looking old gentleman (a stout Church and State man, I'll swear) was so astounded that he changed his table to increase his distance, and looked at me as if he expected to see me carried away by an Avatar of the evil principle. Thence got I to Bedford, where I stayed some days with Captain Smyth, heard all the town politics, saw a jail with two men in it, father and son, charged with cutting the tails off fifteen pigs, dined with a clericus, and did various other things, not forgetting seeing a play acted by little children. . . . Thence got I to Cambridge, inside a coach, with a lady whose history I wormed out of her, agreeably to a talent I have for doing those things when I like, which you will admit when I tell you that in a ride of twenty-five miles I ascertained that she had married, when very young, an officer of the first Light Dragoons, with him had gone to India, was stationed at Bangalore; where she travelled; how he died, she came home, and married the vicar of some place which I now forget, and, having stayed at some place, which I equally forget, was now moving, with furniture following in a waggon, and husband deposited outside the coach, to take possession of his living, first stopping to dine with a friend whose name I forget. I also ascertained which of all my cousins in India she had danced with in her day, which was instructive to know. These, and a great many other things, did I ascertain; so you may see that if I am not communicative myself, I know how to make other people so when they do not know what I am at (page 78).

A letter written in 1859 to Sir John Herschell treats in

half-a-dozen lines, and in characteristic fashion, of the idea of Cause.

Thanks for your pamphlet. I have not had time to do more than glance at it, but will say what I think when I have got through a heavy job of calculation—a job of life and death, as one may say—for it is all about premiums, and claims, and assurances, &c.

Maurice de Biran, who died in 1824, aged about sixty, was a *philosophe*, who speculated and died, even as a silkworm spins and dies. He will be a gaudy moth, I daresay. His cocoon was published by Victor Cousin in 1841, in four volumes. He was very much against Napoleon in 1814, which means, I suppose, that he had been his parasite theretofore. He was a public man of some kind. Probably his will was an impulse to better his condition, or butter his condition. He passes for an acute thinker in France; but I have never seen a line of his writing.

I believe that so much of cause as is not mere notion of precedent and consequent is derived from our own consciousness of power exercised at will. If we had been rational posts, incapable of motion, chewing the cud of what passed before our eyes, and if with a will incapable of action, I do not see how we should have had any real notion of cause. What the will is I have not the least idea, or whether it ought to be called the *shall* or not. Query, if it be really correct to call it the *will*, how is a person, whose will is undecided, said to be *shilly-shally*? Ought it not to be *willy-wally*? Kind regards to the circle (page 300).

Here is a pleasant note to the same old friend, under date 1863:

MY DEAR BARONET,—There's change for your "Professor." Everybody attaches some ideas to a word derived from early associations. The first "learned Professor" I read of under that name was Olearius Schinderhausen, of Leyden, who departed with his cast-off suit biennially. I did not think I should live to match him; but as I never go out, and always work at home in a dressing-gown, I also have but one coat in two years.

Seventy-one, eh? Go on to eighty, and then apply to me for further directions, if I should be in a condition to give them. Addition of the same to a ratio of greater inequality diminishes it. So says Jemmy Wood; and the life of man confirms it. When

you were preparing $\sin^{-1}x$, I was learning numeration from my father on a zahlenbreitstein—a pebble, of diameter and flatness, picked up in the road. And I remember that when it was lost I refused all arithmetic till another was found, which, considering that no one had told me the etymology of *calculation*, showed a kind of natural philological acumen.—Yours very truly, A. De Morgan (page 320).

We may quote one more letter, or portion of a letter, addressed, in September, 1868, to Mr. John Stuart Mill, who was then residing at Avignon. After some pleasant talk and inquiry about the Avignon edition of *Gardiner's Logarithms*, and a reprint in 1770 of the same, Mr. De Morgan turns to another subject of more general interest.

A nice job you will have made for the courts. Some ladies have actually passed the revising barrister because there was no opposition. The R.B. was right; he is not bound to know that Jane Smith is a woman, nor could he raise the question. I have a cousin whose wife is *David*. When the poll clerk sees a female claimant I suppose he will be bound to say, "Madam, you cannot be the Jane Smith on the list, for the law says that voters are all men. I must wait until some man comes forward and declares he is the person described!" Then the poll clerk may, perhaps, be subject to an action. But if he should admit the claim, there may be a scrutiny demanded, and, perhaps, a petition against the return. The question will raise some logic. The world of concepts being divided into man and non-man, if man mean male person, and only man can vote, non-man equally excludes Jane and her pussy and her pianoforte. They all come under the contra-positive—all voters are men. All voters are men, *i.e.*, all non-men are non-voters. There is but one answer to Jane, the cat, and the pianoforte, *i.e.*, *non-man*. I hope you will push the point, and get rid of the bother; it infests the house. But, in justice, let no woman be placed on the register except on her demand. To be a voter is sometimes dangerous. A man ought to face the danger, but you have no right to enforce it on women. In principle you might as well enforce the militia on them. Many women think exemption from politics is one of their rights (page 383).

We recommend our readers to go to the book itself. It gives the picture of one who lived to benefit multitudes, and

injured none—a man, wise, tender, devout, yet with a singular independence of character and an uncompromising conscientiousness. The Memoir, written as it is with both feeling and judgment, will be welcome to all who knew Professor De Morgan, or that have had reason, as pupils, to be grateful for his skill as a teacher, and for his patient love of his work. It will also, we hope, gain the notice of the far wider circle of those who care for the more original and sturdy forms of human intelligence and conduct.

EDWARD S. HOWSE.

DR. MARTINEAU'S AND MR. POLLOCK'S
SPINOZA.—II.*

III.—SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY.

IN reading Dr. Martineau's exquisite sketch of Spinoza's life and character there has been little call for any mental effort. We have easily followed our accomplished guide and tranquilly enjoyed the successive biographical pictures which careful research has made so truthful, and artistic skill so beautiful and life-like. But now a more arduous task lies before us. So far we have been for the most part pleased, but passive recipients of intellectual and æsthetic gratification. If we wish, however, not only to have an adequate idea of Spinoza's history, but also to mount to his philosophical point of view, and endeavour to see the problem of the universe somewhat as he saw it, and to appreciate in some degree the merits and defects of his proposed solution, then we must nerve our minds for strenuous exertion. A more competent expositor than Dr. Martineau we could not find, but in passing to the second part of his study of Spinoza we soon discover that it is no longer a facile and delightful excursion in the company of a highly cultured friend through picturesque scenes which the imagination can easily realise.

* *A Study of Spinoza.* By JAMES MARTINEAU, LL.D., D.D., Principal of Manchester New College, London. With portrait of Spinoza. London: Macmillan and Co., 1882.

Spinoza; his Life and Philosophy. By FREDERICK POLLOCK, Barrister-at-Law, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Honorary Doctor of Laws of the University of Edinburgh. With portrait of Spinoza. London: Kegan Paul and Co. 1880.

Spinoza; Four Essays, by Land, Kuno Fischer, J. Van Vloten, and Ernest Renan. Edited by Professor KNIGHT, St. Andrew's. Williams and Norgate, London and Edinburgh. 1882.

Rather is it now a hard climb up Alpine heights of philosophical thought under the guidance of a vigorous thinker who will choose for us the least toilsome route, and will help us over difficulties with the happy knack of a practised mountaineer, but who will, at the same time, soon let us know that it is vain for those to set out on this expedition who are not prepared to put forth mental energy in grasping and surmounting the ideas which will rise before them.

It may be as well to preface our account of the more salient features of Spinoza's philosophy by some remarks on the proper function of philosophy in general, and also on the relation of philosophy to ethics and to religion. The wonder which fills the soul of man as he contemplates the visible cosmos or looks into the mysterious depths of his own consciousness cannot but awaken some intellectual impulse to theorise concerning this spectacle of the outer and the inner world. Reflection on the facts of perception and self-consciousness sooner or later reveals the truth that the human mind cannot think of the ever changing appearance of nature without thinking, at the same time, of an abiding cause of their successive appearances, just as it cannot think of its own successive mental states without recognising a permanent self as the seed of its various affections and the cause of its various relations. The antithesis which thus presents itself to the reflective mind is expressed by several pairs of terms which indicate respectively different aspects of these contrasted ideas. It is spoken of as the relation between God and the Creation, the Real and the Phenomenal, the Infinite and the Finite, the Eternal and the Temporal, the One and the Many, and in Spinoza's phraseology it is the relation between Substance and its Modes. But thought cannot stop short with an analysis of man's perceptual experience, it has also to explain the facts of self-consciousness, or the relation of its own personality to the two terms of this fundamental antithesis. Is the Ego a part of the changing phenomena of the universe, or is it something more than a series of changing states, and akin rather to the abiding cause of the phenomenal world? To determine, then, the proper meaning and reciprocal relations of these three

terms, God, Nature, and Man, becomes the problem to which all minds in whom the philosophical instinct is strong cannot help addressing themselves : and the different philosophical systems are the different attempts which have been made to present a self-consistent and adequate solution. But it is also to be noted that man's relation to the cosmos and its cause is not merely that of a spectator and theoriser. Man is not only a thinking being, he is also a moral and religious being, and in each of these respects he feels himself to stand in specially intimate relations with the Infinite and the Eternal. All philosophical systems, then, so far as they achieve their proper object, must include not only a theory of our sensational and perceptive consciousness, *i.e.*, of the physical universe and its ground or cause, but also an explanation of the facts of our moral and religious consciousness. It is not the function of the philosopher to attempt to create or to destroy moral and religious ideas ; he has simply to reckon with them as actual factors of experience. As, however, it is impossible for any theory concerning God, Nature, and Man, to become influential without, at the same time, either invigorating or depressing ethical and religious ideas, philosophy necessarily assumes considerable practical as well as theoretical importance in respect both to conduct and devotion. It is true that the philosophy of a man, or of an epoch, takes its form from the character and culture of the philosopher and of the time ; but it is equally true that a philosophical system becomes in its turn an ideal force which reacts powerfully upon the intellectual, moral, and religious life to which it owes its birth and its vitality. The facts of experience in which philosophy endeavours to discover organic unity fall, as we have already noticed, into three distinct groups, namely, first, the orderly sequence of physical and psychological phenomena, which forms the subject of scientific research ; next, the ideas and emotions which have reference to the cause and meaning of the phenomenal universe ; and, finally, the personality of man with his consciousness of moral freedom, his sense of obligation, his trust and reverence, his conscious sympathy and

union with the Eternal. Each of these several phases of experience has its special attraction for particular persons, and for particular periods in the mental history of mankind; and if, in the case of any philosopher or any age, the attraction to one particular phase of experience is so strong as to throw the others quite into the background, it is almost inevitable that the philosopher who is under this influence will use, as a key to the explanation of the *Universum*, the theory which he has found to answer in that province of experience which especially engages his interest and attention. In such a case the theory has not been formed from a comprehensive and sympathetic study and appreciation of the whole field of human experience; it is a merely provincial explanation, which is forcibly imposed upon other regions of thought and feeling to which it has no real application. Take, for example, the absorbing modern interest in the study of the order of cosmical phenomena, which was in its vigorous youth in the time of Spinoza, and is now in the prime of its robust manhood. The only theory which this experience seems to require for its philosophic explanation is the recognition, as an ultimate law, that the sequential relations of phenomena are invariable, or, as it is sometimes, though incorrectly, expressed, that causality obtains without exception throughout the universe. The natural effect of the subordination of all other ideas to this dominant idea, is that the other two spheres to which experience introduces us are either ignored altogether as substantive realities, or else constrained to obey this law of mechanical sequence. We shall presently see how both the theology and the psychology of Spinoza are hampered and paralysed by the tyranny of ideas which have their proper application in the mathematical and physical sciences, whence they are derived, but which, when raised as they are by him from their provincial sphere to universal empire, must either produce spiritual desolation by violently extirpating the other principles of human nature which rise up in protest against this despotism, or else present the spectacle of a philosophy divided against itself, and harbouring antagonistic ideas which it strives in vain to place in amicable

relations. Spinoza; at times, has recourse to the method of abruptly stamping out those intractable factors of human nature which are hopelessly at variance with his fundamental principle, as when he tells us that it is folly to repent of sins, seeing that sorrow is so much lost power, and as for the past, it could not have been other than it was; but, as a rule, he, like all great philosophers, shows a wide and deep acquaintance with human nature in all its chief aspects, and his ingenuity is mainly employed, not in distorting the facts of consciousness in order to squeeze them within the limits of his theory, but in so ordering his exposition that most of the important factors of our moral and religious experience are duly represented there, and it is only when we carefully examine their mode of entrance that we see that on Spinoza's principles they have no right of admission, and are there, not because logic demanded or allowed their presence, but because they belonged to Spinoza's inmost nature, and could not be extruded or disowned. We have a similar example of this inability of theory to wholly silence the claims of the ethical and religious consciousness in the case of J. S. Mill, and in this instance, also, the philosopher endeavours to show that his ethical ideas and his religious faith are in perfect accordance with his philosophy. Both Spinoza and Mill manage to fashion a most winning image of self-sacrificing love out of egoistic materials; and while Mill, in the last of his posthumous essays, puts in a curious claim for immortality on behalf of a portion of that unsubstantial aggregate of sensations which, in his view, constitutes man, so too Spinoza, after repeatedly assuring his readers that man is but a parallel series of modes of extension and modes of thought with no permanent substantiality, yet finds, ere he reaches the end of the *Ethica*, a method of rescuing "the better part of us" from the fate of temporal things, and translating it to its home in God's eternity. It is clear, then, from the instances of Spinoza and Mill, that, though a philosophical theory may not explain the facts of the religious consciousness, or may even seem logically incompatible with these facts, it by no means follows that the philosopher himself is

necessarily poor in regard to ethical and religious experience. When, as in the above cases, the logical articulation of the philosophical theory is actually dislocated by the inward pressure of ethical ideals and religious aspirations, it seems to us more reasonable to suppose that the religious element in such natures is real and living, but that it is restrained by some tyrannous intellectual pre-possession which grew originally out of a partial view of human experience, but has now assumed such strength and rigidity that it no longer allows the religious life free expression and development.

In every philosophical system there is generally one idea which takes precedence of all others, and gives to the philosophy its characteristic expression; and it may help us to understand Spinoza's true position as a thinker, if we briefly compare his dominant idea with other ideas which prevail in recent British philosophy. We have mentioned together Spinoza and J. S. Mill; but we by no means wish to suggest that there is any affinity between the governing idea which controlled the thought and emotion of the English philosopher and the idea which exercised most potent influence over Spinoza's inner life. Of the three elements which make up human experience, Mill fixes upon the sensational consciousness as of primary interest, and his ruling idea is that, by the principle of invariability of sequence and the laws of association, he can explain the sense of personal identity and the idea of causal energy. When we turn from Mill's Idealism to Mr. Spencer's Transfigured Realism, we seem, at first sight, to be closely approaching Spinoza's point of view; but this apparent approach is to a great extent illusory. Spinoza and Spencer agree in recognising the validity of both terms of the antithesis of God and Nature, but the governing conception of our English thinker is that Nature, or the Phenomenal, is the only Knowable, and that of God, or the Unknowable, nothing save His bare existence can be intelligently predicated; so that with him, as with Epicurus and Lucretius, the study of physical and mental phenomena absorbs the interest, and the exposition of the laws of these phenomena forms the beginning and the end of his philosophy. He does not, like

Mill, ignore God as the eternal substance and cause of phenomena, but his God is divested of all human interest. As in Mill's idealism sensation is the central fact, and man's rational, ethical, and religious ideas the mere products of association, so in Herbert Spencer's realism Nature is the one engrossing object of all philosophical research, for Nature, in his view, absorbs Man and hides God. Far otherwise is it in the system of the grandest of modern Stoics—our Hebrew Spinoza. With him, as with the prophets of old, God is the Alpha and the Omega of his thought. The mystic idea of self-existent Substance, with its infinity of infinite attributes, is the starting-point of his philosophy, and the close and culmination of it is the ascent of the soul, by virtue of clear reasoning and pure love, into that transcendent sphere where time and its vain illusions are no more, and man becomes a sharer in God's eternal life. Nor even in this mortal life is Spinoza's God unknowable, for the signal merit of Spinozism is that it emphatically asserts that we can never really know phenomena unless at the same time we have a clear knowledge of God and His causation. If, then, we characterise Mr. Spencer's "System of Synthetic Philosophy" by the name "Agnosticism," we need some other term to express Spinoza's proposed solution of the great problem of philosophy. It may be called Pantheism; but it must be clearly borne in mind that Spinoza's God is no sum-total of the various modes of body and mind that together constitute the manifested cosmos, or, in Spinoza's language, the *Natura naturata*. God is the *Natura naturans*, in whom is neither divisibility nor time succession, and who is active in His entirety in all causation. The *Natura naturata* is God as seen through the delusive medium of the sensuous Imagination, the *Natura naturans* is God as apprehended by the clear intuition of the Reason.

Where, then, is the difference between Spinoza's Pantheism and Christian Theism, seeing that both recognise the constant presence and activity of God in nature and the soul, and both maintain that the true end of human existence is to escape from the servitude of earthly passion by the greater might of self-forgetful love, that so man may

enjoy that spiritual freedom which is another name for intimate communion with the Eternal? Notwithstanding the apparent resemblance, there can hardly be a doubt that there is a very real difference between the religious views of the Christian Theist and those of Spinoza, and assuredly that difference would be fundamental and vital were the Spinozism which is actually presented in its author's various writings transformed into Spinozism, as it ought to be if Spinoza's system were that faultlessly logical deduction from his first principles which it is sometimes supposed to be.

The opposition between the fundamental prepossessions which control Spinoza's theological doctrine and those which prevail in Christian Theism will be clearly seen in the course of the review of his philosophy to which we now proceed, and some light will also be cast, we think, on the interesting fact that, notwithstanding this opposition, his writings have so much real or apparent affinity with Christian ideas.

Dr. Martineau's elaborate exposition of Spinoza's philosophy includes a very full discussion of the Logical Theory, the Metaphysical System, and the Ethical Doctrine; there are also shorter chapters on the Political Doctrine, the Doctrine of Religion, and, finally, an account of Spinoza's views on the Biblical Theology. The Logical Theory comes first in order, for though Spinoza's logic to a certain extent implies his metaphysical doctrine, yet some account of the former is a necessary preparation for the study of the latter. For the thorough understanding of this difficult subject the reader must, of course, refer to Dr. Martineau's complete and accurate exposition, and he will find some additional help furnished by writers who are more in personal sympathy with Spinoza's doctrines, in Mr. Pollock's thoughtful volume, and also in Professor Land's brief, but most luminous account of Spinoza's views in the two lectures now fortunately made accessible to English readers in Professor Knight's very interesting collection of "Spinoza Essays." We shall attempt no more than to present those features of Spinoza's doctrine which seem to us most necessary for attaining an accurate

general idea of his philosophy, and especially of his ethical and theological position.

Let us begin, then, with Spinoza's view of Perception. He starts with the assumption that objects are other than our ideas of them, and thus postulates a world of external realities opposite to the mind. He does not, however, hold the ordinary view that, as external objects act upon our nerves, so our nerves in turn act upon the mind, and produce there sensations and ideas ; for we shall see, when we come to consider his metaphysical system, that it is a conspicuous doctrine with him that material and mental things, though ever existing in exact parallelism with each other, exert no reciprocal influence. Matter is only acted upon by matter, thought by thought. What, then, is the nature of the relation between the mind and its object ? On this subject Dr. Martineau writes as follows :—

The idea, though other than its object, *agrees with* the object, so as to report *what it is*—i.e., to take its *Essence* into our thought. The idea of an ellipse, *e.g.*, is different from the ellipse, having no area and foci ; yet presents in thought the characteristic properties which the figure possesses in fact. We are to assume, then, these two positions : that the idea is other than the thing, so that the same predicates cannot be affirmed of both ; and that yet they have a point of union in the essence of the thing, which is present objectively in the one and formally* in the other. In this conception of a single "essence," qualified only by objects which touch its seat but not its identity, Spinoza flings a bridge across from things to thought ; he takes for granted that they communicate, and sets up a doctrine of natural dualism (p. 108).

We are not sure that we fully understand what Dr. Martineau means when he says that in Spinoza's view things and thought "communicate" with each other, for when describing Spinoza's doctrine, that the body is merely an aggregate of movements and the mind an aggregate of ideas,

* In a long and valuable note on page 109, Dr. Martineau explains that in Spinoza's phraseology "formal" existence means existence without reference to the presence of a perceiving mind, while to have "objective" existence is to come before the mind's attention. The former is real, the latter ideal.

Dr. Martineau adds :—" And these two pluralities are kept apart by the fact that each idea, while itself in the sphere of thinking, has its object in the sphere of extension, between which there is no communication " (p. 215). But Spinoza holds that in every act of perception what the mind immediately perceives is the state of its own body as affected by the object perceived, and so it would seem that the relation between things and thought must be that of correspondence rather than of intercommunication. And if we refer back the modes of extension and the modes of thinking to their substantial unity in God, it appears that even then, though they must be regarded as aspects or activities of the same ultimate reality, they could not be said to exert any causal influence on each other. It occurs to us, however, that in these two passages, which seem to be at variance, Dr. Martineau may be consciously dealing with two distinct stages in the development of Spinoza's thought, in the first of which some of the mediæval Realism still clung to him, and enabled him to say that the same essence was at once in the thing and in the thought, whereas at a later period he had become a more thorough Nominalist, and could no longer regard essence as competent for this act of mediation. †

Mr. Pollock's remarks on the question of Perception are worth quoting, both as an indication of his own philosophical position and also as illustrative of his statement that Spinoza bids fair to become the favourite philosopher of men of science :—

We cannot but notice one extraordinary defect which is conspicuous in Spinoza's psychology. One of the first things we expect from a psychologist nowadays is a systematic account of the processes of perception and knowledge. But Spinoza does not appear to have any theory of perception at all. He assumes, as we all assume, that there is some kind of correspondence between sensations in consciousness and things in the external

† That this is the correct explanation is rendered probable by a passage on page 134, in which Dr. Martineau says, " In Spinoza's ' Short Treatise ' he uses the ' Animal Spirits ' (accepted from Descartes), as a middle term between Percipient and Perceived, just as the ' Essences ' of things mediated for him between the Real and Ideal of the Intellect."

world. But of the nature of that consciousness he has very little to say. . . . Not that his metaphysical principles are in themselves unable to furnish means of dealing with the problem; on the contrary, they very much simplify it. The puzzle of sensation when considered in the usual way, is that there is a relation between the heterogeneous terms of consciousness and motion. Something happens in my optic nerves, physiology may or may not be able to say exactly what, and thereupon I see. Can my sensation of sight be said to resemble the thing seen, or the images on my two retinæ, or the motions on the optic nerves, and if so, in what sense? These questions are essentially insoluble on the common supposition that body and mind are distinct substances or orders in nature. If body and mind are really the same thing, the knot is cut, or rather vanishes. The problem of making a connection between the inner and the outer series of phenomena becomes a purely scientific one. It is no longer a metaphysical paradox, but the combination of two methods of observing the same facts, or facts belonging to the same order; and the science of physiological psychology can justify itself on philosophical grounds, besides making good its claims by the practical test of results. But the people who cry *materialism* at everything they disagree with or cannot understand will, doubtless, cry out that this also is materialism. And they are very welcome to any good it can do them (p. 213).*

* In connection with this doctrine of Perception, Spinoza has occasioned his readers much perplexity by using the words "idea" and "object," now in one sense and now in another. Dr. Martineau will, no doubt, confer much advantage on future students of this philosopher by the successful pains he has taken to track home to its source this element of confusion. After reading *A Study of Spinoza* (pp. 131—139), "on the two meanings of 'object' and 'idea,'" the student will have no difficulty in threading his way through the entanglements produced by Spinoza's ambiguous use of these terms. While referring our readers to the above passage for a full exposition, we may briefly indicate the main features of the distinction. When describing the operations of the understanding, Spinoza uses these two terms in the usual way. But it is a characteristic doctrine of his that every material thing, as well as the human organism, has corresponding to it a concomitant idea or mode of thinking; for all modes of extension are correlative to attendant modes of thought. Therefore, all things are animated, and, with regard even to a stone or a tree, Spinoza would say that "the superiority of our mind to theirs depends only on the superiority of its corporeal object." In accordance with this view, he maintains that the mind is the "idea" of the body, and the body the "object" of the mind, not meaning thereby that the mind is thinking of the body, and so making it its object in the ordinary sense, but simply that the affections of the body (i.e., the condition of the ultimate molecular

We may notice, by the way, that of all the feats of logical legerdemain few are more striking than that by which Spinoza managed to pass, *more geometrico*, from this doctrine, so dear to Mr. Pollock and his scientific friends, that body and mind are but two modes or aspects of the same reality, to the doctrine, in which Spinoza's Theistic admirers find such satisfaction, that though the body perishes at death, nevertheless "the better part of us" is eternal.

As we have many images and thoughts in the mind which do not correspond to any external reality, we need some criterion by which to distinguish between truth and error. It is only by the internal marks of an idea that we can, according to Spinoza, learn whether it is true or false. The internal marks by which a true idea is characterised are *clearness* and *distinctness*. Mr. Pollock is probably in the right when he says that Spinoza's test of truth is not substantially distinguishable from Mr. H. Spencer's ultimate postulate—namely, that every proposition is true of which the contradictory is inconceivable, though Spinoza's formula expresses the criterion in an affirmative form. As Spinoza habitually regards geometrical knowledge as the norm to which all other knowledge should approximate, it is probable that he fancied, from the readiness and success with which his criterion could be applied to mathematical matters, that it would be equally efficacious in separating truth and error in other spheres of knowledge likewise. It is a curious illustration of the difficulty of applying this test of truth in the metaphysical sphere that, as Mr. Pollock points out, some of the most current notions in philosophy and psychology which Spinoza makes the objects of his

elements of the nervous system or brain) exactly correspond to the psychical elements which compose the mind. It is evident, however, that we do not attend to these cerebral conditions of our consciousness, and therefore to say that the object of the mind when it is observing a tree or a person is not the outward form at all, but that special configuration of the cerebral elements which the presence of the external thing or person produces, is to introduce a fertile source of serious confusion. It is, as Dr. Martineau remarks, an analogous impropriety to that committed by Sir William Hamilton, "when he confuses the *Cause of a Sensation* with the *Object of a Perception*," only that, in accordance with Spinoza's theory, the cerebral state is not the cause, but the concomitant of the sensation.

most unsparing attacks are precisely those which have been most commonly maintained, on the ground that they are principles given by consciousness, as clear, ultimate, and self-evident.

We shall presently have to consider how far Spinoza's imposing deduction of the phenomenal universe from the one eternal Substance satisfies, both in its supreme idea and in its process of derivation, the logical conditions which his own criterion of truth imposes. But, first, it is necessary to have a clear conception of the relation which such terms as Substance, Cause, and Reason bear to each other in his doctrine. The clue to his usage, in regard to these words, is to be found in his notion that the relation of the *Natura naturans* to the *Natura naturata* is analogous to that of a geometrical figure to the various inferences which can be drawn from it. The consequence is that he uses the category of Substance and Attribute, and that of Cause and Effect interchangeably, and then finds that, after all, neither of them expresses what he really means. Hence it comes about that instead of Cause we sometimes find him speaking of Reason, for it seems quite inappropriate to say that the equality of the sides of a triangle is the cause of the equality of the angles, for we might just as well say, inversely, that it is the equality of the angles that causes the equality of the sides. To use Dr. Martineau's words:—

Where the given thing, instead of being physical or qualitative, is quantitative in its essence—*e.g.*, a geometrical figure—the language of causality becomes wholly inapplicable. You may, doubtless, make some one characteristic of the circle, taken as its essence and put into its definition, yield others by inference; but it is not their *cause*, inasmuch as you can invert the order and deduce it from any one of them that may be substituted in the prior place. Their *ratio essendi* is a reciprocal one by which they eternally coexist, and not a successive one, like the *ratio fiendi*, which, in causality determines the order of events. This second category the understanding applies only to phenomena, and the properties of "Substance"—of entity "*in se*"—are not phenomena, but eternal as itself (p. 116).

Compare with this the following [passage from Professor Land's lectures :—

To Spinoza God and the world are correlates, as much as the equality of the angles and that of the sides, as much as the circle and the relations of magnitudes connected with it. It is possible in geometry to deduce the second from the first; but the first may equally well be deduced from the second. The word "Cause" is not a fit one in this part of the system; if it is to be used, the world may with equal correctness be called the cause of God. If we let the word go, with the whole logical apparatus connected with it, and hold fast simply the mathematical analogy, the conception of Spinoza will appear in clear daylight (p. 22).

We have placed these two passages together because, if we mistake not, they reveal in a conspicuous way an interesting relation between these two eminent expositors of Spinoza. Both are heartily at one as to Spinoza's real meaning; but while the English thinker regards Spinoza's doctrine of the relation of God to the world as fundamentally erroneous, and considers that God is really related to the world as Cause to Effect, the Dutch thinker, on the other hand, appears to be in complete accord with the inner spirit of Spinoza's teaching, and the only correction he would make in it is that the word, as well as the idea, "Cause," shall be entirely dropped out of use in speaking of God's relation to the phenomenal universe, and shall be confined to its ordinary employment among men of science to express the humanly conceived relation of one finite mode of being to another. It is possible that we are mistaken in supposing that this is Dr. Land's own view, for our opinion is gathered rather from the general tone and colour of his lectures than from any definite statement of his; but, in any case, the position which we have assigned to him on this question is not without its prominent representatives, and we suggest to our readers that, by comparing together these two views, and asking themselves in which of these directions their own sympathies and convictions tend, they will have one of the best possible

crucial tests for deciding whether or not they themselves are genuine Spinozists.

One of the most important factors in Spinoza's logical theory is the doctrine of the three stages of human knowledge which answer respectively to Imagination, to Reasoning, and to Intuition. This mode of graduating the cognitive process appears not only in the *Ethica*, but also in a slightly different form, with a fourfold division, in the "Short Treatise concerning God and Man," which, as was before mentioned, was probably written before Spinoza removed from Amsterdam. It is, indeed, quite organic in Spinoza's thought, and forms the basis of his ethical as well as of his logical method. The ideas of Imagination are the crude sense affections which have not yet been subjected to careful comparison and reflection, and present such a commingling of truth and error that they are a constant source of illusion. Dr. Martineau, in his chapter on "The First Order of Ideas," unfolds with much subtlety Spinoza's views on this somewhat complex subject, and thus sums up his account of these ideas:—

They are a medley of subjective and objective influences. They carry no apprehension of causes. Their association together is accidental. And their order is uncertain, as our belief in contingency attests. They are, therefore, confused and inadequate ideas; involving, indeed, no illusion, if taken for what they are—viz., mixed and partial states, falling short of the essence of things; but fatally misleading when accepted as real knowledge (p. 145).

Three, however, of the delusive influences of Imagination need to be particularly mentioned; these are the formation of Class-names or Universals, the idea of Time, and the belief in our own Freedom, *i.e.*, in our ability to act in either of two alternative ways; but the consideration of the last of these had better be deferred till we treat of Spinoza's Ethical Doctrine. From his theory of the formation of Class-names and his treatment of them as among the sources of illusion, it is clear that Spinoza had, to a great extent, disengaged himself from mediæval Realism,

of which, however, we still find some traces in his doctrine of "Essences." As Mr. Pollock points out, Spinoza's view of the origin of "Universals" is another of the many instances in which he seems to have anticipated recent scientific theories, for there is a very close resemblance between his doctrine and that put forth recently by Mr. F. Galton in a paper on "Generic Images." According to this view, when a large number of similar objects have been successively presented to the mind, the images so overlap each other in the texture of the brain that the slight variations in different directions which distinguish individuals, tend to neutralise each other, and the result is a confused image which is not that of any individual in particular; and it is this vague impression which is described by the Class-name. Spinoza's doctrine is thus expressed by Dr. Martineau:—

Where concurrent or contiguous images are partially *similar* (as of a man, a woman, and a child), repetition, as it accumulates, will resolve the integral representations; saving the constant features by reiteration, while the inconstants die away by non-recurrence. The result is, a mutilated representation or compound of such common properties as affect us in all the instances: constituting the meaning of a "*Universal*," or Class-name. . . . Where the partial similarity is reduced to a minimum, and the images delivered have nothing in common except in their being images, all their features are crowded out; none having advantage by iteration over the rest, so as to escape the reciprocal blurring and erasure consequent on the limited capacity of the human brain. The result is such abstracts as are expressed by the "so-called transcendental terms," "Thing," "Being," "Somewhat." As a mere residuum of obliterated images these also are "confused" (p. 143).

If we bear in mind this account of Class-names and Abstract Ideas as due to the illusory play of the imagination, and so answering to no reality, we shall see that Spinoza's supreme idea, that of Substance, was regarded by him as at the furthest possible remove from being merely an abstract idea, for the characteristic of the idea of Substance with

him is its exceeding clearness, whereas abstract ideas are instances of extreme confusion.

Spinoza's doctrine of Time, as contrasted with Eternity, is a point of cardinal interest and importance in his system, and may be regarded as the chief achievement of his philosophical genius, for it is by the employment of this contrast that he, in the fifth book of the *Ethica*, manages to perform the logical feat which we before noticed, and so to save his theory of human nature from the materialistic consequences to which it seems inevitably to lead. It is at the point where he begins to speak of existence out of time that his modern evolutionist admirers, such as Mr. Pollock, are reluctantly compelled to part company with their master, and he ascends on to another plane of thought, where Transcendentalists, like Schleiermacher and Schelling, hasten to welcome him with open arms. "Time," says Spinoza, "is nothing but a mode of thinking." The ideas of Past, Present, and Future would have no place if we could see things in their necessary causal connection as the expression of Substance, for Substance and its perfect cosmical expression are but two aspects of the same thing, and from the stand-point of Spinoza's intuition, it would be as absurd to talk of a real time succession among events, as to say that the various properties of an equilateral triangle manifested themselves one after another, so that the equality of the sides was succeeded by the equality of the angles, and the equality of the angles by the fact that each angle is the third of two right-angles, &c. It is the delusive imagination which, by presenting things in isolation rather than on their necessary connection with the whole, causes us to see in events a time relationship. Here again we see that it is the mathematical analogy that furnishes the key to Spinoza's meaning. Mathematical relations are independent of time, therefore to the eye of the philosopher all the relations which are necessarily implied in the idea of Substance, or God, must be out of time also. As Dr. Martineau notices, Spinoza's view of Time and Eternity might seem to anticipate Kant's "Transcendental Æsthetic" doctrine. "But," he continues, "Spinoza does not mean that the

time-order in which sensory material disposes itself is only the *a priori* 'form' of our perceptive faculty, and therefore not predicable of things as they are irrespective of perception. Spinoza did not resolve the externality, coexistence, and succession of objects into the constitution of the subject; but, on the contrary, assumed, as we have seen, the presence in thought of the essence which was real in the thing. He does not, therefore, teach the ideality of time in the Kantian sense" (p. 144). Here again the doctrine of the "essence which is at once in the thought and in the thing," to which we before referred, presents itself, and we are once more in perplexity as to Spinoza's real meaning. Dr. Martineau, can, no doubt, quote texts from Spinoza which quite justify his reading of Spinoza's doctrine, but still we cannot help thinking that the general drift of Spinoza's latest thinking was away from this doctrine of "essences," and was becoming more idealistic, and therefore Kantian, in its character. We express this opinion, however, with much diffidence, for it is a hazardous step to stray away from such a guide as Dr. Martineau, when we reach these sublimer heights of speculation. At any rate, there was this important difference between the Kantian and the Spinozistic doctrine, that according to the former it is the necessary character of our mental constitution that compels us to impose time and space relations on phenomena and disqualifies us in our present existence for realising in thought that "eternal" state, which lies "beyond the veil of space and time;" whereas in Spinoza's doctrine this disability is only the work of the delusive imagination, and he who attains to true philosophical intuition can in this present life step over the threshold of heaven, gaze with untroubled eye upon the Absolute, and enjoy the divine privilege of beholding the panorama of the cosmos under the form of eternity. On this subject Mr. Pollock writes:—"Spinoza teaches that the eternity of which the mind is conscious in the act of rational knowledge is wholly out of relation to time. Also, it is distinctly stated to be a kind of existence. Here then we have existence out of time, and a knowledge or perception of it in consciousness. Now it is, at least, a

serious question whether existence out of time is conceivable" (p. 299). We agree with Mr. Pollock that it is not "conceivable" in the sense of "imaginable," but we are by no means sure that it is not both "thinkable" and "believable."

In the foregoing remarks, we have partially anticipated the two other stages of knowledge—i.e., Reasoning and Intuition. In *Ratio* we rise by means of acts of comparison to "common notions," by which Spinoza appears to mean ideas of the separate common properties of all things; and hence this stage seems to be, on the whole, identical with our present idea of Induction, or the ascertainment of the laws of nature. There is this great difference, however, that Spinoza would not have considered that *Ratio* achieves its proper task till it succeeds in showing how the laws it discovers flow deductively from the attributes of Substance; and this is precisely the step that science seems unable to take. Hence, as we shall see, there is a fatal lacuna in Spinoza's attempted deduction of the world from God's attributes of Extension and Thought.

Though so much hinges on the Intuitive stage of knowledge in Spinoza's system, it does not seem that he attached to the word Intuition a very definite and uniform idea. He tells us that in Intuition the mind sees at a glance and not by a process, and in this view we should be disposed to regard it as a kind of Inspiration, independent of the previous exercise of rational thought. But then, again, we are told this third kind of apprehension advances by logical deduction from the idea of the real essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate idea of the essence of things. It would seem, then, that it is the power which the practised intellect is supposed to attain of immediately apprehending the true character of a thing or an event by instantly associating it with the combination of causes which necessitate its existence. Once again the mathematical analogy will, perhaps, help us, for the practised mathematician sees at a glance the various properties of a figure before him, though he had first to learn them by a process of reasoning. Here, then, we see Spinoza's idea of

the relation between *Ratio* and *Scientia Intuitiva*. As from the standpoint of Intuition there is no such thing as time relations among objective phenomena, so subjectively the perfect philosopher as he attains to the higher intellectual vision should not need to go through a reasoning process; for past, present, and future should lie before his intuition as an open book. This will also, perhaps, serve to explain why Spinoza says that the mind enters into this highest stage of knowledge only in so far as the mind itself is eternal; for the mind passes into the eternal condition when it is no longer deluded by time and the shows of time, and therefore it is no longer enslaved by the passions which have their ground in these vain imaginations, and if it could attain ideal perfection in this state, it would intuitively see God in everything as its ground and cause; it would have no need for reasoning, but would anticipate in this life the Pauline idea of heaven, "where we shall know even as we are known." How far we are at present off from this happy consummation may be inferred from Spinoza's confession that the matters which he himself understands in the intuitive way are very few.

In what has been said respecting the Logical Theory, the chief features of Spinoza's Metaphysical System have been incidentally described, so that we need not dwell very long on this portion of our subject. As an introduction to what we have to say on this head, we cannot do better than quote from Dr. Martineau the following passage:—

Spinoza's theory of the world was not born in a day; and in its growth was far from building itself up in the order ultimately given to its exposition. Were we to tell its story chronologically, we should begin with the two parallel data which he accepted from Descartes—"Extension and Thinking"—the bases respectively of matter and mind. Reduced afterwards to a second tier in his pyramid by the superposition of a crowning apex, these were at first his supreme categories. On their resources he relied for detecting the laws of the universe; thence it was that he started his doctrine of physics, psychology, and ethics. They were the working factors of his speculation, though not its titular head. He thus wrought out, in the first instance, a dualistic philosophy; and then, by a prefatory stroke of

thought or of assumption, converted it into a monism. In his early Short Treatise, the higher term (there called "God") into which he resolves the two heads of deduction is reached by processes of *reasoning*, borrowed, for the most part, from Descartes. In his Ethics the show of inference is dispensed with, and the unit of Being is made also the initial point in thought, and provided for at the outset in a *Definition*. That he thus treats as self-evident what before had needed demonstration implies a new phase in his philosophy; and to appreciate that philosophy as a whole we must look at it in its final form" (p. 167).

There is some doubt as to the nature of the tenure on which Spinoza holds his conviction of the existence of that "*res singularis*" to which he gives the names of "God," "Substance," and "*Causa sui*" (*i.e.*, the Self-existent One). He evidently does not mean by these terms to describe the aggregate of physical and mental modes of existence, but just the reverse of this—namely, the Eternal, the timeless Being, who is one and indivisible. Does, then, the certainty that this Being exists belong to that highest stage of knowledge which Spinoza calls Intuitive? If the idea that such a Being exists be a true idea, it ought, according to his own criterion of truth, to present itself to the mind in such complete clearness that to doubt it would be impossible. Probably this is the ground that Spinoza would take if he were cross-questioned, for he says elsewhere that, though he can form no mental picture of God, he, nevertheless, has a perfectly clear idea of God. If he had said further, "And the invariable concomitant of this clear idea is the certain conviction that the clear idea corresponds to an objective reality," his statement would have been intelligible and satisfactory. But, unfortunately, he is still under mediæval influences, and though he has omitted from the Ethics the psychological argument of Descartes, he still manages to slip in under cover of his first Definition ("By *Causa sui* I understand that whose essence involves existence") the old ontological argument, and lays himself open to the retort that, if by "essence" he means an idea in the thought, the fact that we cannot think of Substance without thinking of existence is no more a guarantee of the existence of Substance than the fact that we cannot think

of fire without thinking of heat is a guarantee of the reality of either fire or heat.* The ontological argument appears to have some cogency in the case of Space; but even Space cannot, in Kant's judgment, make good its claim to real existence. If, then, we drop this scholastic survival "essence," which is a source of confusion rather than of conviction, we are led to the conclusion that Spinoza intuitively perceived the existence of Substance—*i.e.*, that by a mental necessity he could not contemplate the plurality of phenomena without apprehending, at the same time, the real existence of the One who is manifested in the Many. Admitting, then, the validity of this position, that the mind cannot but recognise the existence of Substance or God, the next question is, Is this intuitive idea of Substance such that we are obliged to infer that it must have an infinity of Attributes, two of which, Extension and Thought, are accessible to us. Spinoza himself allows that our knowledge of Extension and Thought is derived from experience, and so at this initial point the theory loses its claim to a purely deductive character, and the connection between Substance and its assumed attributes is in no sense a logical one.

The attempted unification of mind and matter by attaching both as attributes to Substance, is an arbitrary speculative assumption, into which Spinoza was led by a supposed analogy with the deduction of geometrical properties from Definitions. He forgot, however, that in the case of the geometrical definition, the imagination constructs the figure, and thus gives a positive content to the notion, to which there is nothing analogous in the Definition of Substance. It is the more needful to insist on this point because Spinoza's error here weakens, if it does not wholly destroy, the fundamental idea of his system, that tyrannous prepossession of his, which, as we pointed out at the opening of this paper, must ever keep Spinozism and Christianity apart, namely, the idea of Necessity, or, as Kuno Fischer calls it, Causality.† Our idea

* Vide *A Study of Spinoza* (p. 164).

† Trendelenburg argues (in opposition to Kuno Fischer) that the ground-thought of Spinoza's system is the parallelism of the two attributes, and the

of necessary or invariable connection is derived entirely from our experience of the phenomenal world, and there is no warrant whatever for transferring it to the relation between the Eternal and the world of phenomena. The order of the cosmos has its ground and explanation in God; but this affords no justification for any assertion as to what God *must* do, or *must* not do. With the idea of the Eternal there wells up in the soul the emotions of infinite trust and reverence and love (and there is good reason to believe that such emotions overflowed the heart and mind of Spinoza); we see God in and through nature, but the laws of nature impose no laws on Him. The very moment the human intellect begins to dogmatise about the limitations of God (and Theists are not at all free from such dogmatism), there is a silent protest rises out of the inmost core of every man's being, and a deep persuasion that on this matter silence is wiser than speech.

We will not stay to discuss the question whether Spinoza regarded the two Attributes as really existing as such in God, or regarded the duality as being merely relative to our perception; but we feel no doubt that Dr. Martineau is right in his conclusion "that no præ-Kantian reader could have put the latter construction on Spinoza's language."

To take up once more the thread of Spinoza's pretended deduction of the universe from God: the question now arises how, if we leap over the great hiatus which separates God from His alleged attributes, and suppose we have reached pure Extension and pure Thought, we are to deduce from these conditions the finite modes of Extension and Thought which constitute the actual physical and mental cosmos.

circumstances that they never interact, and he thinks the special feature of the system is that by this ground-idea it overthrows both Materialism and Teleology at one blow, the former by the principle that matter cannot influence mind, the latter by the principle that mind cannot influence matter. With all respect for Trendelenburg's very high authority, we cannot help thinking that he is mistaken here, and that what he calls the ground-thought is subsidiary and accidental compared with that idea of Causality to which Kuno Fischer assigns the dominant position.

"If we ask," writes Dr. Martineau, "why Modes should arise at all, and introduce defect within the perfect existence of the Absolute,—whether, as Schelling says, 'the Absolute is ennuyé with its perfection' ?—Spinoza answers with a constant phrase:—It is 'by the necessity of the divine nature.' That is, the divine nature cannot help it, comprising in its essence an immanent causality, rendering explicit its own implicit contents" (p. 194). The ablest of Spinoza's correspondents, the Freiherr von Tschirnhaus, writes to him as follows:—

I should like you to indicate to me how, on your theory, the variety of things can be shown to follow necessarily from the concept of extension, since you remember the opinion of Descartes, that this variety could be deduced from extension in no other way than by supposing that the effect arises from the production of motion by God.

And a little further on he continues:—

The reason why I particularly desire to know this is, that in mathematics I have always observed that from anything considered in itself, that is from the definition of anything, we cannot deduce more than *one property*, and that, if we wish to know other properties, it is necessary that we should refer the thing defined to other things. From the definition of the circumference of a circle, we learn its uniform self-similarity, possessed by no other curve, but we have to add radii, intersecting chords, etc., before we can establish other properties; and this seems to be opposed to the 16th Prop. of Book I. of the *Ethica*, in which you assume, as known, that from the given definition of anything whatever *several* properties are deduced. Which seems to me to be impossible, unless we refer the thing defined to other things; and so I cannot see how, from some attribute of God considered in itself, *e.g.*, infinite extension, the variety of bodies is able to arise" (Letter LXXI. of Bruder's Edition).

This letter is worth careful study, for here, as Dr. Martineau truly remarks, Tschirnhaus "hits Achilles' heel" (p. 121). The mere definition of infinite extension could not of itself enable us to deduce even the ideal space relations which bodies would have to observe if they really existed, for you must add to your definition or intuition of

infinite space, the definition or intuition of limited space before you can take a single step in logical deduction. And even supposing it were possible to deduce from pure extension the whole body of geometrical relations, we should still be as far off as ever from the actual cosmos, for we should only have the ideal space relations which a real universe would conform to, but as to the real universe itself, it could never come at all within the grip of our ideal deduction. To quote Dr. Martineau's concise and characteristic expression:—"Spinoza's account of causation mistakes logical cogency for dynamic necessity, or what amounts to the same, assumes, that, in virtue of parallelism, the one is the exponent of the other, and that in the dialectic of thought we may read the genesis of things" (p. 195).

We need not dwell on Spinoza's doctrine of immediate and mediate Eternal Modes, nor on his scholastic use of the word "Essence," by which he strives in vain to mediate between the infinite attributes of God and finite bodies and minds. His views on these matters are luminously expounded by Dr. Martineau (pp. 179—212); but Spinoza's ingenious devices to give a plausible appearance to his assumed deduction only serve, when critically examined, to confirm the conclusion that we know the Infinite by Intuition and the Finite by Perception and Self-consciousness, and that every attempt to pass from the former to the latter, by a logical process, is a signal failure. Here, then, again, at another most critical point, the chain of deduction snaps asunder, and Spinoza's system is as incapable of passing logically from God to the Finite, as our recent empirical philosophies are of making the inverse passage from the Finite to God.*

Spinoza, indeed, indirectly confesses that he cannot find, in his idea of God, the cause of a finite thing, for he says:—"No single thing, *i.e.*, having a finite and determinable existence, can exist, and be determined to act, unless determined thereto by some other cause, also having a finite and

* See an eloquent passage on this feature in Spinoza's philosophy in Mr. J. F. Smith's fine article on the "Ethics of Spinoza," in the *Theological Review* for October, 1870, p. 553.

determinate existence; which again cannot exist and act unless determined thereto by some other finite and determinate cause, etc., *in infinitum*."* But along with this account of Causation, which corresponds to the current scientific use of the term, Spinoza also recognises a quite different kind of causation,† for in other passages of his writings he identifies causality with necessary sequence from the attributes of God. This setting up of two causalities, the blending, that is, in the same system of philosophy of the theory which refers every change immediately to the action of God, with the opposite theory which finds the cause of each change in the preceding finite existence, is a serious source of confusion. As we have before seen, Dr. Land thinks that Spinoza's view will become clear as daylight if we drop the word "cause" in the first of the above senses, and hold fast to the mathematical analogy, according to which the world is as much the cause of God, as God is of the world. We are not sure that Spinoza himself would have been quite willing to buy clearness at this cost. It seems to us that he never fully realised all that is logically involved in this mathematical analogy, and did not see that causality in the first of the above uses could just as well be read backwards as forwards. The word "cause" in this sense is too vitally and organically bound up with his system to admit of being cut away as a disfiguring excrescence; and we strongly suspect that Spinoza would have sought to justify his two-fold use of the term by saying that in the first sense it denotes causality as viewed from the "intuitive" point of view, into which time-relations do not enter; and as, therefore, all the successive stages of causation which science interposes between God and the finite effect may be compressed into one act, God may be said to be the immediate cause of the finite events; whereas "cause" in the second sense indicates the aspect of the causal relation as seen in the second or reasoning stage of knowledge, when time-relations are still present to the thought, and therefore the causality presents itself as broken up into an infinitude of finite causations. Spinoza might

* Vide *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 204.

† Vide *Op. cit.*, p. 207.

thus argue that causation, though really homogeneous, must of necessity appear heterogeneous when contemplated now under the form of time, now under the form of eternity. Of course, in any case, he is exposed to the fatal question, How is it possible to deduce from the idea of God that His causality should differentiate itself into the finite modes which constitute the cosmos?

Let us now turn to Spinoza's doctrine concerning Man. Though Spinoza represents man as a compound of two parallel series of modes, which always correspond but never interact, he is not really able to preserve this parallelism intact. In treating of man as a percipient being, the thinking part of man is necessarily made so dependent on the extended part as to appear to bear the relation to it of a copy to the original, and, on the other hand, we shall see, when we come to consider his view of man's final destiny, the thinking element is at last so raised above the bodily that it secures for itself an eternal existence in which the body appears to have no share. The Mind is, as we have already seen, the Idea of the Body. This idea, which constitutes the mind, may have an idea of itself, so that now the mind, besides knowing, knows that it knows, and so self-consciousness arises.

This further knowledge (says Dr. Martineau) is a new fact, of which also an idea is formed, and so on till the first self-reflection includes an infinity. We are not, indeed, aware of having this infinite series of *discreet* cognitions; for the invariable occurrence with every idea, of the *same knowledge of it* amounts to a *fusion* of all the reflexes into one, viz., self-consciousness of the whole as *one mind*—a comprehensive *continuum* of thinking. "This knowledge of the mind," it is added, "is united with the mind, as the mind is united with the body." The doctrine wrapped up in these difficult propositions means simply—Given, manifold sensible affections; consciousness of them involves self-consciousness, and self-consciousness, self-identity: and so numerical data melt into individuality (p. 215).

It appears, then, that according to Spinoza the human mind is composed of the ideas of the manifold parts that make up the body, that is to say the mind is just as complex

as the body is. There is then no proper Self or Ego, but merely an aggregate of modes of thinking attended by modes of extension. We get no satisfactory account of the consciousness of personal unity and identity, for Spinoza says "the knowledge of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body," but the body and the mind are two independent and heterogeneous phenomena, unsusceptible of fusion, with nothing in common except *being phenomena*. "To such conditions," continues Dr. Martineau, "it is hopeless to look for the continuity and self-identity of personal existence" (p. 120). At this point it seems to us that Spinozism, as a logical system, utterly stultifies itself; for, how is it conceivable that a creature who is in every sense merely phenomenal, in whom there is no real substantiality at all, should be able to arrive at a knowledge of God, and from such *a priori* knowledge deduce that phenomenal universe of which he is himself a fraction? Not only are we unable to understand how such an aggregate of finite modes of extension and thought could attain to such sublime knowledge, but we cannot even understand how it could attain to knowledge at all. The being who knows phenomena shows, in the very act of knowing them, that he is something more than a phenomenon. As the late Professor Green writes, "Nature, with all that belongs to it, is a process of change; change on a uniform method, no doubt, but change still. But neither can any process of change yield a consciousness of itself, which in order to be a consciousness of the change must be equally present to all stages of the change; nor can any consciousness of change, since the whole of it must be present at once, be itself a process of change."*

Most surprising is it, that a thinker who had once grasped the distinction between that which is in time and that which is out of time, or in other words between what is phenomenal and what is substantial, should not have seen that there is that in man which differences him from nature, enables him to know nature, and to know also the Eternal, because man partakes of the nature of the Eternal!

* *Mind*, January, 1882, p. 14.

We cannot bring ourselves to believe that we have after all penetrated to the inmost meaning of the deep-thinking Spinoza, when we say he regarded man as merely phenomenal.

We will presently return to this matter; let us first, however, turn to Spinoza's Ethical Doctrine which forms a most interesting chapter in Dr. Martineau's volume, but at which our space only allows us to glance. As Spinoza maintains that God's acts flow from the necessity of His nature, and man is only a mode of this necessary manifestation, the possibility of human Free-will is at the outset excluded. That we think we are free is one of the delusions of the imagination. Freedom means action determined solely from within; hence God is perfectly free, and man becomes free in proportion as his conduct is determined by the inner impulse of love to God. Seeing that we are only modes of thinking and modes of extension there seems no provision in our nature for Action. Spinoza explains action by the law of "*Conatus*," by which he means that each thing endeavours, as far as it can, to persist in its own existence. "The human mind—understanding and imagination too—consciously shares in this universal endeavour; which as limited to it is *Voluntas*; as belonging to it and the body together is *Appetitus*, constituting the essence of the total man himself, and possibly operating unconsciously; when consciously it becomes *Cupiditas*."*

As there are three stages of Knowledge, so are there three corresponding stages of Feeling. Spinoza displays great ingenuity and insight in his analysis of the various springs of human action, and Dr. Martineau's full exposition of Spinoza's doctrine of the Passions and the Emotions presents much attraction and instruction to readers who may not be interested in Spinoza's metaphysics. The feelings connected with the Imaginative stage of knowledge are the Passions which take their rise from outward causes. So long as we are under their sway we live in bondage. But the *conatus* within us, *i.e.*, the impulse to maintain and increase our own being, prompts us to strive against these passions which

* *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 236.

lessen and impair our power, and with the growth of Rational and Intuitive knowledge, corresponding affections arise and free us at length from the servitude of passions. We cease to act selfishly, for we learn that individual power and being is augmented and enriched by union, that is, by merging private interests in the public good. "The mind is no longer kindled from without or disposed of by feeling which is not insight. Incandescent Rationality becomes *Fortitudo*, with its two divisions of High Spirit and Nobleness, and incandescent Intuition becomes *Intellectual Love of God*." *

We have now reached that final stage in Spinoza's thinking where his philosophy begins to possess great attraction for religious and mystical minds, and we will devote our remaining space to a very brief consideration of this important but difficult aspect of Spinozism. We before hinted that if Spinoza really regarded man as a mere phenomenal mode of God's manifestation of Himself in the cosmos, then the exalted tone in which he describes the consciousness of intellectual love towards God, his language about "the better part of us," and his evident assurance that this portion of us exists on a higher plane of being than does the perishing body, all become to us utterly inexplicable. Dr. Martineau is assuredly right in maintaining, with Trendelenburg, that in the fifth book of the *Ethica*, where Spinoza explains how the mind secures for itself freedom from servitude to the body, the determining place is assigned to the mind. The mind, indeed, is represented as having gained an ideal of human excellence, and as controlling the bodily activities with a view to the realisation of that ideal. It seems probable, therefore, that Spinoza when writing this concluding part of the *Ethics* no longer felt assured of the truth of his doctrine of the parallelism of body and mind. It is to be noted, too, that he sometimes represents the conflict in human nature between the ideal and the earthly, as a struggle between the eternal in the essence of man and the phenomenal in his existence. Now these considerations, when taken in conjunction with his new doctrine concerning "the better part of us," appear to

* Op. Cit., 268.

us to indicate that Spinoza, in writing in such earnest and glowing terms about the intellectual love of God, felt and practically held that his own mind had a substantive existence, and was attaining, through devotion to truth, a spiritual communion with God which was of too intimate a nature to be severed by death. It is hardly likely, we think, that Spinoza would have introduced into his system such a glaring incongruity as the doctrine of a better and a worse part in human nature, and would have resigned the one part to the fate of the phenomenal and translated the other to the realm of eternal reality, had it not been for the quiet expansion of an internal spiritual experience, which was gradually acquiring strength enough to dislocate to some extent the compact framework of his intellectual system and so find for itself a real but, as yet, inadequate expression. It has been sometimes suggested that Spinoza introduced into his system the features in question to escape, as far as possible, the *odium theologicum*. It is, no doubt, true that Spinoza loved peace, and was naturally cautious, but it is also evident that the love of truth was his characteristic passion, and if anything could awaken in him detestation and scorn, it was hypocrisy. So far from the fifth book of the *Ethics* bearing marks of effort on Spinoza's part to give his doctrines a more Theistic look than his inmost soul could justify, it seems to us that the book carries on its face clear traces of the exercise of ingenuity and effort to make his philosophical system express, if possible, without the entire sacrifice of its logical coherency, that spiritual faith, that consciousness of union and communion with God, which he cherished in the secret depths of his soul. When we think of the purity, serenity, and moral beauty of Spinoza's life, the victory he had evidently won, not only over the more earthly passions, but even over ambition, "that last infirmity of noble minds," we are constrained to believe that there must have been some adequate spiritual force to have produced this remarkable effect, and what could that force have been, if it were not the growing supremacy in his soul of that divinest and mightiest of all passions—the love of God?

It is true he calls it an "intellectual" love, and he would probably have admitted the accuracy of Dr. Martineau's suggestion,* that by that term he simply means to distinguish the *philosophical* habit of mind from the *scientific*; but we must remember that, in Spinoza's view, the wise man's philosophy and theology were one, and the word "intellectual" with him wore none of that cold, unemotional aspect which it suggests to us. To use Dr. Martineau's most felicitous epithet, Spinoza's intuitive ideas were all "*incandescent*." Truth and love presented themselves to his mind as simply the obverse and the reverse of the same spiritual fact; and it is this essential unity of idea and emotion which he seeks to express by blending the two together as noun and adjective in the combination "*amor intellectualis*." As we have previously intimated, the metaphysical theory, which Spinoza had been forced to form as the necessary logical outcome of Descartes's mechanical physiology and psychology, rendered it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for him to describe and analyse his religious consciousness in appropriate terms, and compelled him to modes of expression which seem most inadequate, cold, and even repulsive to those who are happily freed from such enthralling preconceptions, and so can more correctly and adequately state and explain their spiritual experience. The essence of religion is, of course, always the same; it is only when this essence has passed through varying intellectual mediums that it assumes its various theological forms. The mental medium through which Spinoza's religious feelings sought to find intellectual expression was singularly unfavourable. The idea of God as the only substantive reality; of the *necessity* of His nature; of man as a phenomenal mode of God's necessary manifestation; all these governing intellectual ideas obstinately refused to adapt themselves to any true and sufficient theological conception. Nor can it be doubted that, under such circumstances, the intellectual medium, if it fails to afford expression to the religious consciousness, exercises a positively depressing and deadening influence on that consciousness. The inner fire

* *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 275

and flame of faith and devotion must, in the long run, either be stifled and destroyed by this obstructive intellectualism (for religion needs expression as much as fire needs air), or the expansive power of religious fervour must burst or burn the obstructive theory, and liberate the spirit from its mental suffocation. That Spinoza's religious life should have suffered sadly from this tyranny of dogma was inevitable, but we are more inclined than we think Dr. Martineau to be, to conjecture that when Spinoza wrote the fifth book of the *Ethica* his religious consciousness was beginning to heave off the incubus which oppressed it, and that the doctrine of "the better part of us" and of "eternal life" are indications of this process; nor is it, we think, very unlikely that if Spinoza had lived much longer he would have recovered that belief in a Self and in Freewill of which his scientific studies had deprived him. The following passage, from Dr. Martineau's work, descriptive of Spinoza's position when he wrote the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (which was probably after the *Ethics* took its final shape) appears to us to confirm our impression that Spinoza was attaining to a truer view of the relation of the soul to God:—"God (he assures us) communicates of his essence direct (*i.e.*, without prophetic medium) to our mind—in greatest perfection of all did this happen to the mind of Christ, who apprehended the saving will of God without word or vision, but immediately, mind with mind, in unique spiritual communion."* This quotation shows, we think, that Spinoza had entered on a track of reflection which must have ultimately led him to the understanding of the profound truth, which is at once presented and misrepresented in the orthodox dogma of the two natures in Christ, a truth of which he evidently did not see the full significance when, two years before his death, he wrote that noteworthy letter to Henry Oldenburg,† in which he says:—"To show you openly my opinion, I say that it is not absolutely necessary to salvation to know Christ after the flesh; but it is altogether otherwise

* Op. Cit. 371. But read Dr. Martineau's explanation of Spinoza's real meaning here.

† Letter XXI. of Bruder's edition.

if we speak of the Son of God, that is the eternal wisdom of God which is manifested in all things, and chiefly in the human soul, and most of all in Jesus Christ. Without this wisdom no one can come to the state of happiness, for it is this alone which teaches what is true and what is false, good and evil. *As to what certain churches add that God took human nature, I expressly declare that I do not know what they say, and, to speak frankly, I confess that they seem to me to speak a language as absurd as if one were to say that a circle had taken the nature of a triangle.*" That in our spiritual life, God and man, the Eternal and the Temporal, the Finite and the Infinite, meet and learn each other's secrets, this Spinoza (though he evidently felt it) could not intellectually realise, for it contradicted the fundamental dogma of his philosophy, namely, that man is only a *mode* of Substance, and not himself a substantial individuality. The following passage from Kuno Fischer's "History of Modern Philosophy"* seems to us to state Spinoza's position in reference to this matter very correctly:—

The idea of personal Individuality solves the riddle of Spinozism. This equation (*Gleichung*) between Substance and Individuality Spinoza himself could not complete, for it contradicts the distinctly settled ideas of his system; but he could not help having an inkling of it, and *expressing it, as it were, against the will of those ideas*, for it is the secret of his philosophy. If we express the *amor Dei* in a mathematical formula, what else does it signify than the equation between Substance and Individuality, between the Divine and the human essence? That the Substance should become a limited thing, or that God should become man, appeared to the understanding of Spinoza just as impossible as the Quadrature of the Circle. . . . But Spinoza has himself, in the *amor Dei intellectualis*, squared the circle, for here is the equation between God and man at least indicated, if not fully carried out.

Every reader of this paper should give himself the advantage of reading Dr. Martineau's powerfully-reasoned chapters on Spinoza's "Intellectual Love of God" and "Religion," in which a less sanguine view is taken of

* Vol. I., p. 593.

Spinoza's theological position than that which we have been trying to express. Dr. Martineau's main contention is that "the intellectual love of God is no affection directed upon a *conscious and responding mind*; but the desire and delight of understanding things as determined by the necessity of nature,—the enthusiasm for truth,—the self-adaptation to the order of the world" (p. 274).

There is much to be urged in favour of this view; but our impression is that many passages in Spinoza's writings, especially in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, show that it does not give an exhaustive account of the contents of Spinoza's religious consciousness.

It is an interesting question whether Spinoza regarded God as self-conscious. Dr. Martineau inclines to the negative; we must confess that it seems to us that Dr. Busolt has made out a pretty strong case for the affirmative, though we quite agree with the latter thinker that Spinoza's words go too far, and probably further than his real meaning, when he says "that if we choose to assign to God such predicates as intellect and will, these terms will be as wide of their proper meaning as the term '*dog*' when applied to Sirius, instead of to the barking quadruped."* Spinoza tells us (*Ethics*, B. II., Prop. 3) "there is given in God an idea as well of His own essence as of all the things which necessarily follow from His essence." This idea of Himself as *Natura naturans* is, we think, clearly over and above the sum-total of ideas which are in Him in so far as he includes all the minds in *Natura naturata*; for the *Natura naturans* is not the mere totality of finite spirits, but is rather that principle which holds them all together in a single unity, in a way analogous to that in which the human Ego gives unity to all its separate mental states. As in Spinoza's view, time-relations have no application to God, it was inevitable that he should assert that "intellect" and "will," such as we have, cannot be predicated of the Eternal. We do not think, however, that this is altogether incompatible with the Theistic attitude of mind. Saisset's "*Essai de la Philosophie Religieuse*"

* *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 333.

was translated into English as an antidote to Pantheism, and yet we read in that treatise:—"God's thought knows nothing of the conditions of an imperfect intelligence; nothing of limit or time or space or succession; consequently nothing of memory, or reasoning, or induction or any of those human intermediaries between an infinite truth and a finite thought. . . . *The difference is not of degree, but of nature and essence*; it is the difference between time and eternity, between the finite and the infinite, the relative and the absolute." It is hardly possible to put into words the relation which is felt to exist in our souls between the human and the Divine, for as we once heard Dr. Martineau (or was it his congenial friend Mr. Thom?) say, the relation of God to us is not like that of one human mind to another, for other minds seem outside of ours, but *God invades our very consciousness*. The feature in Spinoza's theology which is most out of accord with the facts of religious experiences is the doctrine that God, *quâ Natura naturans*, cannot love finite souls. Here we think he misinterpreted his own consciousness, and was misled by the determinist dogma; for as he says in the Short Treatise:—"If God loved men we should have to suppose that men possessed Free-will;" no very alarming supposition for us, perhaps, but a serious one for Spinoza, for it involved the overthrow of his entire system of thought.

We have neither time nor space to examine adequately Spinoza's views on that other important and kindred topic, the Future Destiny of the soul. We the less regret this however, as we would rather not attempt to condense Dr. Martineau's full and lucid statement. This section of his book is a marvellous piece of clear exposition and subtle criticism. We cannot see how Spinoza could have satisfactorily rebutted Dr. Martineau's conclusion that the eternity which is so repeatedly and emphatically claimed by Spinoza for "the better part of us" is not shown to be personal or individual immortality. Whenever Spinoza attempts to explain the relation of that part of us which persists after death to the perishing portion of the soul which shares

the fate of the body, he seems to be compelled by logical exigencies to so express himself that all that characterises the special individuality falls to the share of the bodily part, so that what remains appears to be impersonal and to merge, therefore, into the consciousness of God. Even if Theodore Camerer's able reasonings in favour of Spinoza's belief in the persistence of a conscious unity after death be regarded as conclusive, there is still no rational ground for believing that the future consciousness will feel its continuity with the present consciousness. Nay, we find on referring to Camerer's admirable account of Spinoza's views, that he admits that on Spinoza's theory the differences between individuals after death can be only a *quantitative* and not a *qualitative* difference, for qualitative differences lie wholly in the region of the imagination, and so drop off at death, and what remains can only be a quantitative difference, *i.e.*, a difference in the amount of adequate ideas, or of knowledge under the category of eternity. Spinoza, then, has failed to set forth and justify an intelligible and satisfactory doctrine of Immortality. Are we, therefore, to infer that he had not himself a living faith in the continuity of that personal communion with God which he enjoyed? By no means. He has not succeeded in explaining and justifying to the intellect that postulate of his spiritual consciousness, but still the postulate is as strong as ever, and to all our objections he would confidently reply:—" *At nihilominus sentimus experimurque nos aternos esse,*" meaning thereby something diametrically opposed to what materialists and secularists mean when they say that there is no proof of the future existence of the soul. We are inclined to think that Spinoza's mistake was in treating as a demonstration of the understanding a doctrine which he held on no intellectual tenure, but which rested on his intuitive consciousness of communion with the Eternal, and waxed or waned not in proportion to the conclusiveness or inconclusiveness of his reasonings, but in proportion to the richness or poverty of his religious experience. His religious consciousness assured Spinoza that the spirit which is pervaded and ani-

mated by love to God is on a plane of being which transcends the finite and the temporal, and that therefore in regard to this Eternal Life all arguments for or against the immortality of the soul based on phenomenal analogies could have no possible force or relevancy. As the soul is surrendered to the invitations of Divine Love and Divine Wisdom it becomes persuaded that "neither life nor death nor things present nor things to come can ever separate it from the love of God." How to co-ordinate this faith with a philosophical creed which provided no substantive existence for the soul and denied free-will and moral responsibility, was the problem which Spinoza's genius was called upon to solve. That under these circumstances he should have been unable so to interpret the *melior pars nostri* as to fully preclude all doubt about the continuity of personal consciousness after death is not to be wondered at. At the same time we cannot resist the conviction that he possessed a firm faith that this prophecy of eternal life, which the soul utters in its divinest moods, involves both a retention of personal identity and the preservation and perfecting of the soul's higher life; and it is to us most interesting and inspiring to note how in Spinoza's writings, as in those of J. S. Mill, this irrepressible instinct of the soul seeks expression under the least favourable conditions of an uncongenial and even antagonistic philosophy. When Spinoza wrote the propositions on Eternal Life in the fifth Book of the *Ethica* his mood was probably closely akin to that in which R. W. Emerson composed the following passage:—

Men ask concerning the immortality of the soul, the employments of heaven, the state of the sinner, and so forth. They even dream that Jesus has left replies to precisely these interrogatories. Never for a moment did that sublime spirit speak in their *patois*. To truth, justice, love, the attributes of the soul, the idea of immutableness is essentially associated. Jesus living in these moral sentiments, heedless of sensual fortunes, heeding only the manifestation of these, never made the separation of the idea of duration from the essence of these attributes, nor uttered a syllable concerning the duration of the soul. It was left to his disciples to sever duration from the moral elements, and

to teach the immortality of the soul as a doctrine, and maintain it by evidences. No inspired man ever asks this question, or condescends to these evidences. For the soul is true to itself, and the man in whom it is shed abroad cannot wander from the present, which is infinite, to a future which would be finite.*

This quotation may perhaps also serve as an illustration of what we suppose Spinoza to mean by the third stage of knowledge, or the vision of things *sub specie æternitatis*.

In conclusion, let us say that it is not at all improbable that a certain mystic, or it may be misty, element in our mind, together with the fascinating effect upon us of that fine spiritual countenance which fronts Dr. Martineau's title-page, may have caused us to read into Spinozism religious ideas and emotions which the author of that system would disclaim, so that the present paper is at the best most incomplete till it is accompanied by a careful perusal of Dr. Martineau's calm and well-matured judgment on these matters. Ueberweg said that a dissection and exposure of Spinoza's numerous paralogisms was urgently called for. This work Dr. Martineau has done with fairness and thoroughness, and while he has clearly indicated the great logical failures, he has at the same time given welcome recognition to all that was good and great in the man and his writings. As an imposing deductive system aiming to explain God and the cosmos Spinozism has received a fatal blow. The logical continuity of the vast structure is broken, and it falls apart into a heap of fragments. Nevertheless, the ruins are magnificent, and from them many a subsequent thinker has carried off most precious material to incorporate in his own philosophy. Nor are they without attraction for other minds. Mr. Pollock has told us what interest they have for students of science; robust spirits of the Goethe type seek in them a soothing calm from life's fitful fever; and they are favourite haunts also with pensive and theosophic souls who feel with Renan that there they are not far from God. Spinoza was about the last man of whom it could justly be said that he is nothing if not logical. Few readers, we

* Essay on the Over-soul.

think, will reach the close of Dr. Martineau's masterly treatise without seeing that there are many passages of exceeding depth and suggestiveness in Spinoza's writings, and their admiration for the great Jewish thinker will be blended with a feeling of warm gratitude towards the highly-gifted expositor and critic who has so effectually aided them to form a just estimate of the worth of Spinozism.

CHARLES B. UPTON.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

THE ORIGIN OF THE NAME "JEHOVAH."

I AM indebted to Professor Sayce for his criticisms in the last number of *The Modern Review*. When, however, he says that my arguments do not seem to him *convincing*, he would appear to have overlooked the fact that I was suggesting an hypothesis, and that I was not attempting to prove and demonstrate. Convincing proof and demonstration may be possible hereafter; but the time for these has not yet come. This being observed, I fail to see that anything said by Professor Sayce detracts from the probability of my hypothesis.

The disappearance from *Dyaus* of the dental, when the word passed over into Hebrew, seems to me to present no insurmountable, or even considerable, difficulty. *Dyahu* and *Dyahveh* would have been, as Professor Sayce knows very well, repugnant to Hebrew analogy and usage; and any other mode of adaptation would probably have involved greater distortion of the word than the mere dropping of the *d*. If such dropping could occur in Latin, a language related to Sanscrit, the fact of Hebrew being an alien language would seem to render a similar disappearance of the *d* sound even more probable.

My critic further objects that "Semitic theology was intensely solar," and that "Jahveh, like other Baalim, was originally a solar deity," while "Dyaus was the sky-god." Of the assertion that Jahveh was originally a solar deity no proof whatever is offered. Semitic theology, however, may have been in general intensely solar, though Jehovah was originally "the sky-god," or, to use the Scriptural phrase, "the God of heaven." According to my hypothesis Jehovah was *not* originally a Semitic deity. To this view (notwithstanding what is said in his last paragraph) Professor Sayce assents; and he questions, indeed, whether *Yahu* "admits at all of a Semitic derivation." It must be

remembered, too, that, in relation to the origin and significance of the name "Jehovah," the remarkable expression *Jehovah Tsebaoth*, "the LORD of hosts," cannot be disregarded. This expression, so unaccountable and incongruous, if ordinary explanations of the name are accepted, gains, as I showed, a new significance when Jehovah is regarded as the God of the sky, "the God of heaven."

The evidence which I adduced tending to show that commercial relations existed between India and Babylonia, is in favour of my hypothesis, even if we cannot determine when these relations commenced. Professor Sayce himself adds a piece of evidence on my behalf—the "mention of *Sindhu*, or Indian muslin, in an old Babylonian list of clothes."* As to the particular Indian language from which *tukkiyyim* "peacocks" (1 Kings x. 22) was derived, we need not, just now, much trouble ourselves. The bird, with its name, may have been transferred from one part of India to another. At any rate, the word, taken with other indications, tends to show that in the days of Solomon there was a traffic between the Israelites and India, either directly or indirectly. But this, though of some importance, is, for our present inquiry, subordinate.

With respect to a period so distant and obscure as that with which we are now concerned, the contention can scarcely be allowed that if, in consequence of commercial intercourse, *Dyaus* was introduced into Chaldea, the name must have been borrowed by the Babylonian traders rather than the Abrahamidæ. Surely, if commercial relations existed, persons not traders might pass from the one country to the other.

Professor Sayce, I observe, overlooks the important statements of Jos. xxiv. 2, 14, 15, that in Chaldea the family of Abraham served originally "other gods," and also the well-known Jewish tradition that religious persecution preceded their departure; a tradition which accords with the view that the cultus of Jehovah was new and strange to the Babylonians. We need not wonder, therefore, if the name has not been found on mythological tablets giving the names of gods worshipped by the neighbours of the Babylonians.

The suggestion that Jehovah was originally a Hittite deity will scarcely, I am afraid, commend itself to Old Testament students

* According to a statement recently made by M. Oppert, monuments which have been discovered by M. de Sarcy indicate the existence of maritime commerce between Egypt and Babylonia at a very remote antiquity. The voyage to India from Babylonia, would have been far shorter.

generally. Jehovah, Israel's own God, and Israel, Jehovah's singularly favoured people, stand in too strongly marked contrast to the Hittites and other contiguous nations, with their false deities and abominations, their Baalim and Asheroth (Deut. xx. 17, 18; Judges iii. 5—7). The theory that Jehovah's character was exalted and spiritualised by the prophets will furnish no sufficient explanation, if Jehovah, bearing the same name, was, and always had been, a well-known deity of the Hittites. On the Hamathite names *Joram* and *Yahu-bidi* I do not know that I need add anything to what I have previously said. With regard to Uriah, his close relation to Israel may easily furnish an explanation of his name.*

Evidently, however, Professor Sayce has not very much confidence, either in his Hittite theory or in adopting, as an alternative, the derivation of the name from *hava*, as used in Job xxxvii 6, "For to the snow he saith, Fall on (*heve*) the earth." But to derive the meaning of the name from this passage standing, as it does, alone, would be in any case precarious. And it is rendered still more so by other peculiarities in the diction of Job with which the verb in the passage cited probably stands in relation. "He who causes (rain or lightning) to fall upon (the earth)" might not be amiss taken as an etymological explanation of the name, if adequate evidence were adduced. But such evidence, so far as I know, is wanting. At some future time I may possibly have an opportunity for inquiring into the Biblical evidence of diverse explanations or etymologies of the name. But to do so now might complicate the question at present under consideration.

If a thorough exploration were made of Mugheir and other sites on the lower Euphrates, together with the island of Bahrein in the Persian Gulf, we should probably gain new evidence as to ancient commercial relations between India and Babylonia. Possibly, we might also discover distinct traces of the introduction of religious ideas from the East, and of the events which resulted in the exodus from Chaldea of the ancestors of the Israelites.

THOMAS TYLER.

* A writer in the *Jewish World* (December 2), referring to Prof. Sayce's contribution in the last number of the *Modern Review*, observes, "The second syllable in each of these names (*Joram*, *Uriah*) is clearly Hebrew; and this would suggest—if the designation in each case is not of Jewish origin—an identity in the dialects of the Hebrews and the Hittites, and an identity in compounded personal names, something more than remarkable."

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

MR. CREIGHTON'S HISTORY OF THE PAPACY DURING THE PERIOD OF THE REFORMATION.*

THE title of this book suggests a comparison with the well-known history of Professor von Ranke. Its difference of plan, however, is at once indicated by the fact that Mr. Creighton's first two volumes represent some forty pages of the older work. This does not, of course, mean that their successors will be written on the same relative scale, but the character of the present instalment is very significant of the completeness with which Mr. Creighton has conceived his design. Professor von Ranke judges history from the present, from the point of view of intelligent contemporaries, and contents himself with a few generalisations about the past, generalisations valuable, and often penetrating so far as they go, but not pretending to independent research. Mr. Creighton on the other hand is convinced that the history of the reformation can only be approached by a patient and prolonged study of its antecedents. "We speak loosely of the Reformation as though it were a definite event; we ought rather to regard the fall of the papal autocracy as the result of a number of political causes, which had slowly gathered strength" (Vol. I., p. 29). He begins, therefore, with a sketch of the rise of the papacy, and dwells upon the successive epochs in its history, the power it drew from the decay of the Roman Empire, and from the spread of Christianity among the German invaders, its revival in the eleventh century, and the claims arrogated for it by Gregory the Seventh. He traces the prominence given to the religious centre by the enthusiasm of the Crusades, the political strength added by the interminable conflict with the German emperors, and, not least, the immense increase of influence derived from the foundation of the mendicant orders, directly connected with the Papacy and free from all intermediate control. By these steps the head of western Christendom attained, under Innocent the Third, "its highest level of power and respect. The change which he wrought in the attitude of the Papacy may be

* *A History of the Papacy during the period of the Reformation.* By M. CREIGHTON, M.A., late Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. Two Vols. Longmans, 1882.

judged from the fact that, whereas his predecessors had contented themselves with the title of Vicar of Peter, Innocent assumed the name of Vicar of Christ. Europe was to form a great Theocracy under the direction of the Pope" (Vol. I., p. 21).

The theocratic idea, however, as Mr. Creighton shows, was rapidly lost from the very conditions under which it seemed nearest to realisation. "The Papacy," it is truly observed, "was only obeying a natural instinct of self-preservation in aiming at a temporal sovereignty which would secure it against temporal mishaps" (p. 22); but none the less did it suffer as a spiritual power. The growth of the States of the Church proved a serious injury to its moral prestige abroad as well as at home. "Instead of being the upholders of civil liberty, the Popes ranked with the princes of Europe, and had no sympathy with the cause of the people" (p. 24). The catastrophe of the empire under Frederick the Second tempted the Pope to assume that international position which was involved in the imperial name; it was on this rock that he stumbled, and Boniface the Eighth, the pontiff who pushed his official claims to the furthest extreme, was also the last Pope who enjoyed a genuine authority as the centre of Christian politics. With him ends the history of the medieval Papacy. His successor retires to Avignon, and becomes the servant of the King of France.

The history of this exile forms the second half of Mr. Creighton's introduction. Drawing nearer to the epoch which, in the author's view, constitutes the potential origin of the reformation, the narrative becomes gradually more detailed, and we would specially direct attention to the excellent account here of the opposition to the Papacy, based on theoretical principles, which began to form itself in the fourteenth century. This tendency, which became prominent in the French resistance to Boniface the Eighth, is reflected in the political philosophy of Dante. Brought into the sphere of practice by the alliance of the great publicists, Marsiglio of Padua and William of Ockham, with the Emperor Lewis the Bavarian, it had far wider consequences than might be suspected from their immediate failure under the feeble and inconsistent management of Lewis. The resistance to the supremacy of the Pope was not necessarily in favour of that of the Emperor. It adapted itself to the growing sense of nationality among the peoples of Europe, and became in this way the lever which was used with marked effect by Wycliffe and Hus. It is certain that neither of these advocates of reform could have won the position they attained, had they not been able to take advantage of the political opinions that were already germinating in men's minds, and Mr. Creighton has done well to lay a decided stress upon their earliest manifestation in the beginning of the fourteenth century. We may notice incidentally that he has repeated an old mistake with reference to this subject in naming, among those who "asserted the independent existence of the temporal and the spiritual power, since both alike came from God, and each has its own sphere of action," the well-known Aegidius Colonna, tutor to Philip the Fair (Vol. I., p. 31). It is undoubtedly true that the manuscripts authorise the attribution to

him of the treatise *De Potestate Regia et Pontificali*, published in the second volume of Goldast's "Monarchia;" but M. Charles Jourdain's discovery of Colonna's book *De Ecclesiastica Potestate* has proved him to have been a supporter of the directly opposite party. Besides this, an early French translation of the work in dispute (also printed, though not identified, by Goldast), expressly ascribes it to Raoul de Presles, or Praelles, a councillor of King Charles the Fifth of France (see Sigmund Riezler, *die literarischen Widersacher der Päpste zur Zeit Ludwig des Baiers*, pp. 139 ff.). The confusion can only have arisen through the similarity of the two titles.

We have dwelt at perhaps excessive length upon Mr. Creighton's introduction because he has been, as it seems to us, peculiarly successful in a field which offers a good test of an historian's power. It is the work not only of a clear-sighted and widely-read historical student, but also of one who has been trained by teaching to select and arrange his facts. Nothing can be more unlike the work of a compiler. Through this outline of the development and decay of the Papacy, we are prepared for the decisive event from which Mr. Creighton dates "the period of the Reformation," the Great Schism of 1378. The Pope had returned from Avignon to Rome; his Italian successor was naturally little pleasing to a college of Cardinals of which two-thirds were French: in opposition to Urban the Sixth they selected their own Pope, Clement the Seventh. This is the situation which the author fixes as the determining event in the career of the Papacy. The medieval conception of the supreme Pontiff had long been gradually fading away; it vanished before the spectacle of a double succession of Popes, each claiming a unique dignity as Vicegerent of Christ. From this epoch the reformation of the church "in head and members" became a practical possibility if not a practical necessity. It would be impossible, within our present limits, to follow the history of the Papacy, through its devious wanderings amid rival popes and rival policies, through the councils of Pisa and Constance, to its renewed vitality in an altered sphere, under Martin the Fifth and his successors. It must suffice to direct attention to a few of the many points of interest afforded by the work before us.

The record of the Schism is at best a dreary one, but it has some circumstances not uninviting to the historian. The two lines of Popes happened to present a series of bold contrasts of temperament and aim, the single particular of agreement being their uniform lack of religious principle, and Mr. Creighton has skilfully drawn these characteristic, however unpleasant, portraits. See, for instance, those of Urban the Sixth (Vol. I., pp. 60, 92 f.) and Clement the Seventh (pp. 65, 127 f.), or of Benedict the Thirteenth and Gregory the Twelfth (pp. 197 ff.). There is everywhere manifest a desire to estimate fairly the most opposite qualities, nowhere a symptom of that indolent spirit which classes the whole set together as false and unworthy representatives of the Church. Such, indeed, they might appear if tried by the standard of other times; but Mr. Creighton is right to insist upon the injustice (to take a typical case) done to John the Twenty-third, probably the best-

abused of all the Popes, by the sudden revival of this standard when he came to be arraigned by the Council of Constance. Here Mr. Creighton even errs on the side of lenity. "It is difficult," he says (Vol. I., pp. 299 f.), "not to see that John XXIII. had hard measure dealt to him in the exceptional obloquy which has been his lot. Elected to the Papacy in return for his signal services in the Council of Pisa, he was ignominiously deposed by the Council which claimed to be a continuation of that of Pisa. Here, as elsewhere, the revolution swallowed up its own child, and John's character has met with the fate which always befalls those whom every one is interested to malign and no one is interested to defend." Yet even this favourable judge, after acknowledging John's decision and political sagacity as Legate in the Romagna, is forced to confess that at Constance he "had neither learning nor moral character to enable him to hold his own in the face of the Council. He had nothing but intrigue, which he managed so ill as to make it impossible for any one to hold by him through respect for the Papal dignity." In other words, his management of the Pisan Council had constituted for him a claim upon the Church, or at least upon the Cardinals, which could only be satisfied by the gift of the Papacy, an office for which he was obviously and notoriously unfit. "He was nothing more nor less than an Italian military adventurer." It is surprising, after such a verdict, that Mr. Creighton should lay a stress upon the fact that "Cosimo dei Medici, who was not likely to befriend an utterly worthless man, retained both affection and respect" for him (Vol. I., p. 301), and "incline to think that the opinion of Florence was less prejudiced" than that of Constance (Vol. I., p. 443). The "opinion of Florence" may be read in the superb tomb in the Baptistery, where the deposed Pope lies attended by the figures of Faith, Hope, and Charity. Surely Mr. Creighton would not have us believe that this represents a "less prejudiced" view of his character.

The Councils of Constance and Basle form the principal subjects of the second and third books of the present history. A certain tediousness is perhaps inherent in the records of Councils, and if the English reader misses here the life and colour which Dean Milman imparted to the corresponding portions of his "History of Latin Christianity," he may at least console himself by the superior accuracy and more complete knowledge of the newer work, which does not, as Milman did, begin the Council of Constance a year too late, and correct itself by silently omitting a year of its sessions. Mr. Creighton's virtue is his steady refusal to enhance the popular interest of his book by magnifying or distorting facts; his temptation is to underestimate them. We think, for instance, that in his struggle against the least suspicion of partisanship, he has unfairly reduced the significance of the activity of the English nation at Constance, which not only formed the moderating element in the Council, but also by its union with the Germans, constituted the majority by which whatever work was accomplished, was made possible. Mr. Creighton almost ignores the influence of Bishop Hallam, and says that his death "gave a colourable pretext for" the English "change of front, though it was in

no way connected with it" (Vol. I., p. 393). Yet certainly the immediate sequence of the two events has a more natural explanation in the disorder into which the party was thrown by the death of its leader, than in the "conjecture" (Mr. Creighton admits that it is nothing more) about "orders from home." Again, in regard to Wycliffe, it will doubtless offend many people to read that his teaching "produced no deep impression in England;" he "set in motion no great movement and left no lasting impression of his definite opinions" (Vol. I., pp. 306 f.); although we are convinced that, with the qualifications which Mr. Creighton adds, namely, that "he did much to awaken controversy," and exercised a considerable religious influence by his translation of the Bible, the criticism is entirely just. The historical importance of Wycliffe lies in Bohemia, in the preaching of John Hus. Mr. Creighton gives a clear and discriminating account of the rise and fortunes of the Bohemian reformer; the tragedy of his death he relates with a pathos that owes nothing to rhetoric, and arises naturally from the absence of affectation, and from the human earnestness of its telling. He allows full weight to the political considerations which assisted his temporary success. Hus was encouraged as a political tool, and abandoned when his co-operation became dangerous. But this does not touch the traditional view of his personal career; for he was unconscious of anything beyond what appeared to him his straightforward duty. "There was," as Mr. Creighton finely says, "a childlike simplicity about his character, and an ignorance of the world which some writers of modern times have mistaken for vanity" (Vol. I., p. 335).

On the vexed question of the Emperor's good faith in reference to Hus's safe conduct, Mr. Creighton is unsatisfactory. He says in a note that he has not "regarded this matter as one of great importance. . . . I have no doubt that Hus was deceived, but I cannot attach excessive blame to any one" (Vol. I., p. 447). In fact, he has not thought it worth while to make up his mind on the subject, for if Hus was deceived, it necessarily involves the severest censure against Sigismund, and so becomes a matter "of great importance" to the historian. For ourselves, we are persuaded that neither party was so ignorant of the meaning of a safe-conduct as to suppose that it could exempt Hus from the decision of the Council. The arguments are too extensive to admit of discussion here, but we cannot but feel that Mr. Creighton, in reproducing, though without its conventional heat of language, the stereotyped view of Sigismund's perfidy, has not exercised that independent judgment for which he is usually conspicuous; certainly he has not carried out his expressed intention of not attaching "excessive blame to any one" (see Vol. I., pp. 331, 338 ff.). He has, in fact, confounded the two questions, of the efficacy of the safe-conduct before and during trial, and after condemnation, which are totally distinct. In other respects, Mr. Creighton's estimate of Sigismund's character and career deserves the highest praise (see particularly Vol. I., pp. 250 f., Vol. II., pp. 162 f.).

The fourth book, which concludes the present instalment of Mr. Creighton's history, is entitled "The Papal Restoration." The central

figure in it is, of course, Aeneas Sylvius, Pope Pius the Second, to whom the author has devoted an exceptionally careful, thorough, and illuminating study, and with whom his second volume ends. The revival of learning forms an important part of this book. To many readers the fourth chapter (Vol. II., pp. 329-344) will be the most interesting in the work. They will contrast its freshness and vigour with the barren recital with which they are familiar, for instance, in Signor Villari's introduction to his life of Machiavelli. Mr. Creighton's view of the attitude taken up towards the movement by Nicolas the Fifth is penetrating and just. "It was not," he says, "exactly a Christian ideal that Nicolas V. set before himself. But the more religious aspirations of the time ran in the direction of ecclesiastical reform; and after the proceedings at Basle it was not judicious for a Pope to interfere with that matter at the present. Nicolas V. saw that reform was needed; but reform was too dangerous. If the Papacy could not venture on reform, the next best thing was to identify itself with art and learning. To the demand of Germany for reformation Nicolas V. answered by offering culture. His policy was so far wise that it enabled the Papacy to exist for sixty years before the antagonism broke out into open rebellion" (Vol. II., p. 327). We may here advert to the peculiar excellence which belongs to Mr. Creighton's treatment of artistic matters from the extent of his personal observation. He brings his traveller's experience to bear upon the buildings and monuments of Rome, Siena, Naples, Pisa, Florence, Basle, Constance; and though his descriptions are not always remarkable, they never fail to impress the reader with their truthfulness and perception. They are another evidence of the unwearied energy which Mr. Creighton has thrown into every detail of his subject. It is this painstaking and accuracy which will give his work at once a position of acknowledged authority.

In a first edition one must expect contradictions, and there are a few here. In Vol. I., p. 350, for example, it is said of Sigismund that "the unguarded words that he spoke lost him his Bohemian kingdom for ever:" in Vol. II., p. 155, we find "his restoration to Bohemia . . . accomplished." Again in a recapitulation (Vol. I. p. 420) a fact is insisted upon, which in the narrative itself is only mentioned incidentally in a foot-note (p. 394). But these are slight blemishes. The style of the work, though wanting in balance and dignity, is throughout direct and lucid; it has the ease and also the carelessness of a practised writer, but the grammatical slips that we have detected are very rare (e.g. Vol. I., pp. 16, 36; Vol. II., pp. 94, 343). Mr. Creighton's looseness in giving references is a fault that may lead to confusion with those who are not expert in the sources of medieval history. It would be difficult to count up the various forms he gives to Dietrich of Niem's history of the Schism, or, for that matter, to Professor Voigt's Life of Aeneas Sylvius. In the appendix to the second volume the perplexity is increased by a crop of misprints: we read twice of Pez's *Scriptores Rerum Austriacarum* (pp. 517, 522), and the Vienna *Monumenta Conciliorum* appears in at least three different spellings (pp. 505, 514, 516). In the same way though Mr. Creighton is scrupulous in his attempt to preserve the native names of

places, his irregularities are frequent. We read of Koeln and Coeln, Erfurt and Erfurth. Perhaps it is too late in the day to protest against the general principle: but for any one but a German to speak of Aix-la-Chapelle as *Aachen* is (*pace* Mr. Freeman) indefensible on any ground; it is to substitute one foreign name for another, the native word being, of course, *Aken*. And what shall be said of such an orthographical monster as *Gröningen* (Vol. I., p. 408)?

R. L. P.

MR. LESLIE STEPHEN'S SCIENCE OF ETHICS.*

MR. STEPHEN'S statement in his Preface that he is a member of the school of thought to which Hume, Bentham, the Mills, G. H. Lewes, and Mr. Herbert Spencer belong, and that his object is to lay down an ethical doctrine in harmony with the doctrine of evolution, will suggest to the reader a correct general idea of the character of the work before us. We further read in the Preface that the author "does not believe that there is a single original thought in this book from beginning to end;" but we think that when the reader has reached the close of the volume, he will not be prepared to endorse Mr. Stephen's too modest estimate of his achievement. It is true that he has mastered and assimilated much of the thought and speculation of the above school of writers, but it is also evident that his book is far more than a mere restatement of earlier views, for not only are these views so combined as to illustrate each other, and, therefore, to form a more self-consistent and luminous body of doctrine, but it also seems to us that the treatise embodies some fundamental conceptions, which, if not wholly novel, have certainly never been so clearly enounced and so systematically applied in any previous empirical treatise on ethics.

We will presently mention the more important of these original traits, but we may first sum up the impressions which the reading has made on us by saying that though we think that Mr. Stephen has not given an adequate account and *rationale* of the facts of our moral consciousness, and that, indeed, by his method no adequate exposition of ethical truth is possible, nevertheless he has said much that is of the highest interest to students of every school, and has certainly done far less violence to the facts of our moral nature than many of his predecessors in the same line of thought have done. In reading him we are not often painfully startled as we are in reading Hobbes and Bentham, and even Bain, by some conspicuous misrepresentation of our ethical feelings, which tempts us to exclaim indignantly, Why, this writer is not expounding actual human nature, he is inventing a nature to meet the exigencies of his psychological theory! Mr. Stephen, for instance, does not represent morality as refined selfishness, and self-sacrifice as a temporary

* *The Science of Ethics*. By LESLIE STEPHEN. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1882.

inattention to self in order that self may get the daintiest gratification after all. On the contrary, he tells us that no act done for the sake of self can be properly called moral; that self-sacrifice really exists, and is no less a duty because it often involves a real deduction from the agent's own happiness. Whether our author's psychological and anti-metaphysical first principles are logically compatible with the moral sentiments which he recognises and seeks to justify, is another question (to which we should not be inclined to give an affirmative answer), but, at all events it is an advantage to feel that the author of the *Science of Ethics* has a moral consciousness not essentially different from that of his readers, and that as a rule he does not much pervert the facts in order to triumphantly explain them.

In saying that he seeks to place his doctrine in harmony with the doctrine of Evolution, Mr. Stephen intimates that, however much he may have been in earlier years captivated by the doctrine of Bentham and the Mills, he does not now base his ethical views, as they did, on an analysis of the individual consciousness and attempt to show how, out of the elementary factors thus reached, all our ethical ideas and sentiments may be explained. With Mr. Herbert Spencer he considers that the study of actual human nature with a view to the ascertainment of its laws can only be prosecuted successfully when the individual is regarded as a part of a larger organism—namely, society; and especially is this the case with our ethical consciousness, for, according to Mr. Spencer and Mr. Stephen, morality proper does not arise till man begins to act from those sympathetic emotions which prompt to disinterested beneficence.

In regard to this new treatment of the subject of Ethics, it can hardly be doubted that the theory of Evolution and the doctrine of Heredity will in the future considerably influence all branches of mental science, and the first step towards learning what amount of modification our views should rightly undergo in virtue of these new ideas, is to study carefully the accounts of human nature now being presented by such able thinkers as Mr. Spencer and Mr. Stephen, whose minds are fully saturated with this new conception, and who are, therefore, most likely to apply it to the fullest possible extent. It is only to be expected that such enthusiastic advocates should be somewhat one-sided, should press their favourite idea too far, and should regard it as the universal solvent for all that is solvable in science and philosophy rather than as one important principle, which must be aided and qualified by other principles equally necessary for the explanation of mental and physical facts. In one aspect man may be regarded as a part of the phenomenal universe, and on this aspect of humanity the doctrine of evolution will probably throw much valuable light; but in another aspect man is raised above nature, and is akin rather to the abiding cause of nature than to the everchanging current of natural phenomena. This is the view of the late Professor Green, of Oxford, in the profound papers which recently appeared in the pages of *Mind*, on the question, Can there be a Natural Science of Man? Admitting the importance of the Evolution Theory in regard to the history of natural phenomena, and, therefore, to the history

of man in so far as he is conditioned by the laws of the phenomenal universe, Mr. Green nevertheless feels himself necessitated by the study of the faculty of Cognition to give a decidedly negative reply to the above question. The abiding mind which knows the relations of successive phenomena cannot, he maintains, be itself a phenomenon; the intelligence which is competent to learn nature's laws must itself be intrinsically above nature. And if this conclusion is inevitable as a result of the study of man's knowing faculty, it is no less inevitable, we think, when we consider our moral consciousness, and feel that we possess a self-determining will, which enables us to make our election between motives which are felt to be of different moral rank, and which justifies our self-condemnation for past sinfulness because it testifies that our conduct might have been better than it really was.

In the languages and ideas of all nations the phenomenal and the metaphysical or ontological are inextricably bound up together, and we are surprised that such an evolutionist as Mr. Stephen should not have taken as *prima facie* evidence of the validity and importance of both ideas the fact that evolution has not had the slightest tendency to eliminate either member of this universal antithesis. It is the great defect of his interesting volume that he studiously ignores all metaphysical considerations, and notwithstanding Professor Green's most weighty protest, imagines that he can give an adequate account of human nature while leaving all such considerations aside. How futile is such a pretension is evident from the fact that the very assumption of an objective universe on which the theory of evolution reposes, and also the belief in the existence of other people, are metaphysical assumptions; and were our author to steer as clear of all metaphysics as he professes to do, he would have no ground for asserting that the supposed events in nature and society are anything more than successive phases in his own sensations and ideas. He cannot do without metaphysics if he would, for every sentence in his book implies the acceptance of some metaphysical beliefs. What, however, he means when he says that he eschews metaphysics is that he will not contemplate the possibility that man's will is an original cause, or that there is any unique and undecomposable element in our moral consciousness, or any ultimate criterion of right and wrong. It is these particular metaphysical ideas that Mr. Stephen would fain dispense with, for these ideas would interfere with his main object, which is to show how, by simply assuming a community of creatures with certain capacities for pain and pleasure, and with a certain power of anticipating the future and of sympathising with each other, all the moral phenomena which we now observe in individuals and in society are seen to be explicable and inevitable consequences.

What has just been said will serve to explain two peculiarities in Mr. Stephen's mode of exposition—on the one hand, the comparative meagreness of his psychological analysis of the moral consciousness, and, on the other hand, the fact that the psychological portion of the discussion is abruptly cut into two halves by the sudden intrusion of a quantity of sociological matter. One would think that the first thing

to be done in expounding a Science of Ethics would be to give an accurate description of what is distinctively ethical in our nature as contrasted with what is sentient, intellectual or æsthetic; but in Mr. Stephen's book we do not get an account of the specially moral ideas and emotions, such as the consciousness of obligation, the felt difference between prudential and moral action, the sentiment of remorse, &c., till we are far past the middle of the book. The reason of this is that the moral factors of human nature are not in his view elementary, and, therefore, before he gives an account of them, he wishes to show how they have been produced. He, therefore, deals first with the psychology of motives in general. In this opening section of the volume we meet with the first indication of originality of treatment, if, indeed, it is not rather a conscious reproduction of Spinoza's view of mental causation. While Mr. Stephen believes that all conduct is determined by pleasure or pain, he denies that the anticipated pleasure or pain is the immediate cause of the act of choice. The anticipation of pleasure or pain is itself a pleasure or pain, and, in his view, it is only in so far as the anticipated pleasure or pain produces an actual pleasure or pain that it exercises any motive force over the conduct. Just as in physics it is said that a force cannot act where it is not, so, says Mr. Stephen, a future pleasure cannot immediately influence us, for only one force sets us in action, namely, present pleasure or pain. This is a curious psychological question; but we hardly think that introspection will justify the doctrine that we are never conscious of a motive to act in the absence of a pleasurable or painful feeling. As feelings, according to Mr. Stephen, are the only causes of action, it follows that it is, strictly speaking, incorrect to speak of the conflict of reason with passion. Passion can be resisted only by passion. Reason is simply the faculty by which future consequences are brought before the mind, and as the anticipation of these consequences is attended with more or less pleasure or pain, it follows that in so far as a man is reasonable he is under the influence of motives which would not otherwise be operative. The immediate appetite is held in check by a number of motives to which only the reasoning being is accessible. It is evident, however, that the anticipation of future consequences often operates as a motive without creating any strong present emotion. Mr. Stephen explains this on the ground that "we feel by signs as well as reason by signs. The sight of a red flag may deter me from crossing a rifle range without calling up to my imagination all the effects of a bullet traversing my body. If the motive which prompts me to run the risk be strong, it may be necessary to convert a greater volume of latent into active emotion. We steer our course by an apparently insignificant rudder, and only call out forces sufficient to overcome the actual resistance." Man, as an isolated being, is thus determined to action by his primitive appetite and instincts, and by his reason or calculation of consequences; but it cannot be said of such a being that he has any ideal of conduct, and the word "ought" has no meaning as applied to him.

To explain how man becomes moral, Mr. Stephen now leaves for the present the psychological investigation, and turns to the sociological. In

several thoughtful chapters he aims to show that the moral law is imposed on each member of society by the needs of the social organisation. It is rather surprising that Mr. Stephen, while regarding the whole of our moral sentiments as the result of social evolution, appears to attach too little importance to the doctrine of heredity, for he assumes that the brains of infants in barbarous and civilised states do not greatly vary, and refers the main intellectual and moral differences of individuals almost entirely to the influences exerted upon them after birth by the social organism of which they form a part. Just as in the infra-human stage those organisms survive which are best fitted for all the conditions of life, so is it also in social evolution; but, as Mr. Stephen explains at great length, the unit of social evolution in a moderately-civilised state of the world is not the nation, but the race. As improvements and inventions are rapidly communicated from one civilised nation to another of the same race, war becomes a subordinate phenomenon, and the real struggle for existence is between races which are distinguished from each other by their social "tissue," that is, by the degree in which each race, by the collective experience and interchanging sympathies of its members, has organised in its language, its laws, its usages and moral ideas the principles of character which are most conducive to self-preservation. In all races, however, there is a fundamental agreement as to the more elementary moral virtues, which are indispensable to social welfare. Mr. Stephen explains that the moral law, which in the course of evolution becomes a corporate sentiment, has two branches, the prudential and the moral; and the formation of moral sentiment in favour of the cardinal virtues—courage, temperance, truth, justice, and benevolence—is expounded with much detail. One of the most interesting features of Mr. Stephen's treatise is the emphasis with which he insists on the doctrine that true morality must be internal, that is to say, that it is not enough that the outward act should accord with the moral rule, it is also necessary that the agent should do it without any extrinsic motive. "The moral law has," he says, "to be expressed in the form '*be this*,' not in the form '*do this*.' It prescribes character primarily, not conduct."

The result, then, of Mr. Stephen's sociological discussion is that he considers that he has now accounted for the presence of distinctively ethical ideas and sentiments in human nature. His conclusion is that the feeling of moral obligation is not innate or intuitive in the individual mind, but has an objective origin, being produced by the pressure which the corporate sentiment of society imposes upon its members; and that in like manner the recognition of the relative moral worth of our springs of action is empirically reached by the relative importance of these different principles to the preservation and enrichment of the social fabric.

Accordingly, our author's exposition of ethical science now returns to the line of psychological investigation, and attempts to analyse and explain man's specially moral feelings; and here he inquires, first, if man is wholly a selfish being, whose apparently disinterested actions have all

an ulterior reference to his own happiness. Mr. Stephen's position in reference to this question is emphatically altruistic, so that here, too, as in other points, he is far more fully in accord with the ordinary sentiments of mankind than many Utilitarian moralists are. He holds, it is true, that all action is caused by the pleasurable or painful feelings of the agent, but what he insists on is that the pleasure often springs from the idea of another's happiness, and the pain from the idea of another's misery. It is through the principle of Sympathy that the representation of another's pleasure or pain operates as a motive to truly altruistic action. Mr. Stephen's account of Sympathy is very suggestive, and he shows that, notwithstanding some very perplexing apparent exceptions, in which a pleasure seems to be felt in another's pain, sympathy is a natural and fundamental fact. Mere sympathy, however, is not necessarily altruistic, for the pain which we receive from contemplating the miseries of others may prompt us to divert our attention from their suffering rather than to take measures for its relief. Mr. Stephen, however, endeavours to show that in proportion as man becomes more reasonable he virtually makes a common stock of pains and pleasures with the whole society to which he belongs, and the desire to augment the pleasure and to lessen the pain of others become as ultimate a motive as his desire for his own happiness.

In order (says Mr. Stephen) that a being provided with social instincts should act reasonably, it is necessary, not that he should take that course of conduct which gives the greatest chances of happiness for himself, but that which gives the greatest chance of happiness to the organisation of which he forms a constituent part. . . . So soon as I become sympathetic, even in the slightest degree, and thereby accessible to the social instincts, the mere prudential maxim ceases to give the true law of motive, and, therefore, of conduct in all the cases in which the sympathies or the derivative instincts are called into action (p. 258).

This passage suggests several difficult questions, to which, it seems to us, Mr. Stephen is unable to give any satisfactory reply. His attempts to answer them occupy the last quarter of the volume, and they reveal, we think, the fatal defects of his theory as an adequate account of man's moral consciousness.

The first question suggested is, Why is conduct which results from the pleasure or pain of the social instincts more meritorious than conduct which is opposed to that instinct? Because, replies our author, conduct at variance with the social instinct is antagonistic to the preservation and welfare of society, and the individual's merit is just in the proportion in which his intrinsic love of doing good leads him to do what the average man will only do when influenced by some extrinsic motive. Does the merit then consist in a man's being so constituted that the balance of pleasurable feeling that leads to beneficial action is greater than the pleasure which anticipated self-gratification produces? Surely, if conduct is thus simply the resultant of emotional impulses, it may indeed be æsthetically attractive or repulsive, but meritorious it can never be. The

idea of merit involves of necessity the metaphysical principle, which Mr. Stephen in vain tries to ignore, that the personal will in moral action is no mere resultant of motives, but is a self-determining power, which, in virtue of its freedom of choice, can direct attention to either the social or the selfish motive, and by persistent siding with one or the other can raise that motive to a predominant intensity. The idea of merit implies then that man possesses Free-will. Mr. Stephen rejects Free-will, and mainly on the ground that we habitually and safely predict conduct if we have a knowledge of character. The Libertarian, however, does not call this in question. In so far as a man's character is already formed, we may confidently predict that he will act in accordance with this formed character, and this power of prediction extends accordingly over nearly the whole of the conduct. It is only at the margin where the personal character is growing or being formed, that is, only in cases where the man is accessible to real temptation, that it becomes intrinsically impossible to forecast how he will decide between competing springs of action. The moral character of man, and of the social organism generally, changes only gradually and slowly, and, therefore, the fact that there is always a margin of uncertainty where complete foresight is impossible, does not prevent statistical inferences from being approximately true, or render man and society wholly inaccessible to scientific research. It is this union of a great and permanent body of formed character and habit, with a living margin of moral growth or decay, which, without annulling that freedom of moral choice which is indispensable to morality, furnishes the needful conditions for a reasonable prevision of human conduct, and for the scientific study of the motor forces in society. The same anti-metaphysical prepossession which vitiates Mr. Stephen's account of merit, vitiates also his exposition of remorse. Remorse is, in his view, the hatred which we feel for our unsocial behaviour, and this hatred is simply the reflection in us, through sympathy, of the hatred with which our neighbours would regard our conduct. It seems clear to us that remorse is felt to be an original sentiment of our nature, and no mere reflection of public opinion, and that it most surely involves, and is based upon, the conviction that the moral choice of ours, which occasions remorse, might have been other than it really was. Further, what is the feeling of obligation? Mr. Stephen tells us it arises from the fact that man is part of a social organism, and that the idea of the line of conduct which is most conducive to society's maintenance and health having been evolved by experience in the whole organism, is reflected in the individual consciousness, and constitutes the sense of duty. But why should such reflected sentiments assume an obligatory character if they have no other authority than the pleasurable or painful experiences of society? And if such be the essence of the idea of obligation, how comes it that the conscience often imposes upon men a line of conduct far higher than that which society claims or expects?

As compared with Utilitarianism the great significance of Mr. Stephen's teaching lies in his doctrine that conduct does not neces-

sarily or always proceed from a calculation of the pleasurable consequences to the agent, but simply from the circumstance that the idea or feeling which leads to the action is, at the moment, more pleasurable or less painful than the other ideas or feelings which are present; and the main object of his book is to prove that as civilisation advances the ideas which prompt action conducive to the public good tend to become the most pleasurable and, therefore, the most influential upon conduct. It cannot be said that he has demonstrated this, for, indeed, to do this he would need to refute all the arguments of the Pessimists; but even allowing that though his reasoning is defective his conclusion is sound, and that in the case of the perfectly moralised man the pleasurable becomes identical with the beneficent, and the painful with the pernicious, Mr. Stephen still provides no answer to the practical question, Why am I, in whom the idea of action for the good of society is not so pleasurable as the idea of gratifying my passion or self-love, bound to obey the social rather than the selfish motive? He can only reply that if I really feel myself morally bound so to act, it must be because resistance to the social instinct is painful, or the yielding to it is pleasant. But resistance to the passion that wars against the social instinct is likewise painful, and yielding to it is pleasant; why, then, do I not feel also bound to gratify the egoistic passion? We find, then, in Mr. Stephen's presentation of ethical science no satisfactory account of the psychological fact that when the social affections and the personal appetites come into collision, an obligation is felt to act in accordance with the former. His ingenious manipulation of the ideas of pleasure and pain does not succeed in yielding the entirely different idea of moral obligation. We might adduce other instances of the inability of Mr. Stephen's theory to account for the clear deliverances of our ethical consciousness; but these that we have cited are a fair sample of the difficulties which his book suggests. Valuable and interesting, then, as Mr. Stephen's treatise is in many respects, as an attempt to explain the genesis and development of moral ideas and sentiments in gregarious creatures who, individually, have no distinctively ethical faculty, it must be regarded as a failure. A true Science of Ethics must, we think, recognise at the outset that in ethical experiences there is a unique element, which, though it is constantly blended with other elements in human nature, is yet essentially undecomposable.

The historical unfolding of the conception of duty is a study of the highest interest, but just as the Darwinian theory does not supersede the necessity of regarding the cosmos as the manifestation of creative thought, so in the history of man the moral ideal must be recognised as an internal formative principle ever seeking to manifest itself in humanity. The successive phases of its evolution are conditioned by the progress of experience, but so far from being the product of experience it ever shows itself in advance of man's actual life, and with an authority whose rightfulness is never really gainsaid, it is ever claiming to realise itself more perfectly in human hearts and lives.

C. B. U.

MR. GUTHRIE ON MR. SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.

IN a substantial volume of nearly 500 pages,* Mr. Guthrie continues the elaborate and acute criticism of Mr. Spencer's philosophical system which he commenced in his former treatise on that author's "Formula of Evolution." Mr. Guthrie's position is not that of antagonism to the scientific doctrine of evolution, but he sees great blanks in the present deductive treatment, which cause him to regard Mr. Spencer's presumed fulness of exposition as merely illusory. "In so far," he says, "as Mr. Spencer's work is viewed as an attempt to show the *a priori* reasonableness of evolution by gradual development already established in various departments of science by *a posteriori* methods, it may be held to have accomplished its object; but in so far as it claims to have put together a framework of thought commensurate with all the sequences of the cosmos, it must be considered a disjointed structure from which as yet several connecting parts are missing" (*Pref.* p. v.).

Of course it is one thing to contend that the evolution of cosmical phenomena proceeds by imperceptible gradations, and not by sudden leaps, and it is quite another thing to attempt to prove that each of the successive phases in this evolutionary process is the *necessary consequence* of the condition immediately preceding it. Towards achieving the first of these aims, Mr. Spencer has done signal service; and the grand generalisations into which he has gathered up the results of the special sciences, and so enabled the mind to grasp the successive chapters in the history of the phenomenal world, well entitle him to gratitude and admiration. But his ambition soars far above this useful achievement. He aspires to impart to us such a knowledge of the ultimate constitution of the universe, that no events in the sublime procession of cosmical phenomena need surprise us, seeing that in the light of his exposition it must be evident to the reason that each antecedent appearance on the phenomenal stage necessitates and explains the particular appearance which follows it. Mr. Guthrie does not maintain, as we should be inclined to do, that this pretension to give a deductive explanation of the universe is intrinsically incapable of realisation; he simply limits himself to inquiring whether Mr. Spencer has succeeded in giving an intelligible and consistent account of the necessary evolution of the universe from certain assumed primitive data.

In telling us in the above passage that "several connecting parts are wanting in Mr. Spencer's explanation of the sequences of the cosmos," Mr. Guthrie might have added that the defective links in the explanation occur at all those hinge-points which really test the truth and adequacy of a deductive account of the universe; for, as Mr. Guthrie's detailed criticism clearly proves, Mr. Spencer's evolution theory fails to account for the passage from inorganic matter to organic bodies, it fails also to show how organism gives rise to consciousness, and we might add, though Mr.

* *On Mr. Spencer's Unification of Knowledge*, by MALCOLM GUTHRIE, author of *On Mr. Spencer's Formula of Evolution*. London: Trübner and Co. 1882.

Guthrie does not discuss this, it fails to show how a merely sentient being necessarily passes into a rational and moral being possessed of a power of free choice between higher and lower springs of conduct.

Mr. Guthrie's criticism of Mr. Spencer's position is the more interesting because it proceeds from one who is fully imbued with the modern idea of evolution, and who, having no metaphysical prejudice against Mr. Spencer's method, has studied it at first sympathetically in the attitude of a disciple, and only later and under logical compulsion in the attitude of a hostile critic.

One of the most important chapters of the book is that in which Mr. Guthrie submits to searching examination Mr. Spencer's explanation of the cause of organic evolution by means of equilibration and polarity, and the following words in which he sums up the results of his criticism are not, we think, much more severe than the case warrants. After justly complaining of Mr. Spencer's habit of gradually altering the recognised meaning of terms, Mr. Guthrie continues:—

In the case before us, polarity, which we can thoroughly understand as applied to the crystallisation of inorganic substances, is so overloaded with properties and powers, and is so expanded for the purpose of explaining all chemical and physiological arrangements, that it ends in meaning nothing at all. Fresh requirements, fresh properties needed—call them polarities, and let them equilibrate. We want growth and accretion—we want modification of molecules—we want fresh aggregates produced out of these modified molecules—call them polarities and let them equilibrate. Anything, everything is polarity—anything, everything, is equilibration. Make these terms vague and all-embracing, and you can deduce whatever you will. Put into them all that you want to get out of them, and the deduction, though obscure, will be sufficient" (p. 435).

Dr. Bain's and Mr. Spencer's attempt to explain the relation between mind and matter by the "double aspect" theory, *i.e.*, the Spinozistic doctrine that the ultimate substance has the two attributes, thought and extension, is also ably discussed in Mr. Guthrie's volume, and Mr. Spencer's inconsistent utterances on this subject are clearly pointed out. Sometimes Mr. Spencer writes as if he believed, with Spinoza, that matter and mind are parallel streams of phenomena which exert no causal action on each other, and must each be fully explained within its own sphere, so that all the muscular movements of organised beings are to be referred entirely to transmitted molar and molecular material movements, which would proceed unchanged if the creature had no consciousness at all; at other times, especially when treating of human psychology, he slips into the ordinary view, and admits that sensations, thoughts, and emotions are determining causes of muscular expression and movement, and that, therefore, these mental states must be admitted into the series of convertible forces; and so the doctrine which prevails in the biological treatise that material changes must always be referred to material causes is tacitly surrendered. Mr. Guthrie also takes Mr. Spencer to task for failing to give any explanation of the appearance of consciousness in a world where previously only lifeless matter was present; but we suppose Mr. Spencer would seek to escape from this difficulty by maintaining with Haeckel

that the elements of sentiency attend all the molecular movements of the inorganic world.

Nearly a third of Mr. Guthrie's book is occupied with the discussion of Mr. Spencer's view of the relation which ultimate scientific ideas bear to the Unknowable. In writing his earlier treatise, Mr. Guthrie proceeded on the assumption that definite conceptions are to be attached to the words Matter, Motion, and Force; but Mr. Spencer replies to his criticism by asserting that to attach to these words any definite meaning involves alternative impossibilities of thought. Mr. Guthrie rightly answers that it is evidently the aim of Mr. Spencer, in his account of the Knowable, to give a clear and self-consistent view of the universe and its evolution, and therefore, though Matter, Motion, and Force be only symbols of the Unknowable, they must, if the unification of knowledge is to be achieved, be symbols which definitely and coherently express all cosmical phenomena. Mr. Guthrie accordingly very properly objects to Mr. Spencer that he first professes to give an intelligible explanation of the cosmos, and then, when his explanations are shown to lack clearness and consistency, takes refuge in the Unknowable, and declares that he never intended his symbols to have a definite meaning. Well may Mr. Guthrie say "the question really is whether Mr. Spencer shall be kept to definite meanings when he speaks of the inter-relations of factors, or shall be allowed sometimes to use them in their definite meanings (which are all that can come into our calculations), and sometimes run away from them behind the scenes, letting them come out again in definite shapes when they have to do concrete work" (p. 130).

In conclusion, though we cannot always follow Mr. Guthrie's reasonings, and are not sure that we agree with his view of the proper relation between philosophy and science, we think that, as a criticism of Mr. Spencer's doctrine, the book contains many sound and important reflections, which well deserve the thoughtful consideration of all students of the theory of evolution.

C. B. U.

CANON COOK ON THE REVISED VERSION OF THE FIRST THREE GOSPELS.

THE work of Canon Cook* on the subject of the Revised Version of the First Three Gospels was undertaken, he informs his readers, for a very special reason. Having wholly, or in part, prepared the commentaries on the three Gospels—for the *Speaker's Commentary*—he had naturally a great interest in comparing the work of the Revisers on those Gospels with that which had thus been done under his own care, or by his own hand. He was amazed and grieved, he tells us, at the amount of change introduced by the Revisers, and felt himself "bound in honour to examine those [altered] passages separately and in detail." The result is this considerable volume, occupied, it will be

* *The Revised Version of the First Three Gospels considered in its Bearings upon the Records of our Lord's Words, and of Incidents in His Life.* By F. C. COOK, M.A., &c., &c., Editor of the *Speaker's Commentary*. 8vo, 1882, pp. 250.

perceived, only with the discussion of the changes introduced by the Revisers in the Greek text of the first three Gospels.

The work, having this origin, may be described as an able, as it is also a vigorous, and, in some respects, a successful, attack upon the results of the revision, as these are shown in the preference given to many new readings of the Greek, and the rejection of corresponding readings of the *Textus Receptus*, the reputed basis of the English Authorised Version. Canon Cook enters into much detail in all the passages of any importance in which these alterations of the text have been made. By some of them he is greatly offended; and it seems too evident that his indignation arises at times from motives which are not purely critical. This is the case, for example, when (p. 24) he observes in reference to Matt. i. 7, 8, 10, that it is to him "perfectly astounding that any critic should throw the responsibility for so positive a misstatement on St. Matthew." This is said in connection with the margin on these verses, in which it is intimated that the "Greek" has the names Asaph and Amos instead of Asa and Amon. Here, it will be observed, it is only a marginal note that is in question, and not a "change" in the text, as Canon Cook terms it. And he means us to understand that the writer of the Gospel could not, as an Evangelist, have made such a mistake, and that, therefore, the variant should not have been recorded. But even if this be conceded to the Evangelist, it might be interesting and right to put in the margin the *fact* that such a variant is found in some most ancient documents. The reason suggested, as above cited, for suppressing this fact, is clearly neither sound nor conclusive. For anything that appears, and for anything that is known of the writer termed St. Matthew, he *might* have made such a mistake, and therefore, it was quite reasonable on the part of the revisers to take notice that these variations occur. It would certainly, however, have been better if they had not said, without qualification, that the "Greek" reads Asaph and Amos. If this were wholly true, these forms of the names ought to have stood in the English version, which professes to represent the Greek. The Revisers ought doubtless to have said only that *some* ancient documents so read; and this is strictly correct, whether the Evangelist so wrote or not.

Another example to the same effect may be found at p. 20. Here, in reference to a particular point, Canon Cook observes: "It would indeed be a grievous evil were the representatives of Socinianism entitled to plead, in support of their doctrines, the text of Scripture as it stands in the Revisers' edition." Such expressions indicate an *animus* which at least is not judicial, whatever else it may be, and reveal to us the fact that the author's earnestness and zeal are very much pre-engaged on the side of the old readings. He is, we may plainly see, unwilling to let them go, simply, it would appear, because they fit in so well with the system of theological doctrines to which he is attached. *

* The charge of favouring "Socinian" renderings has been vehemently thrown at the Revised Version by the *Quarterly Reviewer* (Jan. 1882). In a very remarkable case this charge has been shown to recoil upon the reviewer's

This is one of the features of this book which, with all due respect for the eminent and learned author, it is proper to point out, and against which a reader should be on his guard. Another is, that, although the author speaks so frequently and so strongly against the critical principles and their results maintained by Messrs. Westcott and Hort in their recent edition of the Greek text, he yet takes no sufficient account of the processes by which those editors have been led to see in certain of the oldest manuscripts the true representatives (or the nearest which are now accessible to us) of the original words of the New Testament books. The manuscripts referred to are, indeed, few in number, and sometimes they even differ from each other in their evidence. Still, they are in fact the oldest existing documents of their kind, and they must have been copied from documents still older than themselves. Hence, where they are fairly supported by ancient evidence of other kinds—versions and ecclesiastical writers—they are entitled to be received in preference to the far greater numbers of other and later manuscripts, the agreement of which with one another, it may be reasonably shown, is largely the result of the well-known tendency of copyists to correct supposed errors, and smooth down rough places, and assimilate passage to passage in the process of transcription. We do not think that the arguments and evidences adduced by the two eminent critics to whom the author is so vehemently opposed, are considered in this volume with the fulness and detail which entitle him to reject their conclusions with so unqualified a disapproval.

Further, it must be noticed that in condemning the readings adopted, or recorded in their margin, by the Revisers, because they so often coincide with the new text of Westcott and Hort, and in ascribing to those editors, as he appears to do, an altogether preponderating influence in the decisions of the Revisers, he, in common with the *Quarterly Reviewer*, is clearly going beyond the limits which the proprieties of the case and the evidence in his possession should have imposed upon him. The Revisers' readings are in general accord not only with the text of Westcott and Hort, but equally so with the older texts of the greatest critical editors of recent times—Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles. These latter again were the predecessors of Westcott and Hort in attributing a preponderating value to the same small body of ancient witnesses whose testimony has been mainly followed by Westcott and Hort, and by the majority of

own head—in other words, to be applicable to the rendering which he defends, and not to the marginal note in the Revised Version against which he brings it. The note referred to occurs in Rom. ix. 5, where the Revisers have very properly acknowledged the fact that this verse has been punctuated and understood so as to yield a very different sense from that commonly attributed to it. Their record of this fact has provoked the bitterest wrath of the reviewer, who stigmatises their marginal note as "the Socinian gloss." Now it happens that Socinus, and the *Frates Poloni* with him, accepted the punctuation and rendering of the verse, which the *Quarterly Reviewer* himself accepts! They held Christ to be God in such a sense that the doxology might be applied to him. The "Socinian gloss" is thus the received and orthodox rendering, not the marginal annotation of the Revisers. This has been pointed out with ample fulness of detail by Professor Ezra Abbot, in his article on Rom. ix. 5 in the newly-published (American) *Journal of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis* for 1881, pp. 141—2.

the Revisers. The coincidence may therefore be said to be one that arose from the nature of the case. Similar principles of criticism, fairly carried out, without any bias in favour of established readings, necessarily led not only Westcott and Hort, and the Revision body of which they were members, but also the most eminent critical authorities who preceded them, to the results which are so largely identical. This was clearly what was to be anticipated; and we imagine that these results will in most instances, though not in all, bear even a larger amount of hostile criticism than they have yet received.

Still we are far from wishing to convey the idea that we think the Revisers always right in the changes they have made. We think that Canon Cook, as well as the *Quarterly Reviewer*, has produced cases in which changes in the Greek text have, to say the least, been unnecessarily made. For example, the preference of the aorist ἀφῆκαμεν to the present in the Lord's Prayer is a case of this kind. Not only is the resulting sense unsuitable to the prayer, but, critically speaking, the evidence for the new reading is shown by Canon Cook to be insufficient. And there are various other cases of the same kind.

We cannot enter into many details, and must conclude with one further remark. Canon Cook objects greatly to the marginal notes to the Revised Version. They are insufficient, he observes, to show the amount of evidence for or against in the several instances to which they are appended. But then they are evidently not intended for such a purpose. The space at the command of the Revisers was quite insufficient for it. Their value is that they awaken attention and put readers on their guard, and will, no doubt in many a case, lead to further inquiry in the proper quarters. The same remark applies to various renderings and to differences noted in the punctuation. The interests of truth required that these variations, or possible variations, should be acknowledged. The Revision Company was not infallible, and happily it did not do its work as if it had professed, or even assumed, to be so. In cases of doubt, where these seemed important enough (and often, it must be admitted, where they were not so), notice of the doubt is given; and in this, surely, the public will think that the Revisers simply did their duty with honesty, as they were bound to do it. Canon Cook, following the bad example of the *Quarterly Reviewer*, writes as if he thought that the Revisers had sometimes appended a marginal note for the purpose of perplexing a reader or of throwing suspicion upon a text (see pp. 231—2) where nothing of the kind was required. In this, it is hardly necessary to say, he is not justified by what appears in their work; and the character of the Company, it may be added, is perfectly proof against such an imputation.

The reader who is interested in these questions may here be recommended to a work of much smaller size than that which has called forth the foregoing remarks—we allude to the pamphlet published by Two Members of the Revision Company* in reply to the articles of the *Quarterly Reviewer*. The reader of those articles and of Canon Cook's

* *The Revisers and the Greek Text of the New Testament.* By Two Members of the New Testament Company. London: Macmillan. 1882. 8vo.

volume will not do justice either to himself or the Revisers if he does carefully consider what is said on their side of the question in that Reply. Though of small extent, we are greatly mistaken if it does not, even for the general reader, put many things in a light very different from that in which the two adverse critics have represented them, and go far towards showing that the Revision, unpopular as many of its alterations may be, whether in the original text or in the English translation, has at least a good deal to say in its own vindication.

G. V. S.

DR. DAVIDSON ON THE NEW TESTAMENT DOCTRINE OF LAST THINGS.*

DR. DAVIDSON'S little volume on Eschatology, or, as he Englishes it on the title-page, "The Doctrine of Last Things," is, like all that has recently come from the pen of this writer, careful, critical, and judicious. It treats of Christ's Second Advent, the Resurrection, the Intermediate State, the Last Judgment, the Resurrection State, Rewards and Punishments, in several chapters, bearing the above headings, and containing a discriminating review and comparison of the various opinions held on these subjects by different New Testament writers, the whole concluding with a summary of results and a statement of the author's own view regarding these momentous topics. The full title of the book is "The Doctrine of Last Things contained in the New Testament compared with the Notions of the Jews and the Statements of Church Creeds."

The chief fault we have to find with the book is a want of care, not indeed in the method of research, but in the manner of expression. For example, on page 4 ff., we read, "Of the passages bearing on the subject [the Second Advent of Christ] some give His own words; others those of apostles, evangelists, and early Christians. To the former belong these statements;" here follow the words found in Matthew xxiv. 30—31, xxv. 31—33, xxvi. 64, Mark xiv. 62, Luke ix. 26. Hence the ordinary reader would infallibly infer that Dr. Davidson accepts all these passages as genuine utterances of Jesus. In the course of the chapter it comes out that this is by no means the case, but that in Dr. Davidson's view the disciples are "inaccurate reporters of the Master's words, because they misunderstood His meaning, and reproduced it in an altered shape." Would it not be more in accordance with Dr. Davidson's intention to have said that some passages *profess* to give the words of Christ about His second coming, but that these are a distorted echo of His utterance rather than "a reproduction of His meaning in an altered shape"?

The same sort of inaccuracy in expression occurs again on page 45 in reference to the doctrine of the Resurrection. "In Isaiah, chapter xxvi. (written in the exile time), it occurs as a wish:—Ezekiel describes it in a vision," i.e., in that of the valley of dry bones. Yet, on page 48 we

* *The Doctrine of Last Things*. By SAMUEL DAVIDSON, D.D. Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co.

read, "These writers do not intimate the doctrine of the Resurrection, but the restoration of the people to their former prosperity in the metaphorical language of a resuscitation of dead Israelites." We humbly submit, moreover, that "the metaphorical language of a resuscitation" is scarcely good English. The chapter on the Intermediate State is exceedingly interesting; the opinions of Jews and early Christians on Sheol, Hades, Paradise, Gehenna, &c., are treated with a vast amount of erudition and in a most discerning and instructive manner, and the same may be said of the chapters relating to the Last Judgment and the Resurrection State.

With regard to Dr. Davidson's own views on a future state, it may suffice to say they are in harmony with those of the majority of Theistical writers. He believes, in short, that the life to come will be a continuation of the life that now is, admitting of indefinite progress, although under altered conditions. He rejects the doctrine of purposeless and eternal torments, and inclines to the optimistic hope of universal perfectibility. In a note in his final chapter he incidentally remarks, "Scientific men generally hold Sir W. Thomson's doctrine of the dissipation of energy, and the consequent final dissolution of all systems in the universe. In these hypotheses man is little if at all considered; God himself is shoved away out of sight behind *Nature*." Is not this a little unkind to the authors of *The Unseen Universe*, who, so far as we remember, based their arguments for God and immortality upon this very doctrine of the dissipation of energy? And is there not a quaint bathos in the closing sentence of the book—"When materialists are prepared to write on the gates of death the words of the poet, 'Leave all hope behind, you who enter,' their state of mind is surely unfortunate"? In fairness to the materialist it should, moreover, be remembered that it is not only hope but fear, which he would bid us leave behind. Very different indeed was the meaning of the legend inscribed above the portal of Dante's Inferno.

E. M. G.

MR. DALE'S LECTURES ON THE EPISTLE TO THE EPHESIANS.

MR. DALE has given us a handsome volume of sermons on the Epistle to the Ephesians,* and we are grateful to him for it. The book is a good illustration of the position of the moderately liberal school of the Independents, alike in its strength and its weakness. These sermons are practical, and must have been well suited to Mr. Dale's own congregation. Sunday after Sunday his hearers would go home feeling that they had heard something which had done them good; we can believe they enjoyed the long course to its very end. And, no doubt, there are multitudes who will have the same feelings when they read the book; it will do them good. This is strength. But the weakness appears in a

* *The Epistle to the Ephesians: Its Doctrine and Ethics.* By R. W. DALE. M.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1882.

fatal inability either to grasp and expound the mind of the real Paul, or to penetrate to that deeper spiritual region where such men as F. W. Robertson or J. H. Thom make us feel that all critical questions are matters of small importance. Mr. Dale continually refers to critical points, touches on questions of authorship and date, and, no doubt, made his hearers and will make many of his readers, feel that he has dealt with the subject in a masterly way, and often disposed in a couple of sentences of whole reams of sceptical cavillings. But he does *not* know Paul as we have learned to know him through the labours of Baur, Holsten, and especially Pfleiderer. We have only to compare Mr. Dale's book with Pfleiderer's *Paulinism*,* to see what a gain modern criticism may win for us, how close it may bring us to the very mind of the Apostle with its self-consistent development and natural relations to his age, how the giving up of doubtful epistles is merely giving up what is inconsistent with the real man, an inconsistency which we perceive only in proportion to the thoroughness with which we feel we learned to know the real Paul. We have no space to enter into details, but one point we cannot leave unnoticed. The Person in whom Paul wanted men to have faith was God, not Christ. Faith is a trust in God based upon a knowledge of His character and disposition towards us, upon a knowledge of His love, of which Christ was the revealer. Paul identifies the spirit of God and the spirit of Christ. He does not identify Christ and God. And he does not make faith consist in believing in Christ, or in anything about Christ, save so far as Christ's life and death and new life constituted the basis of facts which enabled him to know God in His true character as Father, and knowing Him to love Him who so loved us, and loving Him to turn to Him in humble, childlike trust.

H. S. S.

DR. VON HARTMANN ON "THE RELIGION OF THE SPIRIT."†

THOSE who are familiar with Dr. von Hartmann's previous publication, "The Religious Consciousness of Humanity in the Graduation of its Evolution," will not be surprised at the title of the present work (see *Modern Review*, July, 1882, p. 636). Each of the two books is a unity in itself, and can be read independently of the other; but, inasmuch as they stand to each other as, on the one hand, the historical, and, on the other, the systematic part of a philosophy of religion, they form an internally-connected whole, which our author designates as his third chief work.

As in the historical portion of the investigation, the form of treatment

* Published by Williams and Norgate in the *Theological Translation Fund Library*.

† *Die Religion des Geistes*. VON EDUARD VON HARTMANN. Berlin: Carl Duncker's Verlag. (C. Heymons.) 1882.

in this systematic part is throughout phenomenological. Beginning with an analysis of the religious consciousness, the examination, starting from this psychological basis, proceeds to the metaphysical postulates of the religious consciousness, which, in von Hartmann's opinion, are everywhere found to be the higher synthesis of the exclusive postulates of abstract monism and theism, and ends in setting forth the practical consequences of the religious consciousness. The result of this systematic research von Hartmann finds to be the same as that of the historical—namely, the religion of concrete monism.

The book is divided into three sections, embracing the psychology, metaphysics, and ethics of religion. Under the first head the religious function is considered: (a), as exclusively human; (β), as reciprocal—a divine and human function. Religious metaphysics is classified as the metaphysics of the religious object or theology, and the metaphysics of the religious subject, embracing religious anthropology on the one hand, and religious cosmology on the other. By the ethics of religion is understood the awakening, the development, and the fruits of grace, as the subjective process of salvation, and the history of the social ethical institutions, the æsthetic cult, prayer, sacrifice, &c., as its objective process.

Now, the religious function may exist as *idea*, as *feeling*, or as *will*. Religion is a psychical phenomenon in humanity, and all actual religious phenomena are also psychical functions of men. As *presentation* or *idea* religion is not only "morality touched with emotion," as Mr. Matthew Arnold defines it; nor is it mere "admiration," as the author of "Natural Religion" would have us believe. A function which refers back to the subject—that is, has the subject itself for its object, cannot be called religious, as is proved by the instances of theoretical consciousness, eudæmonistic egoism, and the purely moral conscience. It is true that philosophy, in twofold form, has sought to supplant religion. In the first place, philosophical rationalism did much to set aside the historical religions, and to put in their place *natural religion*, or the religion of reason, with its spiritless deism and triad of ideas—a personal God, personal immortality, and personal freedom of will. Then came the French encyclopædists, with their spiritless materialism, such as, more recently, we find in Strauss' "New Faith." Opposed to this we have the ascending development of philosophical monism from Spinoza, through Fichte to Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Hegel. Thus we see that, without the idea of God, there can be no religion, for this is the starting-point of all religious function.

Since the time of Schleiermacher, the importance of the emotional aspect of religion has been so well understood and appreciated that we need not dwell upon it here, but can pass on to consider the religious function as *will*. Dr. von Hartmann well says: "The religious will is the *alpha* and *omega* of all religion; as unconscious will, its first cause, as conscious its final goal. Without the unconscious religious motive to raise one from dependence upon the world to freedom in God, without the unconscious longing after the Divine which is primarily satisfied

with even the relatively most unfitting objects for the building up of a religious relationship, the evolution of religion in man would have been impossible; even those who regard the goal of this intense longing as illusory must admit that. . . . Of religion before allthings it may be said: 'By their fruits ye shall know them;' first of all, action, or, psychologically considered, the will to act, is the fruit, which must serve as a criterion for the value of all religious functions."

It may be remembered that in his "Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness," von Hartmann's position was that pessimism, in its widest range, is the indispensable postulate of the moral consciousness, and he now finds that the like holds of the religious consciousness. "The reality of suffering," we are told, "and thereby the reality of man and of the persons and things that work upon him, is the indispensable postulate of the religious consciousness, without which the latter can only attempt to maintain itself by self-contradictions."

As regards what is termed religious anthropology, man is in need of salvation, not only with reference to evil, but quite as much, nay, more, in respect of guilt. None can feel free from guilt, however much he may try to do so—that is an indisputable fact, both of the moral and of the religious consciousness. Now, the conception of guilt contains two ideas: that of wrong, and that of responsibility for the same. Then comes the question: What are the metaphysical conditions under which wrong, and the responsibility are possible? The answer would seem to be, that the individual who is neither determined nor otherwise from without, must determine himself in his actions and resolutions, and in such a way that this self-determination falls within the realm of divine knowledge and will; but, for this to be possible, that essence of the individual from which he determines himself must lie, not outside, but inside the Divine Being, and without loss of individual reality. That is to say, according to von Hartmann, the right mean between fatalism and indeterminism is a psychological determinism, and the right mean between abstract monism and theism is concrete monism, which takes account quite as much of the unity of all being in God as of the reality of the many beings toward each other. "As the willing and knowing of the individual must be real, partial functions of the absolute willing and knowing, in order to be truly within its sphere, so also must the constant groups of functions which constitute the reality of the individual have their subsistence in the absolute actuality of the Divine Being, and not in themselves, so as not to represent a Being outside the Divine Being, but rather to be momenta of the absolute idea and absolute will in each of their single actions."

Dr. von Hartmann expressly tells us that, in the present work, he has had nothing but scientific interests in view, and that nothing is further from him than the tendency to practical agitations. Be it so; but there is a wisdom which is hidden from the "wise and prudent," and which, we venture to think, will survive the spread and progress of culture, and even the philosophy of the unconscious.

H. M. BAYNES.

SIGNOR VADALA-PAPALE ON MORALS AND RIGHT IN LIFE.*

IN this volume the author of "Il Codice Civile Italiano e la Scienza" and "Darwinismo Naturale e Sociale" seeks to show that science cannot be studied apart from life. The subjects of which he treats are Man and Life, the Good, Human action—Ethics, Morals, and Right as bearing upon laws generally, upon science, and upon history, and finally, the cosmical, psychical, and social forces in action, and the Harmony of life.

Signor Papale's studies are based upon Comte's positivism and Spencer's biological researches in their application to sociology. He is convinced that the sociological principle is the only basis for a true theory of law. "Right must be studied in the cosmical order, in the social order as manifested in the individual, in the family, in society, in humanity, and as effected by the State. Thus considered, right is the vital principle of the organism named humanity, which is incarnate in all the most minute relations affecting the conditions of the existence and evolution of all organisms. In the spontaneous part of human actions life is controlled by the moral law, hence the need for a study of the *relations subsisting between the moral law and right generally*, which do not constitute a distinct branch in science, but which are nevertheless an integral part in the study of the science of right itself, in serving as a guide to the limits of a code."

We then have to ask the oft-repeated questions :—How far can a science of human nature exist? and—How far may laws of human nature be regarded as certain? Signor Papale knows the answers given to these questions by Vico and others in Italy, by Ahrens in Belgium, by Schäffle in Germany, by Comte, Brocher, and Fouillée in France, and by Mill, Spencer, and Buckle in England. But, though he gives us an excellent summary of the history of morals and right, he omits to mention the curious and instructive application of philosophy to history by Hegel, who pointed out the relation of cause and effect between the physical environment of a given community and its social and political advancement. The great theatre of human thought and action—the earth's surface, being parted into three great divisions, mountain, plain, and shore, we might expect to find what we know to be the case, namely, that primitive conditions of society characterised the first, that there is a progressive state of social institutions on the second, and that on the third, there are the phenomena of commerce, empire, and wealth. Thus the Asiatic development would, he tells us, represent the childhood of civilisation; the Greek, with its worship of sensuous beauty, might be called its youth; whilst the Roman, in cultivating politics and law, would be strictly analogous to its manhood. As regards the old age of civilisation, Hegel thinks it is exhibited in the Teutonic development, which cares little for the world of *action*, but much for the cosmos of *thought*.

* *Morale e Diritto nella Vita: Studi dell'avvocato, G. VADALA-PAPALE*
Napoli: Comm. Gennaro de Angelis e figlio. 1881.

In defining morality and right, Signor Papale agrees with M. Brocher, who says that morality tends directly and by itself to realise the destiny of humanity, whereas right only tends to it *indirectly*. Morality lays down the maxims of all life, rules not only the secret thoughts, but also external conduct. Right, on the other hand, establishes the proper autonomy in society, and governs those acts of external life which are the conditions of existence and development generally.

Accepting Comte's theory of the three states, our author finds that, in this positivistic age, the greatest social reaction against the despotism of class and state is the Declaration of Man's Rights, the assertion of the national conscience, the proclamation of man's autonomy in the search after the best social means for fulfilling his destiny. The part played by morality and right in this struggle of society against despotism, of civilisation against barbarism, is, in the one case, that of fraternity, and, in the other, that of autonomy. "The *autonomy* of individuals, of different organisms, of nations, in universal *brotherhood*—that is the centre round which the whole social system eternally revolves. Thus the history of man is gradually unfolded without ever coming to a close."

Signor Vadala-Papale is interesting throughout, but there is one thing that vitiates the whole of his work, namely, the assumption that the millennium can be brought about by the attainment of a *material* ideal, instead of by a lowly following of Him whose meat and drink it was to do the will of God.

H. M. BAYNES.

RECOLLECTIONS OF UNITARIANISM IN NEW ENGLAND.*

MR. ALLEN follows up his previous excellent volumes with a very practical group of discourses on "Our Liberal Movement in Theology." The "Our" means that of the American Unitarians; and as Mr. Allen has lived through the greater part of the period he sketches, and held close personal relations with the chief actors in "Our Liberal Movement," he is able to throw his lectures into a very bright and attractive form, bringing its heroes successively upon the stage in the living reality of their respective individualities. Mr. Allen divides the history of American Unitarianism into three periods, the time of its Growth, roughly beginning in 1815, and including its controversy with the Orthodox sects; the time of Criticism, or of internal controversy among the parties of its own body, commencing about 1836; and that of Construction, that is, of scientific criticism on the one hand, and of denominational organisation on the other, opening more or less exactly in 1860. Not only the span of time but the scope of persons and of thought covered by this history, renders the little book of much more than denominational interest. No writer, from whatever quarter, who should essay to narrate the history

* *Our Liberal Movement in Theology*, chiefly as shown in *Recollections of the History of Unitarianism in New England*, being a closing Course of Lectures given in the Harvard Divinity School. By Joseph Henry Allen. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1882.

of American literature or American thought, could pass over the men who are the subjects of Mr. Allen's vivid characterisations. Channing represents the first of his three periods, Theodore Parker the second; while John Quincy Adams, Edward Everett, Charles Sumner, with Emerson, Bryant, and Longfellow are rightly claimed along with the divines Norton, Noyes, the Wares, Putnam, Gannett, and Starr King, as twining their names with the remarkable denomination of which Mr. Allen tells the story. When we realise that these, with Bancroft, Lowell, and others very eminent, if not all technically Unitarians, one and all have received powerful and determining influences from Unitarian communion, we are almost inclined to say that a full history of American Unitarianism would embrace a history of American literature.

To us, by far the most interesting chapters in the book are the personal sketches of Channing and of Parker. Mr. Allen tries very hard to make the balance that weighs these two men hang even. He dwells with reverent affection on the gentle dignity and the religious optimism of Channing: we think his candour fails to save him from disparaging the heroic ministry of Parker. The vague, uneasy feeling about slavery which mingled with the valetudinarian habits of Dr. Channing, but failed for so many years to compel his conscience to plain speech and action in the matter, must ever painfully contrast with the keen and agonising sense of the great iniquity which shook Parker's mighty soul as a reed shaken in the wind. Channing was, perhaps, the most wonderful exponent of the dignity of human nature who has spoken in modern times; his character can best be indicated as seraphic. Parker was perhaps the noblest exponent of the pressure of God upon the human conscience since Augustine; he himself is best described by that epithet of all others most rarely true in the record of humanity:—a Great Man. His virtues were the virtues of greatness; his brief outbursts of passion were the noble sins of greatness. It is fair neither to him nor to Channing to place them side by side as *men*, whichever we may prefer as preacher or theologian.

And, indeed, the apologies which Mr. Allen makes for the friendliness of so many leading Unitarians to slavery, or their long-sustained neutrality in the struggle, seem to us unfortunate. It is quite true that good men often fail to pierce through the veils that decently drape iniquity; but if other men meanwhile, amid contumely and great personal peril, expose and denounce the sin—these men show themselves, so far at least, of the nobler mould. The reason Dr. Gannett and the rest did not perceive the wickedness of slavery was that they were not great enough, were not prophetic enough to do so. It is better quietly to thank God for the much good that was in them nevertheless, than to drag them out to-day for equal honours with Garrison, Parker, and Sumner, whose rightness, and whose righteousness, intervening history, and the conscience of the present, vindicate with so sharp a contrast.

We do not for a moment expect Mr. Allen to see with us in this; but, despite this blot, we would express our cordial interest in a book we would gladly have noticed at greater length.

R. A. A.

MR. IRELAND'S AND MR. CONWAY'S BOOKS ON EMERSON.

THE only readers who will have any fault to find with Mr. Ireland's book * will be those who bought it in the first edition, so soon to be superseded by the present one, which is an improvement upon it in every respect. It appears now with some important additions, and has its value also much enhanced by copies of three characteristic portraits of Emerson, at the ages of forty-four, fifty-five, and seventy years respectively. The volume, too, is now in every way satisfactory in its outward form. The well-executed biographical sketch which occupies a little more than a third part of the book, has been worked over again, and made somewhat fuller, and will be very acceptable, especially to those who have not got Mr. Ireland's "authorities" to consult—chief among them Mr. G. W. Cooke's *Life and Writings of Emerson*.† The portion which is in a special sense the author's own personal contribution to our knowledge of Emerson, is contained in some forty pages of recollections of his visits to England in 1833, 1847-8, and 1872-3, followed by thirty pages of letters chiefly addressed to his young English friend and disciple. The Recollections, which have been considerably extended, and the familiar letters, give, in a very pleasant way, some characteristics of the guest whom Mr. Ireland was fortunate enough to be one of the first to welcome to our shores. The two or three specimens of his letters to Carlyle are just enough to give us an inkling of the high intellectual pleasure which Prof. C. Norton, as editor of the complete correspondence between the two great men, is preparing for us.

The rest of the volume is made up of miscellaneous records, gathered from many different quarters, containing estimates of the character and teaching of the philosopher, anecdotes, and recollections which had been set down by friends and by the many admirers who went on their pleasant pilgrimage to the genial oracle of Concord. Amongst the most interesting of the additions to this part of the book are the fervent and eloquent tributes which were paid to Emerson's memory at a special meeting of the Massachusetts Historical Society. Of these addresses the gem is the one given by Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes—so delicately sympathetic, so happy in its touches of poetical fancy and kindly humour, so clear and certain in its insight. Amongst the writers who have been drawn upon for reminiscences of Emerson at home or on the platform, are Miss Bremer, M. D. Conway, G. W. Curtis, Bronson Alcott, G. J. Holyoake, Walt Whitman. Some pages are given from Mr. Frothingham's *Transcendentalism in New England* about Brook Farm, and from Mr. Curtis's lively sketch of some of the picturesque and amusing aspects of that famous social experiment. Then come passages from the sermon in which Emerson resigned his pulpit and gave up the Unitarian

* *Ralph Waldo Emerson: his Life, Genius, and Writings. A Biographical Sketch.* By ALEXANDER IRELAND. Second edition, largely augmented. Three Autotype Portraits. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co. 1882.

† Reviewed in the *Modern Review*, April, 1882, p. 425.

ministry in 1832. And there are reports of three of his public speeches, including the one on Burns, of which Mr. Lowell said that "every word seemed to have just dropped from the clouds."

We have said enough to show how much there is that is interesting and serviceable in Mr. Ireland's book. It has a distinct place of its own amongst the contributions to the Emersonian literature, of which a useful list is given in its concluding pages, and which may be consulted by readers who want more reminiscences and opinions and estimates to assist them in their studies. For our own part, with Mr. Cooke's book, and Mr. Ireland's, on our shelves, together with the one which is the subject of our next notice, we are very well content now to wait for the full, authentic records, first in the Carlyle-Emerson letters, shortly to be published, and then in the final Memoir. We only wish that Messrs. Macmillan would make haste and give us the beautiful edition of Emerson's writings which they have promised, so that we might be spared the discomfort of poring over the small and crowded type of the only English edition which is at present to be had.

Mr. Moncure Conway's book* which we have referred to above as completing our trio of Emersonian volumes, is, in some respects, the most original and characteristic of the three, and, on the whole, will probably prove the most attractive. It has a somewhat wider range of interest in certain directions, associating with Emerson, as the central figure and pervading presence, many of the other dwellers in that charmed circle of high friendships and generous schemes and fruitful work which had its centre at Concord. Mr. Conway writes as one who was in the secrets of that choice society—if, indeed, it had any secrets which were not open ones to all who cared to know and feel the charm of that bright, hopeful, quietly-glowing life of high thought and plain living which is so attractive and so inspiring.

In the graceful and harmonious prelude to his book, the author tells us how, when he was on the eve of his mission as a Methodist preacher on circuit in Maryland, he met, in some chance number of a magazine, with a sentence of Emerson's which changed the whole course of his life. Presently he received, as he says, "his marching orders," in reply to the letter which he had ventured to send, posting it "with a feeling that it was addressed to some impersonal spirit, dwelling in a spiritual realm, harmoniously called Concord, whom it would never reach." There is a pleasant account of his introduction, in due course, to the man to whom he owed his deliverance from bonds, and who gave him the welcoming word, and the smile "which was the break of a new day." "Many years after I read that one in paradise was asked how he got there, and replied, "One day as Buddha passed by he smiled on me."

Here Mr. Conway is in his best and happiest mood, and prepares us to enjoy and not to criticise; and we may say that there is little in the book that is not in keeping with these meditations and reminiscences, dated

* *Emerson at Home and Abroad*. By MONCURE DANIEL CONWAY. London: Trübner. 1883.

"the Vigil of Emerson." It is only now and then that he seems to forget his master's rule of beautiful candour, and tolerance, and breadth of sympathy. In his impatience of anything which he deems narrow or retrograde, he is slow to admit that there is any progress or freedom in paths which lead in any other direction than that in which he has gone. He appears to believe that the Unitarians really thought that Emerson was insane because, like the Quakers, he did not hold to the ordinance of the Lord's Supper, and because he began to preach some mystical doctrines which were strange to current creeds of heterodoxy.

No doubt the Unitarians of that generation did meet with shocks and perplexities, and had presently to consider some things that had not been dreamt of in their philosophy. We suppose in Mr. Conway's own case his spiritual education took a little time ; and it is not every individual, still less every Church, that can get along as fast as he has done. But we should have thought that he knew enough of the lives and the faith of such men as Dr. Channing and Henry Ware, to have been able to assure himself that the Church in which they, and others like them, found a religious home, was not held together by a "Christianity made easy ; New England theology with none of its crosses, but all of its comforts, adapted by scholars to suit spiritual epicures ;" and we do not see either wit or wisdom in saying that "between the Universalists, who believed God too good to damn them, and the Unitarians, who believed they were too good to be damned, respectability was able to make itself quite comfortable." However, we know that it pleases Mr. Conway to say this sort of thing, and it does not hurt anybody in particular. We should hardly have noticed it had he not said, when he began to write, that the smile with which his friend had taken his last farewell of him should not be changed to a frown by any sentence in the book ; and we think the tributes of love and honour which Mr. Conway records as having been paid to Emerson's memory by so many of the leading men in the Unitarian churches, should have thrown a more kindly light on one or two pages of a more than half-forgotten controversy.

It is impossible in the course of a short notice to give any account of the various matters of strong personal interest which are to be found in Mr. Conway's book. There is a very pleasant chapter in which the life at Concord is pictured, and some of the dwellers or visitors there are sketched. Brook Farm is described, but not, apparently, from personal knowledge, G. W. Curtis and Nathaniel Hawthorne supplying most of the information. Hawthorne himself and his wife are the subjects of a very graceful and charming sketch ; and another chapter is devoted to the poet-naturalist, Thoreau. Accounts are given of Emerson's visits to England, which formed the subject of Mr. Ireland's *Recollections* ; but beside the matter which they have in common, the two writers have their own separate experiences to record.

There is a great deal that is very thoughtful and suggestive in all that the author says about the characteristics of Emerson's philosophy and his influence as a teacher and as an eminently beautiful type of high and noble intellectual and spiritual life. We can quote but one out of the

many sentences of true insight and appreciation which occur :—"An unspeakable awe-stricken reverence for virtue and wisdom ; a spirit ever kneeling before the universe as the transcendent temple of goodness and truth ; a horror at the thought of raising private interests before eternal principles and laws ; a faith not to be argued with, absolute, in personal righteousness as the condition of all worth, involving a sense of corruption in all qualities, however brilliant, which have not that foundation."

There is something very stirring and quickening in the picture of the calm-browed philosopher and man of letters going forth from the retirement of his peaceful home amongst the woods and orchards to take his part in the great anti-slavery battles. When slavery was approaching its death-struggle, it was with the old fervour and courage that he resumed his place among his anti-slavery comrades, and "not only at every critical point spoke the best and bravest word, but was as prompt to share any personal obloquy or danger as he had been in earlier years when he took Harriet Martineau to his house in the face of the mob."

Scattered through Mr. Conway's pages are many pleasant gleanings of anecdote, with reminiscences of intimate talk, scenes and incidents which he has done excellently well in rescuing from oblivion. We do not know exactly how many of the chapters have appeared before as articles in magazines and journals, or how much has been done in the way of supplying connecting links, or in giving harmony of tone and proportion to the whole. But the author has succeeded in making a very pleasant, readable book, with a unity and marked literary quality of its own. One thing we may now confidently say about Emerson, that the more we know of his character, from the merest accident of his outward life to the inmost heart of his being, the more noble, and admirable a type of manhood will he seem to be ; and we need not wait till the whole history of his life has been told to claim for him a place of high honour among the world's very best and truest men.

MR. CAINE'S RECOLLECTIONS OF DANTE ROSSETTI.*

MR. HALL CAINE'S memorial of a brief but intimate friendship with one of the few men of original genius among the poets and artists of our time has an interest which, on the whole, is a sad one. It gives only too faithful a picture of a fine sensitive nature that was not strong enough to bear the burden of a heavy life-sorrow, a mind grown morbid and self-tormenting, and a will fretting itself away against shadows. We do not mean that this is the prevailing impression that would be produced by the complete view of the poet's life which has yet to be given, and which we shall receive, it is to be hoped, from the hand which, of all others, is most entirely competent to the task—that of Mr. Theodore Watts. Mr. Caine's record is naturally the most vivid and interesting when he writes from his own personal knowledge of

* *Recollections of Dante Gabriel Rossetti.* By T. HALL CAINE. London: Elliot Stock. 1882.

his friend ; and this is confined to the last two years or less, when the fatal results were becoming ever more painfully evident of the resort to chloral as a deliverer from the torments of insomnia, from which he had suffered since the terribly sad death of his wife after two short years of happiness. It was not till too late, says Mr. Caine, that "he learned the sad truth . . . that the fumes of this dreadful drug would one day wither up his hopes and joys in life, deluding him with a short-lived surcease of pain, only to impose a terrible legacy of suffering from which there was to be no respite."

Before telling the story of the beginning and course of his own intimacy with Rossetti, Mr. Caine gives a slight general outline of the poet's life, with some characteristics of his boyhood and youth, and a glance at the circumstances and training which had the most influence on his career, with some mention of the comrades with whom he worked and dreamed. In writing of the things which did not come within his own ken, Mr. Caine wisely confines himself to a very few pages ; and the chief part of the introductory matter consists in careful analyses and criticisms of Rossetti's more important poems, and of the one picture, "Dante's Dream," by which his reputation as an artist will be most surely established. We commend Mr. Caine's critical account of the poems to those of our readers especially who remember Mr. Buchanan's notorious article on "The Fleshly School of Poetry," and who have a lingering feeling that there was any ground for the attempt to identify Rossetti with an odious school of writers, happily never naturalised in England, who have glorified the lowest life of sense and dragged every high and pure feeling into the mud. A dozen pages are devoted to the disagreeable subject of this attack, which inflicted a deep and irremediable wound on the poet, and the cruel injustice of which the critic acknowledged, with compunction, when it was too late to undo the mischief. We cannot attempt any critical estimate of Rossetti's poetry here. It would not in all respects, perhaps, coincide with the one which Mr. Caine has given. But we are bound, at least, to say that we agree with him in saying that there is not a line of which the motive is not perfectly pure ; and we quote with pleasure a stanza from Mr. Buchanan's dedication of one of his later books "To an old Enemy" :—

Pure as thy purpose, blameless as thy song,
Sweet as thy spirit, may this offering be ;
Forget the bitter blame that did thee wrong,
And take the gift from me !

Mr. Caine's acquaintance with Rossetti was confined at first to a correspondence which extended over two years. This was followed by one year of frequent personal intercourse, after which the two friends became housemates together for the short remainder of the poet's darkening life. The numerous extracts from the correspondence, and the reminiscences of conversation, are full of interest, both for the impressions they give of Rossetti's character, and for the various literary and artistic judgments they contain both on his own works and on the writers whom he and

his correspondent and friend discussed together in letters or in talk. We regret that we have no room for quotations from some of the many pages headed by the names of Chatterton, Coleridge, Keats, or Wordsworth.

The reader will learn from Mr. Caine many interesting particulars about the poet's works. He will have a curious feeling about the first volume of *Poems* when he knows that its chief contents were buried in the young wife's coffin, and years afterwards restored to light with much remorse and self-reproach. He will read of the friendly stratagem by which, after a long period of illness and gloom, Rossetti was cured of the delusion that he had finally lost the power of making poetry, and how, by a challenge of his ability to compass the simple, direct, and emphatic style of the ballad proper, he was presently led to write the stirring ballads, "The White Ship" and "The King's Tragedy." For these and other such matters, and for a variety of character sketches and personal recollections, sometimes amusing, often painful enough, and always interesting, we acknowledge our debt to Mr. Caine. He undertook a task which must have been in many ways a trying one; and for the way in which he has accomplished it he has well deserved the thanks of every admirer of Dante Rossetti's genius.

LAWS OF LIFE AFTER THE MIND OF CHRIST.*

THIS much wished-for and much-needed volume has reached us so late in the quarter that we can at present give it little more than a welcome. It is inscribed to the Rev. James Martineau and Dr. W. B. Carpenter, as "respectively representing the ministers and laymen at whose desire it has been published." It should carry some significance in any anticipatory estimate of its value, that such men as these desired its publication and desired it because they knew what was sure to be in it. There is in these active times of ours such a rush of thought, such a rapidity of conclusion, such a haste and yet positiveness of conviction, such a jump at results on partial data, and such a miscalculation of the bearing of these data on wider and larger questions, that it requires a very strong hand indeed to induce us to pause and re-weigh matters.

For this cannot be done by any one who is not fully abreast of the existing state of knowledge and criticism—and in full sympathy, too, with all that is real and sound in it—admitting freely and willingly any proved fact of what has sometimes been most vaguely termed "hostile and destructive" criticism of records, and yet refusing to allow it more influence in great truths than legitimately belongs to it.

In this state of things it is of great interest and moment to receive the distinct and distinctive utterances of a perfectly independent and very mature thinker like the author of these discourses, and find him standing at last—after all this shifting panorama—in the immovability of an old

* *Laws of Life after the Mind of Christ. Discourses* by JOHN HAMILTON THOM.

and unchanged conviction. We do not say that everybody may integrally accept that conviction, but every one capable of thinking must respect it, for all such must see that everything with this writer is pondered thoroughly out and proved, if not absolutely, to what is to his own mind at least, after test upon test, its true foundation. In the opening sentences of the volume we find the key to his thoughts of Christianity as "The Impersonation of the Love that is in God":—

It was taken for granted that Christianity must have an unique essence, whereas its distinction is in having an unique fulfilment. It was forgotten that its supreme characteristic, Catholicity—the intuitive recognition of its intrinsic beauty by every soul that is alive—its power, wherever it can show its presence, to kindle life in souls that before seemed dead—are inconsistent with unshared attributes, with the isolation of a nature separated from the fundamental aptitudes and sympathies of human kind. Nothing that is catholic can be peculiar, except in the degree in which it develops and harmonises common properties.

Christianity has its crowning distinction; but this does not consist in introducing new elements into the spiritual world; it consists in perfecting, above all, in impersonating what was already there. Christ came to make all things new; but renewal is not innovation or reversal; it is exactly the opposite. It is building upon the ancient foundations, it is growth from the original stock. Christianity is not the root of whatever is good in human nature, for that was in it from the beginning, its inspiration and its law; nor is it the flower, the promise of the complete outcome, for that also was before in saints and prophets and all good men's lives; it is the consummation, the full-rounded fruit, and that never was before, and except approximately, alas! never has been since. Christ introduced no new germ into the human constitution; man was made in God's image; he combined the elements in a symmetry, only foreshadowed as an ideal until he showed it in the actual, and quickened the real, ruling, nature that is in us into consciousness and tension by revealing in life the end for which we all are living. Christ came not to preach any new doctrine, but to make the Truth, the everlasting gospel of the life of God in the soul of man, known in its substance, in its concrete presentation (pp. 1, 2).

Now, though nothing could be more complete than this statement, of itself, it is not left alone. It is followed up in the remainder of this very striking and high-toned discourse. It is explained, amplified, buttressed, so to speak, by detailed illustration. For this is one of the characteristics of Mr. Thom's style—as it was of Dr. Chalmers's and Dr. Channing's—that blow upon blow is dealt in the argument, till the truth intended to be enforced is firmly welded, and line added to line and colour laid on colour, till the picture of the thought comes out as clear, yes, and as warm, as sunshine. The Discourse entitled "The Universality of Christianity" still further illustrates this main position, where the universality is shown not in the usual way of extent of reception and adaptation, but in its faculty of covering all the ground, developing all the powers and meeting all the wants of our entire nature, so that even now "we are no nearer to any exhaustion of the riches that are in Christ than we are to having scaled the heavens when we reach a mountain's top."

And the volume spreads out to the enforcement of great lessons of practical value, issuing forth from these foundation truths. Such headings as these—"Circumstance, the Unspiritual God," "No Supererogation in Spiritual Service," "Brotherhood towards the Unattractive and the

Repellent," "Spiritual Counterparts to Temptation and Despondency," "Quiet from God," "From the Seen to the Unseen," indicate the reach of the subjects, besides many others apparently more directly practical, such as "Knowing and Doing," "The Judging Spirit," "The Morality of Temper," "Self-Denial," "Disquiet of Spirit." But the speciality of all these Discourses is the philosophic spirit in which all matters are treated. Not that they are philosophical Discourses. They are Discourses on the actual religious life, but they are all written in a philosophical spirit. The acute and penetrating discernment of motives, the searching insight into varieties of character and act, and into the subtle doubtings of the soul, interesting and impressive and instructive in themselves, are made still more so by the profound expositions of roots and causes by which they are enriched.

We do not ourselves know many—we might, perhaps, say any—natures, however high and pure, that this book would not have the power, if not of making higher and purer, yet certainly of fortifying, helping and holding up, in whatever heights they might have attained; though, no doubt, the old saying is true again here, that it is only those that have ears to hear that will be able to hear—these sounds as from the spheres.

It would be doing entire injustice to these Discourses to read them quickly through, one after another. They should be read as they were written, in stillness and quiet—deliberately and meditatively, each leaving its impress on the soul with no risk of erasure even by a worthy successor, or of being turned into *palimpsests*. Before our further notice can appear most of our readers will, no doubt, be in possession of the volume itself—we do not mean in the material form alone, but in mental possession of most of its contents. Happy shall we be if now or hereafter, by anything we may say, we shall be able to help them still more fully to realise the value and richness of the possession.

X.

SOME AMERICAN BOOKS.

FROM America come several volumes dealing with the subject of religion, both in its controversial and its devotional aspects, and deserving more adequate notice than we can give them here. There is, however, less in them to criticise and discuss than to read with sympathy and general agreement.

Perhaps this remark applies least exactly to Mr. S. J. STEWART'S *Gospel of Law: a Series of Discourses upon Fundamental Church Doctrines*. Mr. Stewart has a trenchant way of putting things from his radical point of view, which, at any rate, serves his purpose of forcing the reader to reconsider some things which he may too lightly have taken for granted. His principal object, he says, is "to apply the facts of science to inherited doctrines, and then to give a positive basis of belief and conduct in consistency with these facts;" and he considers that no essential argument in the volume "is based on anything that is not absolutely proved." We think he is rather over-confident here, and he is apt, like other people, to think things are absolutely proved when

they are proved to his own satisfaction. On the whole, however, he keeps to fairly certain ground, and it is some of his conclusions rather than his premises that we are occasionally inclined to question. He certainly has the art of arresting the attention and making his reader think, and he is thoroughly alive to the vital significance of the doctrines which he discusses.

The anonymous author of *Ecce Spiritus : a Statement of the Spiritual Principles of Jesus as the Law of Life*, has brought to the study of Christ and his doctrine a very thoughtful and devout spirit, and a sympathy without which it is impossible to know what is the true spiritual power and inner meaning of Christianity. Like all true Liberals, he welcomes all the light which science affords and heartily accords it its legitimate claims; and he writes for those who, like himself, are fully sensible of the extent to which the revelations of science have affected traditional dogmas and ways of thinking, but who cannot rest in negative results, and who "are not wholly without hope of a possible meeting ground between faith and fact." Such a hope will, we think, be strengthened by much that the author advances. The reader will not fail to admire the candour and earnestness which characterise the book. Perhaps the style would be more effective if it were more concise, and if there were more salient points to mark the course of the argument. But if our attention sometimes flags, we are ready to confess, on taking the book up again in a fresher and more sympathetic mood, that it was our impatience that was chiefly to blame.

MR. GEORGE S. MERRIAM has considered some of the same questions in his essay entitled *The Way of Life*. It is a study of the character of Christ, the result of an inquiry as to what elements of Christianity are to be considered true and permanent, and what must be regarded as transitory, and, for us, no longer serviceable. The author has "looked upon Jesus as a man only, with no superhuman nature or miraculous powers, but having in himself the elements of character which give to life its value and its true significance." The revelation of what the life of a true son of God should be is treated as the essential revelation in Jesus. There are some extremely suggestive remarks in the Introduction on the way in which the portrait of the Christ has been "idealised by the love and veneration of eighteen centuries. Whatever trait of fidelity, heroism, sacrifice, tenderness, faith, has risen upon the vision of hearts schooled in experiences of love and anguish and triumph, has been attributed to the divine Christ, and has blended with the portrait handed on in glowing radiance from age to age." It is not our ideal of manhood or our faith in God that is at stake upon the results of historical criticism. And whether we omit from our conception of the character of Jesus some things which seem difficult to harmonise with the rest, or whether we allow the religious imagination to present in some respects an ideal image which we cannot historically verify; still the transcendent significance of that life remains, and it is revealed in "the multitude that no man can number who have been inspired, each in his degree, by a courage, a love, a faith, akin to that of Jesus." The main essay, which forms only a third part of

the book, is followed by what are called "Open Letters," in which are set forth some aspects of life as it might be if it were really penetrated by the Christian idea. They are written in a frank and hopeful spirit, and the style of the whole book is bright, clear, and unaffected. It is a little book of very modest pretensions, but it is one which both conservatives and radicals in religion may study with distinct advantage.

A Year of Miracle: a Poem in Four Sermons, by W. C. GANNETT forms a very dainty little volume. As may be guessed, each of the four seasons of the year forms the topic of a discourse, and thoughts appropriate to the Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter of the natural world are connected with the seasons of human life. The author glorifies in his poetical prose the beauties and wonders and gifts of Nature, partly for the mere delight of picturing them, but more for the sake of the divine meanings, which need no didactic applications, but are plain for all who have eyes to see and hearts to feel. Mr. Gannett has a keen and discerning eye for the symbols and lessons of the outward world, and he delights in showing how the teachings of science heighten, instead of destroying, the poetry of Nature, by giving fresh food for the imagination, and deepening the sense of awe and wonder and admiration. He has given us some choice specimens of this poetry in his very charming and original little book.

There must be many of our readers to whom the name of Henry Ware is dear, and who have not forgotten him as a teacher of pure Christian morality, both by his writings, and still more, perhaps, by the record of his good life. They will turn with interest and expectation to the volume of sermons which has been published as a memorial of the ministry of his son, JOHN F. L. WARE, under the title, taken from the sermon with which it opens, *Wrestling and Waiting*. The friends who have made the selection have added a few grateful words of affectionate remembrance of what their pastor was "in home and camp, church and school." The sermons seldom touch upon any burning questions of controversy, and they pass over unnoticed points which might provoke criticism. They treat of the inner life of the soul, and the life of practical duty and devotion. They are characterised by plain and faithful speech, with that quiet trust in God, and belief in the unseen divine life, which helps us by sympathy and insight to realise the things of which it tells. Perhaps the most characteristic sermons are those on such subjects as "Seasons of Quiet," "Gentle Influences," "Silent Building." The only controversial sermon—and the polemical tone is almost absent from it—is the one entitled "None but Christ." It is a plain and unpretending utterance of the Unitarianism which is practically unaffected by the disturbing influences of what is called negative criticism and radicalism in theology, and which, if it does not contribute much towards a solution of the more difficult problems of modern religious thought, offers a place of quiet and of religious communion, and of fellowship with the spirit of Christ, where some of the purest and most deeply religious souls have found rest and have gained courage and strength for their life's work.

The volumes which we have thus briefly and imperfectly characterised

are published at Boston, by Mr. G. H. Ellis, and have come to us with the additional imprint of Messrs. Trübner and Co., London; as also have the following, which we have received from Messrs. Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., of Boston.

The Lord's Prayer: Seven Homilies, by WASHINGTON GLADDEN, was suggested by Mr. Ruskin's question, whether a definition of the Gospel "acceptable to the entire body of the Church of Christ, might not be arrived at by explaining, in their completeness and life, the terms of the Lord's Prayer—the first words taught to children all over the Christian world." It is by no means the first time that the attempt has been made to connect an exposition of the essentials of the Christian life with the clauses of the Lord's Prayer. Probably it is never done without putting more into them than actually belongs to them in their directness and simplicity. As an instance of this we might cite Mr. Gladden's exposition of the clause about our daily bread, which is said to teach five distinct lessons. 1—Our dependence on Him to whom we pray. 2—It is daily bread, i.e., only plain and simple food, no luxuries. 3—It is our daily bread, or, it may be, sufficient for the day, not a superfluity. 4—It is our daily bread—ours only when we have earned it, not when we have got it by extortion, speculation, or dishonesty. 5—The petition is "give us," and it has regard to the necessities of all humanity. On all these points the author has admirable lessons to teach, only we can hardly agree with him that in this instance, and in some others, he has "not strained one word beyond its obvious and natural sense." Not that we find any fault with him for doing so in view of the excellent practical religious teaching, which forms the substance of his homilies.

On the Threshold, by THEODORE T. MUNGER, is a specimen, and a good one, of the numerous class of books written for the benefit of young men "beginning life." It is full of good sense and practical wisdom, and appreciation of all the healthy interests and the keen and hearty enjoyments of a vigorous life. There are excellent chapters on Health, Books, Amusements, Manners, Friends and Companions; and the author throughout has been mindful of his promise to his readers: "If they find some pages that are strenuous in their suggestions, they will find none that are keyed to impossible standards of conduct, or filled with moralisings that are remote from the everyday business of life." The author addresses himself to the youth of his own country especially. But young people on this side the Atlantic would find little or nothing in his book which does not suit their own case.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF RELIGION.*

HERR HAPPEL has written a very excellent brochure on Christianity in its relation to the comparative history of religions, which we have read with great interest. In a pamphlet of just ninety pages he

* *Das Christenthum und die heutige vergleichende Religionsgeschichte.* Von JULIUS HAPPEL. Prediger der Reformirten Gemeinde zu Bützow. Leipzig: Otto Schulze. 1882.

explodes the old arbitrary division of religions into one true and many false, and shows how such a view is totally incompatible with scientific or impartial investigation. In his introduction he recognises that the ancients had a presentiment, though only a presentiment, of the true nature of the problem of comparative theology. He remarks how the early Church fathers acknowledged in the best forms of pagan faith a kind of "natural Christianity," how they long endeavoured to explain affinities, now on the hypothesis of plagiarism, now on that of an original revelation, and now on that of a later special extra-Judaic or extra-Christian revelation, and how the correct solution of the problem could not be attained so long as all religions were tried by that of the Jews, as an absolute standard of truth. In his first chapter he vindicates the proposition that the comparative history of religion cannot fail to result in a more comprehensive and juster comprehension of Christianity itself. In Chapter II. he insists that Christianity can only be properly understood as the outcome of national life, and dwells on the contributions made by Herder to this conception of the subject.

Yet he allows that this consideration does not exhaust the question of the origin of Christianity, but that the latter presupposes the creative genius of an individual mind; while, at the same time, the immense amount of preparation which the course of history had brought about for the reception of the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth must never be lost sight of. Not only, however, in relation to the past but equally to the future development of Christianity is the comparative study of religions of paramount importance. Nor must we neglect in this consideration even the most elementary and rudest forms of faith. Only from the standpoint of historical development can the wide consensus of so many nations in favour of Christianity appear in its full significance, and only when the previous contributions of mankind at large towards the solution of the religious problem are acknowledged can the services of Christ be appraised at their true worth.

In all religions an outward investiture and an inner essence are to be distinguished, and this no less in Christianity than the rest. Like all other forms of faith Christianity has had a perfectly normal and natural growth. Like all others, too, it has a special genius of its own, which is not to be discovered solely by a study of the New Testament Scriptures, but equally from a comparison of the life of Christian with that of non-Christian races. It is by this means that the individuality of its founder will become manifest, and we shall thus obtain a criterion by which to separate the essential from the accidental in historical forms of Christianity. The above are the main theses worked out by the writer in detail, with abundant illustration from eminent authors, and with a vast array of learning and research, of which the results appear compressed into a small compass. The writer concludes as follows:—"The comparative history of religions as it is destined henceforth to be studied will be able most thoroughly and comprehensively to bring to light the real excellence of Christianity, because it is best able to take from it its pretended advantages, to strip it of its plumes and trappings, to show up its angularities

and points, to pull down the walls that bar the prospect, and set the observer on mountain heights, whence he can survey the whole domain of the religious life of mankind. There it will appear that the excellence of Christianity consists not in monstrosities, in supernatural doctrines, in mysteries inconceivable by human reason, as incarnation, inspiration, or so-called miraculous narratives, as the removing of mountains, &c., but in what is simplest, most natural, most human of all, but, nevertheless, is commonly the last to occur to men's minds; something which is found, indeed, in other religions, but nowhere else so set in the centre as it is in Christianity, so made the core and pivot of religious faith and life. Just in the fact that the Christian religion, in its essence, in its fundamental elements (love to God and man), when once recognised, is so simple, so obvious, so easy even for a child to understand, resides its true grandeur and the unique service it renders to the life of humanity."

E. M. G.

PROFESSOR LESLEY ON MAN'S ORIGIN AND DESTINY.*

THE present volume is the second edition of a work published twelve years ago, with the addition of six new lectures containing the author's "vision of the World and the wonders that shall be." Doubtless this has long haunted his brain; and it is interesting to know what a man of position in the scientific world, speaking from the standpoint of the physical sciences, has to say on so fascinating a subject.

Our author commences by reminding us that the physical destiny of our race on this earth will depend, first on the astronomical future of our globe, and that this, in turn, depends upon the sun and its spots, with which famines are associated as effect to cause. Hence in the future famines will be at least foreseen. But arguing from meteorological considerations, he asserts that there is no fear that the early or latter rains should fail the husbandman. The observations made a century or two centuries hence will teach men "how to engross their habitations on wholesome places, how to purify the atmosphere of cities from noxious vapours, how to foretell storms and to prevent shipwrecks." By the use of the telegraph and the telephone "the best choice of methods and means at the least possible outlay of the capitalised wealth of the world will be made" and "Christianity will be unified." Geographical maps which now lie, when they lie, "with the extraordinary force of all dramatic action, as compared with verbal statement," will, in the future, be more accurately drawn—to these will be added underground contour maps, and charts of the sea bottom; while the comparison of one century's maps with those of successive centuries will give an authentic history of the earth's changes.

* *Man's Origin and Destiny, sketched from the Platform of the Physical Sciences.* By J. P. LESLEY, Professor of Geology in the University of Pennsylvania, &c., &c. Second Edition, enlarged. London: Trübner and Co. 1881.

By the aid of the Chemistry of the future the waste of raw material will be eliminated from human industry. With iron and coal, and the machines which can be made by their aid, "the destiny of man is made safe." In Geology the Diamond Drill is destined to inaugurate the future study of the, as yet untouched, profounder depths of the under world. In Natural History the catalogue of living and extinct creatures will be completed, and the fullest information will be acquired concerning them. Man will more and more assert his lordship over the lower world, but instead of turning the luxuriance of Nature into a wilderness will change the desert itself into a watered garden. Man will be freed from medical as from all other kinds of superstition. "Air, water, food, sleep, work, pleasure, and cleanliness, are destined to resume the pharmacopœia of the future." Hence a gain of quantity, not of quality. The race will not be stronger than the best individuals of the race are now, but there will be more strong and capable individuals.

Under the head of the social destiny of the race the writer utters a very definite political prophecy, and discerns that "the first great event of the future will be the taking of Constantinople." A wise government established there is to absorb Austria and Greece, European Russia, Asia Minor, Syria, Arabia, and Northern Africa, and hold in check Italy, France, and Spain. This wise government will be just and benevolent. The whole human race—except the privileged owners of real estate, and the lawyers, politicians, and soldiers their retainers—the whole human race entertain the profound conviction implanted by Nature and cultivated by the experience of life, that ownership is based on creation and confirmed by use alone. The destiny of man is to prove this conviction true, and to illustrate the truth of it in the future. In manufactures the skill of man has exhausted itself. With respect to finance, it seems likely that every separate interest of society will have its weight in determining legislative enactments, and that a just balance of all interests will be represented by a frequently modified, but generally consistent, system of internal taxes and foreign imports. However highly educated people may become, the hope of the future will always depend upon a band of honest experts whom the people can trust and to whom they can delegate the power to tax. But there will always be two classes of financiers, and between them the Protectionist practice will occupy the happy mean. To the question, Will war ever cease? our author replies that nations will put away their standing armies when there are no more kings and nobles, but only artisans and tradesmen, scholars and physicians and artists left in the land, with here and there a thief, a sot, or an imbecile, who will be cared for, each in a proper way.

The government of the future will (perhaps) be a republican hierarchy: the two main principles of which are: 1. No man has a right to express an opinion who does not know the subject. 2. Popular suffrage must be localised within the limits of personal acquaintance.

It is idle to ask if the practical will ever supplant the imaginative—"as well ask if the genius of creation is exhausted; as well ask if the heart of the world is destined to chronic ossification or fatty degeneration.

In the future, however, the higher education must ever remain the privilege of a portion of the population. There will be for *all* sufficient good, but no more, and to secure this, education must be compulsory—women must be educated on a full equality with men, and the sexes must be educated together. In the future, philanthropy will be the “science of Hygiene respecting Roguery in Society.” When beggars pretend they are starving they must be made to starve in reality, and so become enlightened on some points which only starving beggars can understand. By organised charity the philanthropic victories of the future will be won.

The future of Religion is not to be found in the Millennium which the sectarian spirit pictures as the triumph of its particular tenets. Education will make men more conscientious and more merciful, and they will consequently form a higher conception of God. This will cause “a direct gravitation towards the religion of Jesus, or to that element which is common to Confutzeism, Mahometanism, and Christianity. . . No creed can stand the fire of modern and future science; no rewards in heaven, or punishments in hell, will be either desired or anticipated. When all men have learned to act on the fundamental principle: Be God’s child and man’s brother, Christ will have, indeed, come the second time to rule and bless the world.”

Such is a brief abstract of the newer portion—the prophetic part—of Prof. Lesley’s work. Possibly enough has been said to indicate the drift of the book. Clearly the modern prophet, like the more ancient one, is affected by his nationality, mingles unproved theories with established principles, is general rather than particular, although, as we have seen, he is clear on one detail, inasmuch as the commencement of his Millennium is to be coincident with the capture of Constantinople. Perhaps the writer has gone a little beyond the title of the book, and discussed more problems than can be “sketched from the platform of the physical sciences;” but it is certain that ere all his hopes are achieved, we shall have to follow the advice of the President of the British Association, and learn to labour and to wait.

C. C. C.

MR. ADAMS’ DEFENCE OF THE ZOOPHILISTS.*

THE little book which has for its defiant title *The Coward Science*, is professedly an answer, on behalf of the Victoria-street Society for the Protection of Animals from Vivisection, to the attack made upon it by Professor Owen in his recent publication called *Experimental Physiology*; but it is, in fact, a general defence of the position of the Zoophilists, and a restatement, in language adapted to the understanding of ordinary lay readers, of the principal arguments against the practice of vivisection.

Mr. Adams makes a lively defence of himself and his employers, and

* *The Coward Science. Our Answer to Professor Owen.* By CHARLES ADAMS, “Paid Secretary” to the Victoria-street Society. London: Hatchards. 1882.

retaliates vigorously on his opponents, and his readers, even if not convinced by his arguments, cannot fail to carry away a clearer idea of the real questions at issue. The earlier portion of the book is devoted to a defence against the purely personal attacks of Professor Owen, and the author has no difficulty in making some good points against him. But what makes the book of real value to all who are interested in the question is the remarkably clear and powerful refutation of the claims made by Professor Owen and his friends for the vivisectional discoveries of Hunter, Harvey, and Lister. So far as the discussion has at present gone, Mr. Adams appears to have decidedly the best of it; and unless some clear and straightforward reply to his arguments with regard to these claims be speedily produced by the other side, it is not too much to say that the large majority of readers will be of opinion that the vivisectionists have been worsted on their own chosen ground.

Notwithstanding our sense of the effectiveness of Mr. Adams' vigorous attack it is impossible not to regret that a question so serious and so important as that of vivisection cannot be discussed in a calmer way than is the practice at present. It is not too much to say that one calm and really fair statement of the arguments on either side will bring us nearer to a conclusion of the question than years of sharp partisan practice.

HENRY BOWYEAR.

SOME OTHER BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS.

WE can only say a few words of appreciation of two admirable addresses given at Manchester New College, London. The first is an *Address to the Theological Students, delivered at the close of the Session 1881—2*, by Rev. H. W. CROSSKEY, LL.D. (Manchester: Johnson and Rawson). Its subject is the relation between the work of the student and the Christian minister; and the importance is shown of a wide and liberal intellectual culture, including a knowledge of the methods and theories of modern science, as an essential part of the preparation for the ministry. The other address, entitled *Religion and Liberty* (Williams and Norgate), was given at the opening of the present college session by Professor JAMES DRUMMOND. It is an earnest plea for mental freedom in the study of theology and of all questions relating to religion, as a necessary condition of religious vitality and of the development of the spiritual life. Dr. Drummond takes a hopeful view of the present aspects of religious controversy; and he thinks that two important spiritual gains can already be discovered. "In the first place men are being thrown back upon the inner resources and primary essentials of religion; in other words, they are more genuinely religious. . . . And secondly, as a consequence of this, there is an increasing unity of spirit."

The Doctrine of the Cross, by Rev. E. P. SCRYMGOUR (G. Bell and Son), is an exposition of the doctrine of the community of sorrow and of

sacrifice. "In the act of sacrifice love is supported and informed by the light of Divine communion; and to bear that light in love is to enter into the sacrifice of Christ." The author keeps close to the realities of spiritual insight and experience; and his doctrine has very few points of contact indeed with the popular notions of the "scheme of salvation."

Reasonable Religion, by the Rev. D. P. FAURE, comes from Cape Town, where the author is minister of the Free Protestant Church. The volume contains nine thoughtful discourses on "Our Belief in God," and "Our Hope in Immortality." Mr. Faure's doctrine is practically the Theism of Theodore Parker, modified by some more recent ways of thinking and speaking on matters of religion. If we rightly understand his position, we wonder how he can think that the doctrine that there is nothing but "Nature self-originated and self-acting," differs only in name from his own Theism. In the same connection, however, he speaks of the self-styled atheist as acknowledging the existence of "Intelligence and Design," and if this is granted, of course the atheistic position is surrendered.

Nathan der Weise, edited with English Notes by Dr. BUCHHEIM, is the sixth volume of the German classics published at the Clarendon Press. The editor's name is a guarantee of careful and scholarly work, with a practical knowledge of the amount and kind of assistance which will be of most service to the student. Dr. Buchheim does not lose the opportunity of showing his appreciation not only of the literary quality of Lessing's great work, but of its noble lessons of charity and breadth of sympathy in religion; and the information he gives of the controversies which led to its production is very much to the point.

The following books, amongst others, must be reserved for future notice:—*The Life and Times of St. Anselm*, by Martin Rule, M.A. (Kegan Paul); *Life of Sir W. Rowan Hamilton*, by R. Perceval Graves, M.A. (Dublin: Hodges); *George Ripley*, by O. B. Frothingham (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co.); *The Legend of Thomas Didymus*, by J. Freeman Clarke (Boston: Lee and Shepard); *R. W. Emerson, an Estimate of his Character and Genius*, by A. Bronson Alcott (Boston: A. Williams); *Pearls of the Faith, or Islam's Rosary*, by Edwin Arnold, M.A. (Trübner); *The Gospel of the Secular Life*, by the Hon. W. H. Fremantle (Cassell); *The Evolution of Christianity* (Williams and Norgate).